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JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS, THINGS AND
STATUS
Kenneth M. Murchison*
Over the last hundied years American courts frequently have
struggled with the problem of developing an adequate theory to deter-
mine when a court has jurisdiction to render a judgment binding on the
parties to a lawsuit. The issue remains significant because of the conti-
nuing validity of one of the rules that can be traced to the vererable
case of Pennoyer v. Neff:1 A judgment is valid under the due process
clause' and entitled to enforcement under the full faith and credit
clause' only if the court had jurisdiction with respect to the lawsuit
at the time the action was initiated. In applying this rule, Pennoyer
sharply distinguished between actions in personam and actions in
rem. It permitted a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction only
when the defendant was served personally with process within the
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In 1813 the Supreme Court ruled that, since the congres-
sional statute implementing the full faith and credit clause gave a judgment the same
effect it would have had in the state where it was rendered, the court that was receiv-
ing the judgment could not refuse to enforce it because the court rendering it lacked
jurisdiction. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). Accord, Hampton v. M'Con-
nel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818). Mr. Justice Johnson's dissent in Mills argued for the
limited exception to challenge jurisdiction that ultimately was accepted in Pennoyer;
his language sounds much like that later used by Mr. Justice Field in Pennoyer:
There are certain external principles of justice which never ought to be dispensed
with, and which Courts of justice never can dispense with but when compelled by
positive statute. One of those is, that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a
state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing
them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their
limits.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In their commentaries Kent and
Story (the author of the Court's opinion in Mills) later accepted the Johnson dissent as
a gloss on the Mills doctrine concerning the full faith and credit clause. 1 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 261 n.b (2d ed. 1832); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION 183 (1833). By 1850 the Supreme Court had adopted it as well. See
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). See generally Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 227-29 (1945); Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 346-48 (1945).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
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territorial boundaries of the state or voluntarily appeared;' but
dicta,5 later accepted as dogma,' allowed a court to-issue binding in
rem judgments whenever the property that formed the basis for
jurisdiction was attached or otherwise brought within the jurisdic-
tion of the court at the beginning of the action.
Although Pennoyer's distinction between in personam and in
rem actions was an enduring one, courts and legislatures gradually
whittled away the prohibition against rendering binding in per-
sonam judgments unless the defendant was served with process
within the state's boundaries. Finally, in 1947 the Supreme Court
promulgated a new rule in International Shoe Company v. Washing-
ton:7 A court can exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant who was not served with process within the state when-
ever the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state for that state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
During the same period that the Supreme Court was expanding
the power of state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents, it also approved quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as an alter-
nate device for reaching the absent defendant who owned property
within the state.' In quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the court based its
jurisdiction on the presence of property within the state, but the
dispute did not concern the title to the property as it did in the in
rem action. Instead, it concerned the defendant's liability on an
unrelated cause of action. In these actions the defendant's contacts
with the forum state were irrelevant; the presence of the property
alone was sufficient.
During the last several terms the Supreme Court has again
4. 95 U.S. at 733:
To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its
constitution-that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subject-matter
of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process
within the State, or his voluntary appearance.
5. Id. at 727: "Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized
form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings taken where
property, is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent
act." See id. at 733. The issue before the Court in Pennoyer was the validity of a per-
sonal judgment against Neff. Thus, the statements regarding in rem actions were not
essential to the Court's decision.
6. See, e.g., Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316
(1890); Huling v. Kaw Valley R.R. Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
215 (1905). See notes 86-89, infra, and accompanying text.
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returned to the question of when a state court has jurisdiction to
render binding judgments against nonresident defendants. The
general thrust of the Court's recent decisions has been to check the
common tendency of state courts to expand the limits of their juris-
diction. For one thing the Court has applied the International Shoe
test to quasi-in-rem actions. Shaffer v. Heitner' held that a state can-
not exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction with respect to defendants
who do not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state
to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice; in
January 1980 the Court applied the Shaffer holding to preclude a
court from establishing jurisdiction over a nonresident merely
because his insurance company does business within the forum state
where the plaintiff resides.0 Other recent decisions have limited a
state court's ability to render binding judgments over a nonresident
in support proceedings and tort actions."
This distinction between direct and indirect impacts led Mr.
develop a unified framework for approaching the problem of juris-
diction over the particular lawsuit. It begins with Pennoyer to
discover the basic principles on which jurisdiction rested during the
late nineteenth century. After tracing the application and modifica-
tion of Pennoyer in the twentieth century, it identifies the new prin-
ciples established by the modern Supreme Court decisions and sug-
gests how these principles should be applied in specific situations
that have arisen in the past and are likely to arise again. Finally, it
tries to place the jurisdictional cases within the broader framework
of American legal thought during the twentieth century.
PENNoYER V. NEFF: THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court's Decision
A brief summary of the facts giving rise to the Supreme Court's
decision in Pennoyer should suffice for the purposes of this article.
J. H. Mitchell sued Marcus Neff in an Oregon state court "upon a
demand for services as an attorney." Neff, a nonresident of Oregon,
was never personally served with process in the state; instead, Mit-
chell relied on constructive service by publication and Neff's owner-
ship of property in Oregon as the basis for the court's jurisdiction.
When Neff failed to appear in the action, Mitchell recovered a $300
default judgment. To execute the judgment, he had Neff's Oregon
9. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
10. Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
11. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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property seized and sold at a sheriff's sale. Pennoyer purchased the
property at the sale, and Neff then sued Pennoyer in circuit court
for the district of Oregon to recover possession of the property.'2
On appeal the Supreme Court held that Neff was entitled to the
property because the Oregon courts lacked jurisdiction to render
the original judgment pursuant to which the sheriff's sale was con-
ducted. Relying in large measure on concepts drawn from customary
international law, Mr. Justice Field began his mini-treatise on the
jurisdictional issue with "two well established principles of public
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over persons
and property": first, "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory";
and second, "that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons and property without its territory."'3
The first of these principles, each state's positive authority
within its own territorial boundaries, recognized broad powers in
every state, including the powers
to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its in-
habitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may con-
tract, the forms and solemnities with which their contracts
should be executed, the rights and obligations arising from
them, and the mode in. which their validity shall be determined
and their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner
and conditions upon which property situated within such terri-
tory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and
transferred."
Mr. Justice Field recognized that a state's actions with respect to
persons and property within its boundaries "often affect persons
12. Relying on defects in following Oregon's statutory requirements for obtaining
the affidavits required to obtain an order of publication and to prove publication, the
circuit court also had found the judgment against Neff invalid. Mr. Justice Field noted
that a majority of the Supreme Court would have reversed the decision of the circuit
court if the defects in the affidavits were the sole basis for decision since one affidavit
satisfied the statutory requirement and the sufficiency of the other could not be
collaterally attacked. 95 U.S. at 720-21.
13. Id at 722. For these two principles Mr. Justice Field relied on Joseph Story's
treatise on the conflict of laws. Id., citing J. STORY, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS c. 2 (1834). Story's concepts were subtle transformations of the theories of the
continental jurist Ulrich Huber. Continental political theory, therefore, was elevated to
constitutional mandate resulting in Pennoyer's rules of jurisdiction based on territory.
See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241,
258-61; Zammit, Quasi-in-rem Jurisdiction.: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 668, 669-70 (1975).
14. 95 U.S. at 722.
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and property without it."'5 Thus, the state court could require per-
sons within the state's boundaries to execute documents in a form
sufficient to transfer title to the property outside the state or it
could satisfy the claims of its own citizens against nonresidents out
of the property of nonresidents when the property was located
within the state. But, according to Mr. Justice Field, no just objec-
tion could be taken to these extra-territorial impacts, for they did
not amount to a violation of the independence of any other state;
only a "direct exertion of authority" upon persons and property out-
side the state, such as by attempting to give state laws extra-
territorial effect or to assume an extra-territorial jurisdiction for the
state's courts, amounted to a violation of the second principle that
protected the "independence of the State in which the persons are
domiciled or the property is situated . . .,16
This distinction between direct and indirect impacts led- Mr.
Justice Field to emphasize that a state court's authority to affect a
nonresident who owned property within the state was limited to its
authority over that property; "the inquiry ... [into the nonresident's
obligations to a citizen of the forum state] can ... be carried ... [on]
only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the pro-
perty."'7 If the defendant had no property within the state, the
plaintiff had to establish jurisdiction in personam, that is, based on
its authority over the defendant's person. It could establish this
authority either by personal service of process on the defendant
within the state or by his voluntary appearance before the state's
tribunals. Substituted service of process by publication was insuffi-
cient.
After outlining the essential elements of establishing in per-
sonam jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Field next considered what steps
were necessary to establish in rem jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction
based on the presence of property within the state. Specifically he
addressed the question of whether the court had to take formal con-
trol of the property "by attachment or some other equivalent act" at
the outset of the proceedings or whether the court could first estab-
lish the nonresident's liability and then seize and sell the property.'8
He concluded that preliminary attachment was required; to hold
otherwise "would introduce a new element of uncertainty in judicial
proceedings," by making jurisdiction depend on the factual situation
existing after the rendering of judgment rather than at the com-
15. Id. at 723.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 727-28.
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mencement of the action. "The contrary is the law," he asserted;
"the validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the
court before it is rendered, not upon what may occur subsequently." 9
Of course, determining the rules for exercising jurisdiction did
not dispose of the dispute between Neff and Pennoyer. The court
also had to address the question of the effect to be given to
Mitchell's judgment pursuant to which Pennoyer had purchased the
property. As Mr. Justice Field stated the issue, the court had to
decide the "force and effect of judgments rendered against nonresi-
dents without personal service of process upon them, or their volun-
tary appearance ." The question had arisen most frequently
with respect to attempts to enforce such judgments in other states
under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution. The
decisions addressing this question had established the rule that a
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit only if the court
rendering it had "jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject
matter,"'" although they were unclear as to whether the judgment
was entitled to enforcement in the state in which the judgment was
rendered." However, this ambiguity with respect to the judgment's
enforceability in the state in which it was rendered did not affect
Pennoyer. While federal courts were not "foreign tribunals" with
respect to state courts, they were "tribunals of a different sover-
eignty . . .bound to give to the judgments of the State courts only
the same faith and credit which the courts of another State are
bound to give to them."" Moreover, the Court also cited the recently
adopted fourteenth amendment as offering an alternate basis for
concluding that Mitchell's original judgment against Neff was not
enforceable even in Oregon. According to Mr. Justice Field, the due
process clause invalidated any attempt by a court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant who was not "brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process within the state, or his voluntary
appearance."" Service by publication was an "effectual" substitute
against nonresidents "only where, in connection with process
against the person for commencing the action, property in the State
is brought under the control of the court ... or where the judgment
is sought as a means of reaching such property or affecting some
interest therein .. .5
19. Id. at 728.
20. Id. at 729.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 732.
23. Id. at 732-33.




Having enunciated the applicable principles, the Court had only
to apply them to the pending dispute. Since Mitchell's original judg-
ment against Neff was based on service by publication unaccom-
panied by attachment of any property of Neff, the judgement was
invalid and did not authorize the sale of the property in controversy.
Therefore, the Court granted Neff's demand that he be restored to
the possession of his property.
"To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this
opinion,""6 Mr. Justice Field included a brief addendum or postscript
to his opinion recognizing three exceptions to the general jurisdic-
tional rules he had articulated. First, the Court did not mean to for-
bid any state from authorizing its courts "to determine the status of
one of its citizens towards a nonresident" even if the nonresident
was not served or otherwise notified of the action.27 Second, the
Court disavowed any intention to limit a state's authority to require
that "a non-resident entering into a partnership or association
within its limits, or making contracts enforceable there" appoint an
agent for service of process for legal proceedings with respect to his
activities or be subject to some prescribed form of service.28 Third,
the Court expressed confidence that a state could validly establish
special service procedures "on creating corporations or other institu-
tions for pecuniary or charitable purposes ....."I
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Pennoyer Framework
As numerous scholars have recognized, Pennoyer is not com-
pletely satisfying from the standpoint of logical consistency. One
may begin by challenging the appropriateness of using concepts
derived from international law to define the authority of states in a
federal system. 0 In addition, the underlying principles relating to
territoriality beg the question by introducing as axiomatic the fun-
damental distinction between direct and indirect effects of state
authority.3 Finally, the immediate need to qualify the basic prin-
ciples by exceptions to the system that the principles create sug-
gests the the principles themselves might be inadequate.
26. Id at 734.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id.
30. Commentators have argued that the intellectual construct of exclusive state
sovereignty in the international sphere never was intended for application as a rule
limiting the judicial jurisdiction of states within a federal union. E.g., Hazard, supra
note 12, at 259-60. This acceptance of exclusive sovereignty, however, was the effect of
Pennoyer's reliance on Story, whose notions were expansions of Huber's general
theory.
31. Id. at 261-62.
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Notwithstanding its logical shortcomings Pennoyer seemed to
establish a jurisdictional framework consistent with common sense.
The concept of territoriality provided a clear and reliable guide to
the vast majority of situations. An individual was subject to state
authority when either he or his property was within the state at the
time the lawsuit was begun, and the court had to establish his
presence by serving him personally or by attaching his property.
Moreover, these concepts were probably reasonably consistent with
the realities of life in the nineteenth century. Interstate transactions
were still the exception rather than the rule, and allowing a state
court to reach nonresidents only when the nonresident came within
the state or chose to own property in the state was likely to pro-
duce a fair result in most cases. Of course, the nineteenth century
had produced exceptions to the general pattern: some associations
and partnerships did business across state lines even though the
principals remained in a single state; husbands and wives might
choose to live in separate states when marriages broke up; and cor-
porations did not easily fit into a system in which jurisdiction was
based on the concept of presence. But these problems properly could
be viewed as aberations in the normal scheme of life and could be
handled, as Pennoyer recognized, by special exceptions to the
general principle.
Finally, one also should note that Pennoyer did not articulate an
independent requirement of notice as an indispensable element of
due process. Nonetheless, the Pennoyer doctrine established a
system that was reasonably calculated to ensure that the defendant
knew that a lawsuit had been instituted against him in most in-
stances. For in personam actions service of process on the defendant
not only established his presence within the state but also informed
him of the pendancy of the lawsuit as did a voluntary appearance by
the defendant. For in rem actions, the system was less error proof,
but the assumption that formal attachment of a defendant's prop-
erty was also likely to bring the lawsuit to his attention seems fairly
reasonable.
THE APPLICATION AND MODIFICATION OF
THE TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
As every student of procedure knows, the territorial principle
ultimately proved inadequate to solve problems of jurisdiction over
the parties in interstate situations. But the reason for its inadequacy
was the principle's increasing unsuitability to modern life rather
than its logical inconsistency. In the years following Pennoyer inter-
state business transactions expanded significantly.2 Moreover, the
32. See generally A. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLU-
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increasing use of automobiles, especially after 19 20 ," enhanced per-
sonal mobility as well as the possibility of torts being committed by
nonresidents who owned no property within the state and who were
likely to have departed the state before the victim had any realistic
possibility of serving the tortfeasor with process.
In the tradition of common law adjudication the Supreme Court
accommodated Pennoyer to changing realities by refining the doc-
trine and expanding its exceptions rather than by abandoning it.
Nonetheless, the tracing of these changes in the Pennoyer doctrine
should not obscure its enduring aspects. For one thing, the Court
has continued to accept the underlying principle that the validity of
a judgment depends on whether the court had jurisdiction over the
parties at the time the lawsuit was begun. Moreover, for two-thirds
of a century the idea of territoriality (ie., the physicial presence of
the defendant or his property within the jurisdiction) formed the
core concept to which all the refinements and exceptions offered
obeisance. In addition, the division of jurisdictional theory into in
personam and in rem branches has also continued, as has the idea
that cases involving the status of persons raised special problems
that could not be handled completely within the customary doctrine.
In Personam Jurisdiction
Natural Persons
Individuals provided the paradigm for which the territorial prin-
ciple was designed because it was normally quite easy to determine
if the individual was physically present within the state when the
lawsuit began. Service of process by the sheriff verified the defen-
dant's presence and also insured that the individual knew about the
pendancy of the proceedings against him. But even cases involving
natural persons occasionally presented problems for the Pennoyer
framework. For one thing, the greater use of automobiles created
difficulties by increasing the likelihood that persons would commit
TION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 207-09, 240-44 (1977) (transformation of American business
through mass production and distribution); H. FALKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND EXPAN-
SION 1890-1900 74 (1959) (increased concentration of American business); G. MOWRY,
THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELTAND THE BIRTH OF MODERN AMERICA 1900-1912 6-10
(1958) (growth of business trusts); G. NASH, THE GREAT TRANSITION: A SHORT HISTORY
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 175-76 (1971) (growth of America industry during the
1920s); A. CHANDLER, The Beginnings of "Big Business" in American Industry in THE
SHAPING OF TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 64, 66-76 (R. Abrams & L. Levine eds.
1965); R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER passim (1967).
33. See generally NASH, supra note 32, at 174-75; R. ROBERTSON, HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 473-74 (2d ed. 1964); G. SOULE, PROSPERITY DECADE-FROM WAR TO
DEPRESSION: 1917-1929 164-70 (1947).
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torts outside the states where they normally resided. State legisla-
tures responded to the problem by passing laws that attempted to
establish jurisdiction over torts committed within the state by non-
resident operators of motor vehicles.' Relying on Pennoyer's
recognition that a nonresident could consent to jurisdiction over his
person, the Supreme Court upheld the new statutes in a series of
decisions during the second and third decades of the twentieth cen-
tury.
Kane v. New Jersey35 sustained a criminal conviction under a
New Jersey statute that required a nonresident who operated a
motor vehicle within the state to appoint the state's secretary of
state as his agent upon whom process could be served for "any action
or'legal proceeding caused by the operation of his ... vehicle .... ,6
The Court based its analysis on the state's broad power to regulate
the use of motor vehicles, a power that "extend[ed] to nonresidents
as well as residents" and included the ability to enact "reasonable
provisions to ensure safety." 7 In upholding the statute, Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion relied on two factors: the "constant and serious
dangers to the public" that attended the "movement of motor vehi-
cles over the highways" and the "aid to securing observance of
laws" that the ability to enforce criminal and civil penalties provided.38
In light of these factors the Court refused to "say that the Legisla-
ture of New Jersey was unreasonable in believing that ability to
establish, by legal proceedings within the State, any financial liability
of nonresident owners, was essential to public safety," especially
since the law was "not a discrimination against non-residents, deny-
ing them equal protection of the law." 9
Of course, the New Jersey statute did not provide a perfect
model. It suffered from at least two serious defects: it hindered inter-
state traffic in motor vehicles by requiring motorists to take action
34. See Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorist, 39 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564
(1926); Legislation, Recent Legislation Affecting the Non-Resident Motorist, 20 IowA L.
REV. 654, 655, 660 (1935).
35. 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
36. Id. at 165 n.1, quoting 3 N.J. COMP. STAT. 3431-34, 3443 (Sections 16, 17, and 37
of the title on Motor Vehicles). The New Jersey statute also required the nonresident
motorist to secure a New Jersey operator's license and to register his car in New
Jersey. An earlier decision had upheld Maryland's right to apply its licensing and
registration requirements to nonresident motorists, Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S.
610 (1915), but the Maryland statute did not contain a provision appointing a state offi-
cial to receive process for the motorists.
37. 242 U.S. at 167.
38. Id.
39. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that the New Jersey statute
imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 167-68.
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prior to entering the state, and it did not grant the state court
jurisdiction over the nonresident who failed to designate the secre-
tary of state as his agent for service of process and who left the
state before he was personally served. A Massachusetts statute of
1923 0 attempted to correct both inadequacies. It dispensed with the
requirement that the non-resident actually appoint an agent for ser-
vice and substituted a declaration that a nonresident's operaton of a
motor vehicle within the state itself operated as consent to the
jurisdiction of the state's courts as to actions in which the nonresi-
dent was involved while operating the vehicle on the state's high-
ways. The Massachusetts law also provided that driving in the state
operated as the appointment of the state's registrar of motor vehi-
cles as the driver's agent to accept service of process.
The 1927 decision of Hess v. Pawloski" upheld the
Massachusetts statute against the claim that it violated the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court's
analysis of the constitutional issue began paying lip service to Pen-
noyer's rule that "[t]he process of a court of one State cannot run
into another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to pro-
ceedings against him,".'2 Mr. Justice Butler's opinion quickly shifted
to an emphasis on the "dangers to persons and property" that attended
the use of motor vehicles.'3 Because of these dangers the state had
the authority to make and enforce regulations "reasonably
calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-
residents alike, who use its highways."" The Massachusetts statute
fell within this authority because it required "a non-resident to
answer for his conduct in the State where arise causes of action
alleged against him" and provided "a convenient method by which
he may sue to enforce his rights."'5 Since the statute made "no
hostile discrimination against non-residents but tend[ed] to put them
on the same footing as residents,""0 it was permissible under the
Kane rationtle. Without really explaining why, the Court ruled that
the power to exclude nonresidents unless they appointed an agent
for service authorized the state to "declare that the use of the
highway by the nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of
the registrar as agent on whom process may be served." 7 Any "dif-
40. MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 90, as amended by Mass. Stat. of 1923, ch. 431, § 2
quoted in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927).
41. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
42. Id. at 355.




47. Id. at 357.
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ference between formal and implied appointment is not substantial,"
the Court declared, at least insofar "as concerns the application of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'"
A second problem area involving natural persons concerned
whether a state's courts could exercise jurisdiction over non-resi-
dents with substantial business interests in the state. In Henry L.
Doherty & Company v. Goodman'" the Supreme Court answered this
question in the affirmative by again relying on a consent theory to
uphold jurisdiction. The precise issue in Doherty was whether
Henry L. Doherty, trading as Henry L. Doherty and Company, was
amenable to suit in Iowa. Although Doherty was a citizen of New
York, he had "established an office at Des Moines, Polk County,
Iowa, and there through agents carried on the business of selling
corporate securities throughout the State."'5 Goodman sought a per-
sonal judgment against Doherty in a lawsuit arising out of his pur-
chase of stocks from one of Doherty's Iowa employees. Relying on
an Iowa statute that permitted service of process on an employee of
an individual who had an office for the transaction of business in a
county other than the one in which he resided, 1 Goodman sought to
establish jurisdiction by serving process on the district manager of
Doherty's Iowa office.
52
The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Iowa courts to
exercise jurisdiction under these circumstances. It accepted the
Iowa Supreme Court's determination that, by establishing an office
within the state, a nonresident defendant "thereby voluntarily ap-
points his own agent ...as one upon whom substituted service in
actions in personam, growing out of that office ... , may be made .... "I
The Supreme Court noted that "Iowa treats the business of dealing
in corporate securities as exceptional and subjects it to special
regulation" and that "Doherty voluntarily established an office in
Iowa and there carried on this business."'" In view of these con-
siderations the Court declared that "the questioned statute goes no
48. Id. The Court did distinguish between formal and implied appointment in
cases involving service of process on corporations. See notes 64-72, infra, and accom-
panying text.
49. 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
50. Id. at 625. The Court did not explain precisely what it meant in declaring
Doherty a "citizen" of New York; presumably, it meant that he was a domiciliary of
that state.
51. IOWA CODE § 11,079 (1927).
52. 294 U.S. at 625.
53. Id at 627, quoting Davidson v. H. L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 747, 241
N.W. 700, 703 (1932).
54. 294 U.S. at 627-28.
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farther than the principle approved by those [Hess and other recent]
opinions permits.""
A third question that the Court had to decide with respect to
natural persons was whether a state could render a binding judg-
ment against one of its domiciliaries who was temporarily out of the
state and thus could not be personally served with process within
the state; in other words, whether the territorial principle limited a
court's jurisdiction over its own domiciliaries. In Milliken v. Meyer"
the Supreme Court ruled that the state's authority was not so
limited. It upheld a state court's jurisdiction that was based on ser-
vice of process delivered to the absent domiciliary while he was out-
side the state. 7 According to Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion,
the state's authority over its domiciliaries was analogous to the
national government's authority over its citizens." Because the state
.accords [the domiciliary] privileges and affords protection to him
and his property by virtue of his domicile," it retains the authority
to exact reciprocal duties, including "amenability to suit within the
state even during sojourns without the state . . . ."I The majority
justified this continuation of authority because of the responsibili-
ties of citizenship that "arise out of the relationship to the state
which domicile creates.""0 Since "[t]hat relationship is not dissolved
by mere absence from the state," the domiciliary's duties are
likewise "not dependent on continuous presence in the State . . .
Corporations
Corporations created even more difficulties once the Supreme
Court held that Pennoyer's territorial principle also applied to
55. Id. at 628. The Court distinguished the seemingly contrary decision of Flexner
v. Farson, 248 U.S. .289 (1919), on the ground that the individual served in Flexner was
no longer a corporate agent when he was served. Professor Austin Scott was appar-
ently the first to suggest this as the correct rationale for the Flexner decision. See Scott,
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARV. L. REV. 871,
884-91 (1919).
56. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
57. As plaintiff in a Wyoming suit, Milliken caused a summons to be issued by the
district court of Carbon County, Wyoming. He also filed an affidavit alleging that
Meyer was a resident of Wyoming living in Colorado and that he had remained out of
Wyoming concealed himself to avoid service of summons. Meyer v. Milliken, 101 Colo.
564, 574-75, 76 P.2d 420, 425 (1937). A Wyoming statute provided for personal service
outside the state on such a defendant. WYo. COMP. STAT. §§ 5636 & 5641 (1920), quoted
in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 459 n.3 (1940).
58. 311 U.S. at 463.
59. Id. at 463-64. For an earlier decision suggesting that this was the correct rule,
see McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (dictum).
60. 311 U.S. at 464.
61. Id.
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them." The basic difficulty was how to apply the concept of
presence to a legal entity that existed only as a fiction of the law.
The obvious response to this problem was to declare the corporation
*present" in the state that created it, a response that was consistent
with the prior Supreme Court decisions."3 This approach, however,
did not provide a completely satisfactory solution for the problem of
multistate corporations. The growing number of these corporations
increased the likelihood that a person would acquire claims against
one of them as the result of the corporation's activities outside the
state of its incorporation. Requiring the plaintiff in such situations
to travel to the defendant's state of incorporation to obtain jurisdic-
tion hardly seemed reasonable when the defendant actually had caused
the injury in the place where the plaintiff resided; not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court regularly found ways to stretch Pennoyer's ter-
ritorial principle to permit state courts to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign corporations.
As in the case of natural persons the "consent" theory provided
one means of reaching out-of-state corporations. Dictum in Pennoyer
itself affirmed the holding of earlier cases that a state could require
a nonresident business association to appoint an agent for service as
a condition precedent to the transaction of business in the state,"
and seven years after Pennoyer, Mr. Justice Field expanded that
concept. In St. Clair v. Cox" he declared that a state could provide
that conducting business within the state by a foreign corporation
would operate as the appointment of the agents involved in that
business to receive process on behalf of the corporation. According
to Mr. Justice Field, such a provision amounted to a condition imposed
by the state for the privilege of doing business within its borders,
"and corporations that subsequently . . . [did] business in the State
are to be deemed to assent to such condition as fully as though they
had specially authorized their agents to receive service of the pro-
cess."' He did, however, limit this broad authority by extending it
only to "litigation arising out of ... [the foreign corporation's] trans-
actions in the state.6 e
62. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
63. A number of decisions held that a corporation had no legal existence outside
the state of incorporation. E.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868); Bank
of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). See generally Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577-78 (1958).
64. 95 U.S. at 735-36 (1877). See text at note 28, supra.
65. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).




The Supreme Court gave state courts even greater authority
when the state required the corporation actually to appoint an agent
to receive process and the corporation complied with the statute. In
those cases, the consent was not limited, as in St. Clair, to cases
arising out of the defendant's transactions in the state. The leading
case was Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company v. Gold Issue Min-
ing Company,8 in which the Supreme Court allowed the Missouri
courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania
insurance company; the suit arose out of a fire insurance policy
covering buildings in Colorado that the company had issued in Col-
orado to an insured incorporated in Arizona. The insurance company
also was licensed to sell insurance in Missouri, and, to obtain that
license, had filed "with the Superintendent of the Insurance Depart-
ment a power of attorney consenting that service of process upon
the superintendent should be deemed personal service upon the
company so long as it should have any liabilities outstanding in the
State." 9 The Missouri Supreme Court held that this power of attor-
ney consented to jurisdiction from all suits regardless of whether
they arose out of business done within the state." Accepting this
construction of the Missouri statute, the Supreme Court ruled that it
did not violate the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee.
Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion for a unanimous court began with
the premise that the corporation could have consented to jurisdic-
tion in the specific case. Since the insurance company had
"appoint[ed] an agent in language that rationally might be held to go
to that length," the state court's construction of the power of attor-
ney "did not deprive the defendant of due process of law even if it
took the defendant by surprise ... ."71 The Court specifically refused
to apply the rule of the implied consent cases which limited the
state court's jurisdiction to suits arising out of the corporation's
transactions within the state. The consent in those cases, the Court
ruled, was "a mere fiction, justified by holding the corporation
estopped to set up its own wrong as a defence [sic]."72 Here, by con-
trast, "a power actually . . . [was] conferred by a document," and
because "[t]he execution . . . [was] the defendant's voluntary act," it
took "the risk of the interpretation that ... [might] be put on it by
the courts.""
68. 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
69. 1& at 94.
70. 267 Mo. 524, 184 S.W. 999 (1916).
71. 243 U.S. at 95.
72. Id at 96.
73. Id.
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An alternate method of asserting jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations was to find that they were "present" within the forum state
and thus fell within Pennoyer's territorial principle. This route, for
example, was the one that the Court followed in St. Louis South-
western Ry. v. Alexander,' holding a Texas railroad corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the New York courts because it main-
tained an office in New York at which it apparently solicited
business and accepted a claim from its dissatisfied customer. The
Court explained that a foreign corporation was present "within the
jurisdiction of the court in which it was sued" only when "the cor-
poration is transacting business in that district to such an extent as
to subject it to the jurisdiction and laws there."" Declaring its inten-
tion to decide the case before it "upon the principles which have
heretofore prevailed in determining whether a foreign corporation is
doing business within the district in such sense as to subject it to
suit therein," the Court declared that each case had to be decided
"upon the facts brought before [the court]" and that no "all-
embracing rule" could be laid down." In Alexander the foreign cor-
poration had "an authorized agent attending to this and presumably
other matters of a kindred character, undertaking to act for and
represent the company, negotiating for it and in its behalf declining
to adjust the claim made against it.""71 This activity, the court held,
"was the transaction of business in behalf of the company by its
authorized agent in such manner as to bring it within the District of
New York, in which it was sued, and to make it subject to the ser-
vice of process there.""
Because both the consent theory and the presence theory ulti-
mately required a determination of whether the defendant was
"doing business" within the forum state, the question of what con-
stituted "doing business" was widely litigated. Gradually, many
courts came to use the "doing business" language to restate the test
that courts claimed to be applying: In the absence of consent, a state
could exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if
and only if the corporation was "doing business" with the forum
state. 0
74. 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
75. Id. at 226.
76. Id at 227.
77. Id at 228.
78. Id.
79. See generally Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir.
1930); Kurland, supra note 63, at 584-86.
80. See Kurland, supra note 63, at 585. Indeed, the prestigious American Law
Institute endorsed this statement of the problem. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF




The development of in rem jurisdiction also raised problems
requiring the refinement and expansion of Pennoyer's territorial
principle. Courts perceived little difficulty in using the territorial
principle to bind the rights of nonresidents in suits to quiet title to
real estate;8 indeed they indicated that the state where the prop-
erty was located was the only one that could render a binding deter-
mination of title to real estate." They also were willing to allow a
determination of the ownership of tangible personal property to
bind persons outside'the state;88 they accepted the dictum of Pen-
noyer" by upholding quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, in which a state based
its jurisdiction on the attachment of the nonresident's property that
was present within the state in a lawsuit in which the underlying
dispute was unrelated to the property."5 But applying these concepts
Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations In Personam, 17 VA. L. REV. 129
(1930).
81. The suit to quiet title provided protection against repeated suits between the
same parties respecting the same land. The original form of action is no longer used,
but the name has been retained and applied to any equitable action to vindicate title to
real property, especially statutory suits to determine adverse claims. H. MCCLINTOCK,
HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 192 (1948). A court may entertain such an
action and issue a decree quieting title to land within the state even though a nonresi-
dent defendant is brought into the suit only constructively through service by publica-
tion. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890). See Knudson v. Litchfield, 87 Iowa 111, 54
N.W. 199 (1893); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812,
writ of error dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). Tyler concerned the state's authority to
issue a judgment with respect to property that would be binding against all the world.
The 1898 Massachusetts statute establishing the state's Torrens system of land
registration raised that problem graphically with respect to suits seeking authoritative
determinations with respect to real property. In an influential opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the state's power to render
a judgment that would have the effect of depriving "all persons except the registered
owner of ... any interest in the land .... " 175 Mass. at 72, 55 N.E. at 812. According
to Mr. Justice Holmes, the court's "U]urisdiction is secured by the power of the court
over the res." 175 Mass. at 75, 55 N.E. at 813. Moreover, he emphasized that Pennoyer
established no formalistic requirement that the property be attached prior to judg-
ment. What mattered was form, not substance, and the Massachusetts requirement of
an "immediate recording of the claim is entitled to equal effect [as a seizure] from a
constitutional point of view." 175 Mass. at 78, 55 N.E. at 815.
82. See, e.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186
(1900). However, when a court had in personam jurisdiction over the parties, the rule
could be circumvented by enjoining the losing party to execute the necessary docu-
ments to convey title. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1909); Tomaier v. Tomaier,
23 Cal. 2d 754, 760, 146 P.2d 905, 908 (1944). See generally Currie, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 620 (1954).
83. See, e.g., Loaiza v. Levy, 85 Cal. 11, 24 P. 707 (1890); Gassert v. Strong, 38
Mont. 18, 98 P. 497 (1908).
84. 95 U.S. at 727. See text at note 5, supra.
85. See, e.g., Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Eliot v. McCormick, 144
Mass. 10, 10 N.E. 705 (1887); Plummer v. Hatton, 51 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 460 (1892).
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to intangible personal property raised difficult problems, beginning
with the question of where such property was "present" for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Thus arose the famous case of Harris v. Balk,"' the
bete noir of many first year law students. Both Harris and Balk
were residents of North Carolina, and Harris owed Balk $180. Balk
in turn allegedly owed $300 to one Epstein, a third party who was a
Maryland resident. When Harris visited Maryland, Epstein arranged
to have a Maryland court issue a writ of attachment against him,
attaching the $180 debt that Harris owed to Balk. Harris did not
contest the attachment, and Epstein recovered a garnishment judg-
ment allowing him to apply the $180 against the amount that he
claimed Balk owed him. Balk then sued Harris in North Carolina to
recover the $180 that Harris owed him; Harris pleaded the payment
of the Maryland judgment as a bar to Balk's claim.
The legal issue in Harris v. Balk was whether the Maryland
court had jurisdiction to attach Harris' debt to Balk and to order it
applied to satisfy Balk's debt to Epstein. If the Maryland court had
jurisdiction, the North Carolina court had to give the Maryland
judgment full faith and credit; if the Maryland court lacked jurisdic-
tion, its judgment was invalid and the North Carolina court could ig-
nore it. Applying Pennoyer's territorial principle, a crucial question
in deciding the jurisdictional issue was whether Balk had property
in Maryland that was attached by the Maryland court at the start of
Epstein's lawsuit against Balk. The Supreme Court ruled that he
did, and it advanced the following argument: A debt is the prop-
erty of the creditor, and it is located wherever the debtor happens
to be. Since Harris was in Maryland, his debt to Balk (that is, Balk's
property) was also in the state. Therefore, the Maryland court's
seizure was adequate to establish jurisdiction up to the value of the
property.
The court rejected Balk's claim that the debt retained its "situs"
in North Carolina because Harris was only temporarily in Maryland
when the attachment proceeding began. According to the Court, the
expression "situs of the debt" was not helpful "when used in con-
nection with attachment proceedings.""7 Insofar as the term "situs"
merely referred to "the place of the creation of the debt, that fact is
immaterial;" insofar as it suggested "that the obligation to pay the
debt can only be enforced at the situs thus fixed," it was "plainly
untrue."" The debtor's obligation to pay the debt "clings to and
86. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).




accompanies him wherever he goes," and "[i]t is nothing but the
obligation to pay which is garnished or attached."" Since Balk could
have used the Maryland courts to collect the debt from Harris while
Harris was in Maryland, the debt was present in Maryland and it
was subject to attachment by the Maryland court. The Maryland judg-
ment disposing of the property thus attached, therefore, was entitled
to full faith and credit.
One additional problem remained with respect to quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction: What if the alleged debtor denied the existence of the
debt? If the court agreed and released the attachment for that
reason, was the creditor bound by that determination? New York
Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy" confirmed that he was not. In
Dunlevy a Pennsylvania judgment creditor attempted to seize Mrs.
Dunlevy's interest in a life insurance policy at a time when she was
a California domiciliary. The insurance company admitted the exis-
tence of the debt, but declared its inability to determine whether
Mrs. Dunlevy or her father was entitled to the proceeds of the
policy; it interpleaded both claimants, paying the debt into the reg-
ister of the court. The Pennsylvania court then found that Mrs.
Dunlevy's father was the rightful owner of the proceeds of the
policy. It, therefore, ordered the amount deposited to be paid to him
and dismissed the garnishment action. After the entry of this judg-
ment Mrs. Dunlevy filed suit in the federal district court in California
seeking to force the insurance company to pay her the cash sur-
render value of the policy. The company claimed that her suit was
barred by the prior Pennsylvania judgment, which determined that
her father was entitled to the proceeds of her policy.
The Supreme Court refused to regard the Pennsylvania pro-
ceedings as a bar. It conceded that the Pennsylvania court "had
ample power through garnishment proceedings to inquire whether
she held a valid claim against the insurance company and if found to
exist then to condemn and appropriate it so far as necessary to dis-
charge the original judgment" and that even though she was "out-
side the limits of the State such disposition of the property would
have been binding on her.""1 But the insurance company's inter-
pleader action went beyond that and tried to create the equivalent
of a suit to quiet title to intangible personal property. This action
the Supreme Court refused to permit because it would amount to "a
final and conclusive adjudication of her personal rights," an adjudi-
89. Id at 222-23.
90. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
91. Id at 520.
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cation that was not binding on Mrs. Dunlevy "unless in contempla-
tion of law she was before the court and required to respond to that
issue."," Since she had never appeared in the Pennsylvania action,
the "proceedings in the Pennsylvania court constituted no bar to the
action in California."93
Status Jurisdiction
In Pennoyer Mr. Justice Field emphasized that the Court did not
intend to deny a state authority to conduct "proceedings to deter-
mine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which
would be binding within the State, though made without service of
process or personal notice to the non-resident."9 But if jurisdiction
in cases involving status was not to turn on the presence of the
parties within the state, the Court still had to determine what stan-
dards would satisfy the requirements of the due process and full
faith and credit clauses in these cases. This section briefly sketches
some of the answers that the Supreme Court gave to these ques-
tions in the first half of the twentieth century. It traces the develop-
ment of the jurisdictional rules concerning divorce and child custody
and also explains how the courts analyzed the jurisdictional issue in
lawsuits to enforce the support obligations that were often involved
in divorce and custody proceedings.
Divorce
The attempt to fashion rules governing when a state court could
exercise jurisdiction in divorce cases floundered on a problem not
generally present in either the in personam or in rem cases-the
Court's desire to uphold a state's substantive determination as to the
circumstances under which its citizens should be allowed to divorce.9 6
This substantive issue became entangled with the jurisdictional
problem because of the wide diversity of divorce laws" and the
92. Id at 521 (emphasis added).
93. Id at 523.
94. 95 U.S. at 734. See note 27, supra, and accompanying text.
95. A similar concern for a state's ability to establish a substantive rule governing
title to real property located in the state formed the basis for the rule that only the
state where the real property was located could render a binding adjudication as to
title to the property. See notes 82-83, supra, and accompanying text. The desire to
avoid federal interference with a state's substantive rules relating to divorce also may
explain the rule that the federal courts lack jurisdiction in divorce cases even when
the parties are citizens of different states. See Ohio ex tel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S.
379 (1930); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) (dictum).
96. For brief summaries of the development of nineteenth-century American law
relating to divorce, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 283-85 (1968); L. FRIED-
MAN, A HISTORY OF AMERCAN LAW 181-84, 436-40 (1973).
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general rule that the substantive law of the forum applied in divorce
cases. 7 In a common situation a citizen of a state with strict divorce
standards (for example, New York) would go to a state with lenient
standards (for example, Nevada) to obtain a divorce and would then
return to New York to live. If the Nevada judgment were entitled
to full faith and credit, New York would have lost the power to
enforce effectively its legislative determination that New York
citizens should not be allowed to divorce except as its law provided.
The desire to avoid this circumvention of a state's substantive
divorce laws and thus to protect its territorial sovereignty was a
common goal of judicial decisions,98 and one method to achieve this
goal was to devise principles that would deny the divorce judgment
full faith and credit.
One alternative for handling divorce cases was to require the
court to demonstrate that it had in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant under Pennoyer's territorial principle. But Pennoyer
itself conceded the inequity of this rule. It would force a spouse
whose marriage partner had deserted to another jurisdiction to
follow the deserting spouse to his new home to acquire jurisdiction,
an extremely harsh burden to impose on an innocent party to the
divorce. Moreover, a deserted spouse who was unable to locate the
deserting spouse could not secure a binding divorce judgment
anywhere. Finally, not only would the application of normal in per-
sonam rules treat the deserted spouse unfairly, it would also
facilitate the circumvention of substantive divorce rules whenever
both parties desired the divorce. The parties could travel to a state
that would permit them to divorce, and the defendant could consent
to the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction, thus foreclosing any
attack on the merits in the state where the couple normally lived.
A second alternative was to treat the person in a status case as
analogous to the res in an in rem action; thus, whenever a person
was present within the jurisdiction, a court could enter a binding
order declaring that person's status. This approach would have pro-
tected the deserted spouse whose continued presence within the
jurisdiction would have conferred authority to issue a judgment con-
cerning his status. But it would have also permitted the deserting
spouse to obtain a divorce judgment in the state to which he fled.
Thus, it would have greatly facilitated circumvention of substantive
divorce laws. A spouse could go to a state willing to grant him a
divorce, and that court would have jurisdiction over him by virtue
97. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 135 (1934); H. CLARK, supra note 96, at 327.
98. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1945); Haddock v. Had-
dock, 201 U.S. 562, 574-81, (1906); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 208-10 (1888).
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of his presence within the jurisdiction even if the deserted spouse
objected. After having been granted the divorce, the deserting
spouse could return to the state he left armed with the divorce judg-
ment (a declaration of his status) that was entitled to full faith and
credit. Of course, this last objection could have been avoided by per-
mitting jurisdiction only when a party was domiciled within the state.
But that limitation amounted to a rejection of the in rem analogy,
for Harris had clearly indicated that presence, not permanence, was
the crucial factor in in rem cases.
A third alternative was to analogize the divorce action to the action
in rem but to classify the marriage relationship, not the person
seeking dissolution, as the equivalent of the res that conferred
jurisdiction. The principal difficulty in implementing this approach
was ascribing "presence" to the marriage relationship; the key con-
cept that solved this difficulty was the idea of the "matrimonial
domicile," or the place where the parties were domiciled when living
as husband and wife.9 This approach had two virtues; it protected
the deserted spouse by allowing a divorce in the state where the
couple had formerly lived, and it precluded the parties to a marriage
from avoiding the substantive law of the state in which they lived
by a temporary sojourn in a state with more liberal divorce laws.
However, this matrimonial domicile approach also had disadvan-
tages. If the innocent party in the break-up of a marriage moved to
another state (for example, the nonadulterous partner), that innocent
party could obtain a divorce only by returning to the state of the
spouse whose misconduct prompted the divorce action. Moreover,
this limit on a state's ability to grant divorces to its domiciliaries
seemed a restriction of state authority inconsistent with Pennoyer's
assertion that states retained authority to grant judgments declar-
ing the civil status of their citizens.
Perhaps because none of the approaches offered a completely
satisfactory solution to the problem of divorce jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court failed, during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, to settle on a coherent theory to unite its decisions.
Bell v. Bell00 demonstrated that the issue was more than a mere
question of personal jurisdiction by overturning a divorce decree
rendered after the husband had answered and voluntarily appeared
in the proceedings, and a series of decisions appeared to suggest that
either the domicile of one of the parties or the matrimonial domicile
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a state's courts. Thus,
Maynard v. Hill' held that if the plaintiff was domiciled in the
99. See generally Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile, 27 YALE L.J. 49 (1917).
100. 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
101. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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state, a divorce judgment was valid under the due process clause
and could be enforced where it was rendered; Cheever v. Wilson"0 2
required full faith and credit recognition of divorce judgments when
the plaintiff was domiciled in the state and the defendant was served
with process in the state; and Atherton v. Atherton'3 ruled that a
divorce judgment was entitled to full faith and credit when it was
rendered in the state of matrimonial domicile following constructive
service of process.
Haddock v. Haddock'"4 rejected this trend toward expanding
divorce jurisdiction. In Haddock, the Court refused to require that a
state grant full faith and credit to a state court judgment that was
rendered by the state in which the plaintiff was domiciled following
constructive service of process on the absent defendant. The Had-
dock opinion distinguished Maynard on the ground that holding a
judgment valid under the due process clause did not necessarily
mean that it was entitled to full faith and credit. '05 To distinguish
Atherton, the Court treated the issue as one involving in personam
jurisdiction. The court rendering the judgment in Atherton was
located in the matrimonial domicile, and thus the court had personal
jurisdiction over the absent defendant because of his constructive
presence in the state."' By contrast, the court rendering the Had-
dock judgment was not located in the matrimonial domicile; the
court, therefore, had no basis for finding the defendant "construc-
tively present" in the state, and its judgment was not entitled to full
faith and credit."7 To avoid the impression that it was treating the
issue solely as one of personal jurisdiction, however, Haddock con-
tinued to cite Bell with apparent approval."8
The net impact of Haddock was to establish a dual test for
divorce jurisdiction. A judgment challenged in the state where it
was rendered under the due process clause was valid so long as the
plaintiff was domiciled in the state. Other states, however, had to
accord a judgment full faith and credit only (1) if the plaintiff was
domiciled in the state and (2) the court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant under Pennoyer's territorial principle, although
102. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108 (1869). Cheever is also significant for its acceptance of the
"modern" rule that, in some circumstances, a woman could establish a separate
domicile from her husband. Id. at 123.
103. 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
104. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
105. Id. at 574-75.
106. Id. at 581, 584.
107. Id. at 572.
108. Id at 583. The Haddock opinion cited Bell for the proposition that domicile,
not residence, was required to support divorce jurisdiction.
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the rigidity of the territorial principle was mitigated somewhat by
accepting the fiction that the defendant was always "constructively
present" in the matrimonial domicile.
Custody
Decrees awarding guardianship of minor children comprised a
second category of litigation handled under Pennoyer's exception for
proceedings relating to status.1" Since Pennoyer referred to the
ability of a state to declare the status of its domiciliaries, it was
natural to import the criterion of domicile as the basis for jurisdic-
tion in custody cases. The treatise writers of the early twentieth
century sought this result by urging the domicile of the child as the
sole basis for a court's custody jurisdiction,110 and the 1934 Restate-
ment of Conflict of Laws accepted this view."
Despite its logical appeal several mid-twentieth century com-
mentators argued that the Restatement rule failed to explain the
decisions. 1 ' For one thing, the inability of a minor to adopt a
domicile of choice could produce unacceptable results by declaring
the child's domicile to be the same as that of a parent who lived in
a state other than the one in which the minor lived.11 3 For another,
the domicile requirement effectively precluded a court from taking
action to protect a minor who needed judicial protection but was
only temporarily within its boundaries. The authors of the Restate-
ment papered over this latter problem by authorizing such courts to
make "temporary" custody awards based on the child's presence
alone,"" but careful students of the cases concluded that state courts
109. Over the years, commentators occasionally have objected to the inclusion of
custody cases within the category of status jurisdiction. E.g., Stansbury, Custody and
Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 820-21 (1944);
Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 42 (1940).
These objections appear to ignore- the obvious reason for the classification: to fit
custody cases within the unified theory of state court jurisdiction that Pennoyer had
tried to create. If one continued to accept Pennoyer's superstructure, a refusal to
classify custody cases as adjudications involving status would have required that
jurisdiction in these cases be based on the principles relating to in personam or in rem
cases.
110. 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14.3, at 717-18 (1935); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 132, at 358 (2d ed. 1938).
111. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934).
112. See generally Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law
and Reason v. the Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953); Stansbury, supra note
109; Stumberg, supra note 109.
113. Traditionally, the child's domicile was the same as that of his father, but some
courts modified this rule to provide that in cases where the parents had separated, the
child's domicile was the same as the domicile of the parent with whom the child resided.
Stansbury, supra note 109, at 821-22; Stumberg, supra note 109, at 54 n.37.
114. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 118 (1934).
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had generally circumvented both problems by a de facto substitution
of the child's actual residence for the domicile requirement.'15
Another reason that the domicile rule failed to harmonize the
existing decisions was the non-final nature of custody awards, which
allowed courts to overturn them without expressly declining to give
full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state. Courts that
issued custody awards invariably retained the right to modify the
award in the future upon a showing of changed circumstances. Inas-
much as the full faith and credit clause only required states to give
a judgment the same effect as it would have had in the state where
it was rendered,"' most states asserted the right to modify the
sister state's custody award when they found that circumstances
had changed since the original judgment. The vagueness of this
standard obviously gave courts substantial discretion to alter
custody awards without challenging the duty to accord them full
faith and credit."7
This ability to change the custody award of a sister state court
received Supreme Court endorsement in Halvey v. Halvey."' In
affirming a New York judgment that amended a Florida custody
award, the Supreme Court held that "[s]o far as the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do in modifying the
decree,""' 9 New York could do. Since Mrs. Halvey had not "shown
115. Stansbury, supra note 109, at 823-24; Stumberg, supra note 109, at 55. Cf.
Ehrenzweig, supra note 112, at 357 ([Tlhe "true rule" is "the court's discretion exclu-
sively governed by the child's welfare").
116. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254 (1891).
117. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 112, at 352.
118. 330 U.S. 610 (1947). In Halvey a Florida court had granted custody of the
Halvey's minor son to Mrs. Halvey. Just before this decree was entered, Mr. Halvey
took the son back to New York without his wife's permission. A subsequent New York
proceeding confirmed the award of custody to Mrs. Halvey, but gave the father visita-
tion rights and required the mother to post a surety bond guaranteeing that she would
honor the father's visitation rights.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the
decision should be based on an evaluation of the two competing interests involved, the
presumptive jurisdiction of the sister state rendering the judgment, and the power of
the state court to provide for the welfare of the child under its control. He found the
New York court's exercise of jurisdiction in this instance justified because of the ques-
tionable nature of the Florida court's jurisdiction to render the original custody decree.
If, however, there had been no such question as to Florida's jurisdiction, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter would have required New York to follow the Florida decree, unless the
party seeking modification could show that circumstances had changed. 330 U.S. at
616-19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
119. 330 U.S. at 614. Some courts even went beyond the considerable discretion
sanctioned by Halvey and discerned a right to reexamine the merits of a custody
award made by a sister state. These courts conceded that a prior order might be bind-
ing on the parents, but they argued that the state's relation of parens patriae made its
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that the New York court in modifying the Florida decree exceeded
the limits permitted under Florida law," she had failed to prove that
the Florida decree received less credit in New York than it would
have had in Florida.
120
The diversity of opinions concerning jurisdiction to award
custody over minor children was exaggerated by the paucity of
Supreme Court opinions unifying doctrine under either the full faith
and credit clause or the due process clause. Indeed, Halvey, the
Court's leading decision of the first half of the twentieth century,
implicitly encouraged courts to review the merits by sanctioning a
right to change a sister state's custody award on the basis of changed
circumstances. But several commentators suggested that the dishar-
mony of the state court decisions was more apparent than real. At
least one suggested that careful analysis of results rather than opi-
nions suggested that courts generally refused to enforce the custody
awards of sister states only when they were ruling in favor of func-
tioning family groups within their borders; states did not use their
power to assist their citizens who had secreted children out of the
states where they normally lived.121
Support Awards
Both divorce actions and child custody litigation often included
demands for monetary payments in the form of alimony or child sup-
port. Since the support award was a money judgment, jurisdiction in
the status suit was not necessarily sufficient to authorize the court
to award support; courts assumed jurisdiction to make support
awards only when they had jurisdiction over the person who was
ordered to pay support or over some property from which the sup-
port could be collected. This rule caused few difficulties with respect
to divorce, however. Thompson v. Thompson1 2 confirmed the Had-
dock rule, which required domicile and personal jurisdiction for
divorce jurisdiction;1 2 1 this confirmation meant that any court
authorized to render a divorce decree that was entitled to full faith
and credit would have authority to render binding support orders as
primary concern the welfare of the child as of the time its courts were considering the
request for full faith and credit. Since the courts were concerned with protecting the
child and not with legitimating prior custody awards, existing judgments had eviden-
tiary value, but they were not conclusive as to what the child's welfare required. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 112, at 353.
120. 330 U.S. at 615.
121. Stansbury, supra note 109, at 828-30. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 112, at
357-59; Stumberg, supra note 109, at 57.
122. 226 U.S. 551 (1913).
123. See text at note 108, supra.
124. 243 U.S. 269 (1917). See notes 84-89, supra, and accompanying text.
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well. In addition, Pennington v. Fourth National Bank12 expressly
authorized the use of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in suits seeking to
establish support obligations.
Jurisdiction to make support awards in custody cases was less
automatic. Of course, in many instances the custody award was con-
nected with divorce jurisdiction, and the establishment of in per-
sonam jurisdiction for the divorce decree would also establish it for
the support award. But when the custody proceeding was not part
of a suit to dissolve the marriage relationship, the person seeking
support had to establish jurisdiction under Pennoyer's in personam
or in rem rules.
New Issues: Notice and the Opportunity to Appear
Notice
The increasing willingness to allow courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion in cases involving nonresidents brought new issues to the sur-
face. One such issue was the problem of notice. As indicated above,
the territorial principle normally operated to provide notice to the
defendant by insisting on personal service of process, formal attach-
ment of property at the outset of the proceedings, or the defendant's
voluntary appearance. But the various extensions of jurisdiction
made these traditional forms of notice inadequate because they
allowed courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants who were never served with process and to base quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction on an attachment of intangible personal property
that might be far less likely to come to the attention of the property
owner. To guard against a nonresident being bound by a judgment
in a lawsuit of which he had no knowledge, the Supreme Court in-
creasingly enshrined the requirement of reasonable notice to the
defendant as a second prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Decisions upholding jurisdiction regularly emphasized that the
statutory schemes made reasonable provisions for insuring the
defendant knew of the pendency of the proceedings against him.
Thus, in explaining the fairness of the Massachusetts statute that
asserted jurisdiction over nonresident motorists in lawsuits arising
out of their operation of motor vehicles within the state, Hess
emphasized the statute required that the nonresident "actually
receive and receipt for notice of the service of process and a copy of
the process.""12 Similarly, in Doherty & Company126 the Supreme
Court quoted with approval a portion of an earlier opinion of the
125. 274 U.S. at 356.
126. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). See notes 49-55,
supra, and accompanying text.
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Iowa Supreme Court, which contained the following language con-
cerning the state statute's provision for notice to nonresident
businessmen:
It is required that the [defendant's] agent shall actually receive a
copy of the notice of suit and that it shall be read to him ....
The action must grow out of the business of that very agency.
Ample time is given the defendant to appear and defend; there
is not only "reasonable probablity" but practical moral certainty
that the defendant will receive actual notice of the pendency of
the action."
Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized the reasonableness of the
choice to serve the agent who was "manager of the appellant's office
when the sale contract was made .. .[and] when process was served
upon him."' 8 Finally, near the end of the unchallenged reign of Pen-
noyer's territorial principle, Milliken emphasized, in upholding the
Wyoming statutory scheme that allowed a domiciliary who was out-
side the state to be served by mail, that "so far as due process is
concerned" the test for the adequacy of notice is whether "the form
of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give ... [the defendant] actual notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard."'" If it accomplished
these two purposes, it satisfied "the traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice ... implicit in due process."'3 0
On at least one occasion the Supreme Court went so far as to
declare that actual notice of the proceedings in a particular case was
insufficient if the statutory scheme lacked adequate assurances that
notice would be provided in all cases. Wuchter v. Pizzutti"', involved
the New Jersey version"' of the state statutes that asserted juris-
127. Id. at 627, quoting Davidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 750,
241 N.W. 700, 704-05 (1932).
128. 294 U.S. at 628. The Supreme Court's opinion also emphasized that Iowa
treated "the business of dealing in corporate securities as exceptional and subject[ed] it
to special regulation." Id at 627.
129. 311 U.S. at 463. See text at notes 56-61, supra.
130. Id.
131. 276 U.S. 13 (1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr.
Justice Holmes concurred. He argued that the due process objection was "an after-
thought provoked by our decision in [Hess]," which had rejected the argument that
had been the defendant's only objection considered by the courts below. By ruling on
the notice issue at this late stage in the proceeding, he argued that the Court was
denying New Jersey's courts any opportunity to place a favorable construction on the
statute and thus to avoid any attacks of unconstitutionality. 276 U.S. at 25-26
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. 1924 N.J. LAWS, ch. 232, § 1, quoted in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 16
(1928). In Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), the Court had sustained an earlier
version of the New Jersey statute. See notes 35-39, supra, and accompanying text.
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diction over nonresident motorists with respect to law suits arising
out of their operation of motor vehicles within the state. The New
Jersey law followed the common pattern of designating a state offi-
cial as the nonresident defendant's agent to receive process, but
unlike the Massachusetts statute sustained in Hess, it did not
require the state official to forward the summons to the defendant.
On the basis of this distinction, the Supreme Court framed the issue
in Wuchter as follows: "Whether a statute, making the Secretary of
State the person to receive the process, must, in order to be valid,
contain a provision making it reasonably probable that notice of ser-
vice on the Secretary will be communicated to the non-resident
defendant who is sued.' 33
The Court concluded that the law "should make a reasonable
provision for such probable communication." 13' Disavowing any inten-
tion to question the Hess doctrine, Mr. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for
the Court emphasized that adequate notice was an independent require-
ment of due process. When this notice requirement was applied, the
New Jersey statute was found wanting: "[Tlhe enforced acceptance
of the service of process on a state officer by the defendant would
not be fair or due process unless such officer or the plaintiff is
required to mail the notice of the defendant, or to advise him, by
some written communication, so as to make it reasonably probable
that he will receive actual notice.""' To hold otherwise would make
it "entirely possible for a person injured to sue any non-resident he
chooses, and through service upon the state official obtain a default
judgment against a non-resident who has never been in the state,
who had nothing to do with the accident, or whose automobile hav-
ing been in the state has never injured anybody.""' Moreover, any
"provision of law for service that leaves open such a clear opportun-
ity for the commission of fraud .. . or injustice is not a reasonable
provision, and in the case supposed would certainly be depriving a
defendant of his property without due process of law."'3 7
To comply with due process, a statute had to satisfy the follow-
ing standard. It must "require the plaintiff bringing the suit to show
in the summons to be served the post office address or residence of
the defendant being sued, and should impose either on the plaintiff
himself or upon the official receiving service or some other, the duty
of communication by mail or otherwise with the defendant.""' Nor
133. 276 U.S. at 18.




138. Id at 20.
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was the Court's judgment altered by the fact that Wuchter had actual
notice of the proceedings because he was personally given written
notice. Since Wuchter "did not . . . appear in the cause and such
notice was not required by the statute," actual notice could not
"supply constitutional validity to the statute or to service under
it.",,"9
With respect to corporations, a similar notice requirement evolved.
The court held that service of process on an agent of the corporation
provided sufficient notice if the person served was one who was
reasonably certain to convey the notice to corporate officers."' The
court also sustained statutes that allowed a foreign corporation to
be served by serving process on a designated state official, but in
this class of cases, the Court was less consistent with respect to
notice. In Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court,"' the
Court went so far as to approve service on a state official even
though the statute did not require him'to notify the defendant and
even though the defendant apparently never received actual notice.
But an earlier per curiam decision"2 applying the Wuchter rationale
to statutory service provisions suggested that the Bond & Goodwin
holding was limited to situations in which the corporation had exe-
cuted a formal consent to the statutory provision for service."'
139. Id. at 24. The Court was not always so zealous to strike down statutes when
the litigants had actual notice. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See also
State ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933).
140. E.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Com-
mercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 255 (1909); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S.
350, 360 (1882). Cf. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1934) (service on
a business agent of a sole proprietorship held sufficient). The statutes requiring ser-
vice on an agent of the corporation can be further subdivided into those requiring for-
mal appointment of a process agent and those permitting service on an "actual agent"
within the state. Eulette, Service of Process Upon Foreign Corporations-Cons titu-
tional Limitations Imposed by Judicial Construction of the Due Process Clauses, 20
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 287, 312 (1942). In either case, the due process standard was the
same: "[Slervice shall be had upon such representative in such a manner and with such
adequate safeguards that it will be reasonably certain that the notice will, in fact,
come to the attention of those individuals responsible for and controlling the manage-
ment of the corporation." Id. at 313.
141. 289 U.S. 361 (1933). The Court distinguished the seemingly contrary rationale
of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), with the following comment: "The power of
the state altogether to exclude the corporation, and the consequent ability to condition
its entrance into the state, distinguishes this case from those involving substituted
service upon individuals .. " 289 U.S. at 365. For a discussion of the Wuchter holding,
see notes 131-39, supra, and accompanying text.
142. Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 278 U.S. 559 (1928), rev'g, 127 Okla.
295, 260 P. 745 (1927).
143. Cf 289 U.S. at 365 ("The fact that appellant qualified to do business in the
State and complied witht he registration statute also distinguishes cases of attempted
service on a State official pursuant to a statute with which defendant had never corn-
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One of the most important questions of notice concerned suits to
quiet title to real estate. Dictum in Pennoyer indicated that service
by publication, when coupled with an attachment of the land at the
outset of the proceedings, would serve "to inform parties of the
object of proceedings taken; '1" and subsequent decisions allowed a
state to "provide for the adjudication of titles to real estate within its
limits as against non-residents who are brought in court only by
publication."" 5 By accepting this service by publication, the Court
allowed states to devise systems for cutting off the interests of
unknown claimants who, by definition, could not be served person-
ally. Although notice in such cases was often fictional, allowing ser-
vice by publication helped to accomplish the goal of clearing land
titles, and attainment of that goal required a binding determination
against all potential claimants in the property. Indeed, an influential
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes when he was Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court went so far as to describe
the elimination of unknown claimants as the "chief end" of suits to
secure land titles. 1"
Special and Limited Appearances
As the courts gradually weakened Pennoyer's injunction forbid-
ding a state from exercising in personam jurisdiction over a person
plied, and where at the time of suit it had removed from the State and was transacting
no business there"). See. generally Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Ser-
vice of Process on Foreign Corporations, 19 MINN. L. REV. 375, 385-91 (1935); Eulette,
supra note 141, at 315-16; Note, Constitutional Law -Jurisdiction-Substituted Service
on Foreign Corporation Without Notice, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 570 (1933). Courts
sometimes construed statutes to require the public official to notify the defendant even
in the absence of a specific statutory directive. E.g., Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn'n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907). At least one state court suggested that the failure of a
statutory scheme to require the public official to notify the defendant would amount to
a violation of due process. Gouner v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 123 La. 964,
967, 49 So. 657, 658 (1909):
this law makes no provision whatever for .. . service on the defendant. the offi-
cer may decline to communicate with the person sued and give no notice
whatever, not even by mail. A judgment might be obtained without the least
knowledge of the person sued. Under the phrasing of the statute, the duty of the
officer begins and ends in his office. If such a judgment were rendered, it could
receive no recognition whatever at the place of the domicile.
144. 95 U.S. at 727.
145. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 327 (1890). See Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S.
256, 274-75 (1896) (a state may "provide for determining and quieting the title to real
estate within the limits of the State and within the jurisdiction of the court, after
actual notice to all known claimants, and notice by publication to all other persons");
Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S.
241 (1907); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
146. Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 73, 55 N.E. 812, 813 (1900). For a
more complete description of the Tyler holding, see note 81, supra.
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not personally served with process, the number of cases in which
the jurisdictional issue became less certain, and thus litigible,
increased. This shift created a serious dilemma for the litigant who
desired both to raise a jurisdictional defense and to offer a defense
on the merits. As Pennoyer suggested and other cases held, a volun-
tary appearance at the proceedings would amount to a consent to
the court's authority, thus waiving the jurisdictional issue."7 On the
other hand, the defendant forfeited his opportunity to offer a
defense on the merits if a default judgment was entered because he
declined to appear and a subsequent proceeding determined that the
original court had jurisdiction over him. In short, to be certain to
get an opportunity to present a defense on the merits, the defendant
had to forego judicial consideration of the jurisdictional issue.
The inequity of requiring such a choice was generally conceded,
and to avoid it the law used the procedural device of the special
appearance, which allowed the defendant to appear solely to chal-
lenge the court's jurisdiction. In the term following its decision in
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court approved the special appearance for
use in federal courts,' 8 and despite an 1890 decision holding that the
due process clause did not require a state to recognize a special
appearance,"' the right was "generally recognized" in state courts
even without statutory authorization.' 51
Although the special appearance did permit the defendant to
secure a judicial determination of the jurisdictional issue, it did not
completely end the dilemma. Since in many states the overruling of
a jurisdictional plea was not an appealable order, and offering any
defense other than the jurisdictional one amounted to a general appear-
ance that consented to the court's jurisdiction, an adverse decision
by the trial court could force the defendant to decide whether to
present his defense on the merits (which would constitute a general
appearance and waive the jurisdictional claim) or to decline to pre-
147. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 729 (1877); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15
(1890). Cf. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (plaintiff who filed suit in California
consented to jurisdiction of that state's courts with respect to counterclaims arising
out of the same transaction).
148. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878).
149. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
150. Comment, Special Appearance in New York, 34 CORN. L.Q. 230, 230 n.6 (1948).
Only Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 1881 (1942), and Texas, TEx. R. CIv. PRAC. art. 122
(1942), refused to recognize the special appearance. For a description of the Mississippi
practice, see Note, Special Appearance in Mississippi, 19 Miss. L.J. 59 (1947). Despite
the nearly unanimous approval of special appearances, there was much dispute as to
exactly what constituted a special appearance. See, e.g., Note, Special Appearance in
New York, 34 CORN. L.Q. 230 (1949); Note, Practice and Procedure-Appeals From
Refusals of Motions to Dismiss-Special Appearances, 18 N.C. L. REV. 354 (1940).
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sent a defense and appeal the final judgment on the jurisdictional
question (which prevented him from litigating the merits if he ulti-
mately lost the jurisdictional issue).'51 To avoid this inequity, the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"2 and the rules of some
states'" eventually allowed the defendant to defend on the merits
without sacrificing the opportunity to seek appellate review of the
jurisdictional issue.
Cases involving quasi-in-rem jurisdiction complicated the appear-
ance issue because defendants tried to make two types of appear-
ances without consenting to personal jurisdiction. First, they
attempted to challenge the court's jurisdiction by attacking the
validity of the attachment. Most courts regarded this approach as
analogous to the special appearance in in personam cases and per-
mitted it.'" Second, defendants who conceded the validity of the
attachment sought the opvortunity to protect the property by pre-
senting the case on the merits without submitting to in personam
jurisdiction, a procedural device that came to be known as the
limited appearance. The Supreme Court never addressed the ques-
tion on whether a defendant had a constitutional right to a limited
appearance in cases involving quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Moreover,
although many states allowed limited appearances, a substantial
number refused to do so.
Cheshire National Bank v. James 5' was an influential early deci-
sion among those states that did permit limited appearances. Inti-
mating that the issue involved the defendant's due process right to
a hearing before a court disposes of his property, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court quoted with approval language in a much
older case that declared: "It would be unreasonable to oblige any
man living in one state, and having effects in another state, to make
himself amenable to the courts of the last state, that he might defend
his property there attached.""15  Although conceding that the
language quoted was not part of an "exact adjudication," the court
151. Of course, appellate review of the issue might be obtained-under 1rocedures
permitting review of interlocutory orders or by virtue of an appellate court's extra-
ordinary writ jurisdiction.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
153. E.g., COLO. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1941); Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (1953); MINN. R. Civ. P.
12.02 (1952).
154. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 40 (1942).
155. 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
156. Id. at 18, 112 N.E. at 502, quoting Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 461, 468 (1813). Cf.
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 954
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. For a federal decision permitting a limited
appearance, see Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214,
218-19 (6th Cir. 1922).
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nonetheless followed it because it stated a "sound principle" that
was "decisive of the question at bar."'57
The Cheshire rationale did not persuade everyone. Some
courts" ' and commentators 59 found the countervailing arguments
persuasive, thus creating a doctrinal impasse that the Supreme
Court never resolved. Opponents of the limited appearance advanced
at least three arguments against it: (1) The merits of the case involved
a single set of underlying personal rights and liabilities, and dif-
ferent courts should not be allowed to give differing decisions as to
that single set of underlying circumstances; (2) the limited appear-
ance encouraged multiple litigation and thus interfered with the
judicial economy goal of securing a final determination in the first
proceeding; and (3) by contesting the plaintiff's claim, the defendant
manifested his willingness and ability to litigate the entire personal
claim in the forum where his property was attached.
THE NEW MINIMUM CONTACTS PRINCIPLE
By the middle of the twentieth century the exceptions to Pennoyer
had altered substantially the substance of the original doctrine. In
form, the territorial principle remained the norm; a state could exer-
cise jurisdiction over persons or property within its boundaries and
had jurisdiction to determine the status of its citizens, but the state
lacked jurisdiction over persons or property outside its boundaries
or concerning the status of citizens of other states. But in practical
terms the Supreme Court had increased significantly the ability of
state courts to issue binding judgments against natural persons out-
side their borders, the actual problem with which Pennoyer was con-
157. 224 Mass. at 18, 112 N.E. at 502.
158. E.g., Everett v. Wilson, 34 Colo. 476, 83 P. 211 (1905); Brignall v. Merkle, 306
Ill. App. 137, 28 N.E.2d 311 (1940); Belknap v. Charlton, 25 Ore. 41, 34 P. 758 (1893).
There seems to be some dispute as to whether most state courts accepted or rejected
the limited appearance. Compare Developments, supra note 156, at 953 (most early
state court decisions accepted the rule), with D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING &
PROCEDURE-STATE AND FEDERAL 443 (1962) (limited appearance rejected in most states
that had considered the issue), but the apparent disagreement merely may represent a
focus on different time periods.
159. E.g., 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.04, at 651 (1938); Note, "Special"
Appearances to Contest the Merits in Attachment Suits, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 403 (1949).
Cf. Note, Special Appearance to Defend Interest in Property, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 242,
244 (1951): "It would seem then to have been properly within the discretion of the
court in the instant case either to have allowed the limited appearance to protect in-
terest in property or to have assumed personal jurisdiction. The exercise of such
discretion should depend on whether the issues raised with respect to the lien are the
same as those which arise where the underlying contract allegedly creating the per-
sonal liability is in question."
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cerned. Contrary to Pennoyer's declaration that "[p]rocess from the
tribunals of one State cannot run into another State,"1 0 the modern
decisions permitted the functional equivalent of out-of-state process
with respect to the nonresident motorists who committed torts while
operating motor vehicles within the state, nonresident entrepre-
neurs whose business activities within the state gave rise to claims
against them, and domiciliaries who were outside the state's terri-
torial boundaries when the lawsuit commenced. Judicial opinions
often used the language of consent to force these cases into the Pen-
noyer framework; but the language of consent was obviously a fiction,
for this consent required neither the defendant's knowledge nor
acquiescence.
With respect to corporations the exceptions were so great as
virtually to eliminate the St. Clair holding that Pennoyer's territor-
ial principle also governed when a corporation was amenable to suit.
Here again the Court used the language of consent to preserve the
Pennoyer framework, but this approach failed to provide a coherent
theoretical framework for reaching all interstate corporations.
Although early Supreme Court decisions indicated that a state could
exclude foreign corporations from doing business within the state,
this principle was subject to the important qualification that the
commerce clause prevented a state from refusing to allow foreign
corporations to carry on interstate commerce within its borders.
Since the state's authority to require consent to jurisdiction was
based on its power to exclude foreign corporations, the logical cor-
ollary to the limit on the power to exclude would seem to have been
a holding that the state could not require corporations conducting
interstate business to consent to the jurisdiction of the state's
courts nor could it treat the carrying on of interstate business
within the state as an implied consent. Of course, that logical step
would have destroyed the usefulness of the consent theory for the
very interstate corporations for which it was designed; it was,
therefore, a logical step that the Supreme Court never chose to
take."'1
The theoretical problem of the consent theory was not its only
difficulty, however. Using the language of consent produced the
absurdity of making the lawful-abiding corporation subject to wider
claims of state jurisdiction than the corporation that failed to
comply with the law. If a foreign corporation complied with the
state law requiring it to designate an agent for service, the state
160. 95 U.S. at 727.
161. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Kurland,
supra note 63, at 581.
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could treat that designation as consenting to jurisdiction in all
cases. ' 2 On the other hand, if the foreign corporation failed to
designate an agent, the state could treat the conducting of the
business as a form of implied consent to jurisdiction, but only as to
claims arising out of the corporation's activity within the state."3
The alternate theory of the corporation's "presence" was equally
unsatisfactory in providing an explanation of when courts could
exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Not only was the
attempt to ascribe locality to a non-physical, juridical person bound
to be fictional, but as at least one commentator subsequently
pointed out, it "necessarily rejected the theme of ... [early Supreme
Court decisions] that a corporation cannot exist beyond the limits of
the state which created it."'"
Although the results of individual cases involving in personam
jurisdiction seemed to represent reasonable responses to changing
social patterns, some commentators'' as well as perceptive lower
court judges'" increasingly recognized that Pennoyer's framework
was no longer adequate to guide judicial decision-making with
respect to when a state court could exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants, especially when the defendant
was a corporation. The 1945 decision of International Shoe Company
v. Washington"7 marked the beginning of a series of decisions in
which the Court tried to formulate a new principle to explain more
162. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93
(1917). See notes 68-73, supra, and accompanying text.
163. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See notes 65-67, supra, and accompanying
text.
164. Kurland, supra note 63, at 582.
165. See, e.g., Haffer, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations as Defen-
dants in the United States Supreme Court, 17 B.U.L. REV. 639 (1937); Rothschild,
Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations In Personam, 17 VA. L. REv. 129 (1930).
166. Probably the most widely quoted critic in the judiciary was Learned Hand.
See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930), quoted in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). See also Farmers' & Mer-
chants' Bk. v. Federal Res. Bk., 286 F. 566 (E.D. Ky. 1922).
167. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Mr. Justice Black filed a separate opinion in which he
argued that International Shoe's appeal should be dismissed as unsubstantial. He
argued that "[t]he due process clause is not brought in issue ... by appellant's ... con-
ceptualistic contention that Washington could not ... bring suit against a corporation
because it did not honor that State with its mystical 'presence.'" 326 U.S. at 323
(Black, J., concurring). Indeed, he urged that "[tlo read this into the due process clause
would in fact result in depriving a State's citizens of due process by taking from the
State the power to protect them in their business dealings within its boundaries with
representatives of a foreign corporation." Id. In his view, the correct approach was not
to adopt the vague standard of "fair play" and "substantial justice" but to recognize
that a State "has the power to protect . . . [its citizens] in their business dealings
within its borders with representatives of a foreign corporation." Id.
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accurately when a state could exercise jurisdiction over natural per-
sons outside its borders and over foreign corporations. The defen-
dant, International Shoe Company, was a Delaware corporation in-
volved in sales of footwear to customers in several states. Its prin-
cipal place of business was located in Missouri, but it "maintain[ed]
places of business in several states, other than Washington, at which
its manufacturing is carried on and from which its merchandise is
distributed interstate through several sales units or branches
located outside the State of Washington."'6 8 International Shoe had
neither manufacturing nor retail offices in Washington, although it
did sell its shoes to persons in the state. The sales were arranged
through sales personnel who resided in Washington, displayed
samples of the company's footwear at various locations within the
state, and solicited orders from prospective purchasers. The com-
pany structured the actual sales transaction to limit the authority of
the sales personnel. They could not obligate the company, but merely
solicited orders that the company's home office in Missouri had to
accept. The company then shipped and invoiced the goods from
points outside Washington, and collections were also made from
these points. The company argued that these activities were insuffi-
cient to manifest its presence in Washington and that the state's
courts could not issue a binding judgment obligating the company to
make workmen's compensation payments covering its Washington
sales personnel. 9
Mr. Chief Justice Stone's majority opinion began its analysis of
the jurisdictional issue by reformulating the test to be applied.
Recognizing the traditional reliance on a court's "de facto power"
over the defendant as a "prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him," the Chief Justice contended that the empha-
sis on power had shifted as the procedure for initiating actions
changed from the capias ad respondum, which obligated the sheriff to
take the defendant and hold him until he responded, to a simple
168. 326 U.S. at 313. For a more extensive summary of the facts, see Kurland,
supra note 63, at 586-88. A 1907 Supreme Court decision had suggested that solicita-
tion in a state was not sufficient by itself to render a corporation present within a
state. Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). Later
Supreme Court decisions, however, had held that a solicitation coupled with other acti-
vities by the corporation within the state would render a foreign corporation amenable
to suit. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
169. 326 U.S. at 315. For a more extensive summary of the facts, see Kurland,
supra note 63, at 586-88. The Court also rejected the contentions that Washington
lacked authority to force International Shoe to make workmen's compensation con-
tributions, id. at 321-22, and that the state had imposed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. Id. at 315.
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notice to the defendant of his duty to appear.7 ' The new test of due
process allowed a state court to exercise in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident who was not served with process within the
state's territorial boundary whenever the nonresident defendant had
"certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ,,.
With respect to corporations, the Chief Justice suggested that
the new test merely made explicit the unarticulated basis of prior
decisions. Conceding the non-utility of the presence concept to explain
when a court had jurisdiction over a corporation, he contended that
the terms "present" and "presence" had merely served as a short-
hand summary of the real issue: whether the company had sufficient
contacts with the forum state to "make it reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there."'72 Thus, when the
activities of a corporation's agents in the state had "not only been
continuous and systematic, but also . . . [gave] rise to the liabilities
sued on," the cases uniformly held that the corporation was subject
to the jurisdiction of the state's courts, and they were equally
uniform in holding that "the casual presence of the corporate agent
or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state
in the corporation's behalf" were insufficient to authorize the state's
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation in law suits
based on claims "unconnected with the activities there.1 78
Of course, gray areas remained. When the corporation's activity
in the state was continuous but the claim was unrelated to the acti-
vity, one line of decisions held that "continuous activity of some
sorts within a state ... [was] not enough" to support jurisdiction as
to an unrelated claim, 7' but in other cases "the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.' ' 75 Similarly, the
cases split in deciding whether occasional acts within a state would
170. Id. at 316. Contrast with this language the famous aphorism of Mr. Justice
Holmes that the "foundation of jurisdiction is physical power." McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
171. 326 U.S. at 316.
172. Id. at 317. To make this determination, one of the factors a court had to con-
sider was "[aln 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation
from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business." Id. at 317, citing Hut-
chinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930).
173. 326 U.S. at 317.




support jurisdiction on a claim that arose as a result of those acts.
Although some of the decisions imposing liability in the last group
of cases supported their holding by the "legal fiction" of the implied
consent of the defendant, the decisions could be explained "more
realistically" as a determination that the acts giving rise to liability
"were of such a nature as to justify the fiction.' 178
The test was not, the Chief Justice emphasized, "simply
mechanical or quantitative"; nor was it merely a question of "a little
more or a little less."' 177 The test was a qualitative one: "[wihether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure."'78 Due process did not permit a state to render binding in
personam judgments "against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."1 79 However,
it did allow a state that extended the "benefits and protections" of
its laws to a foreign corporation doing business within its borders to
require the corporation to respond to suits brought to enforce obli-
gations that "arise out of or are connected with the [corporation's]
activities within the state."''
Applying this minimum contacts test to the case before it, the
Court concluded that the Washington courts could exercise jurisdic-
tion. The company's activities in the state were "neither irregular
nor casual" but were "systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question," and the obligation that formed the basis for the
lawsuit "arose out of those very activities." '' Hence, it was "evident
that these operations establish[ed] sufficient contacts or ties with
the state of the forum to .make it reasonable and just, according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to per-
mit the state to enforce the obligations which . . .[International
Shoe] has incurred there." '82
APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE
MINIMUM CONTACTS PRINCIPLE
International Shoe was a seminal decision because of the Court's
willingness to discard Pennoyer's territorial principle in determining
176. Id.




181. Id. at 320.
182. Id.
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when a state could exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
But the new approach raised as many questions as it answered. For
one thing, International Shoe had substantial contacts with Wash-
ington and the case involved a claim directly related to the contacts;
thus, except for the Court's reminder that the test was "qualitative"
and not "quantitative or mechanical," the case provided little
guidance for the two classes of cases that the Court's own summary
indicated had proven troublesome in the past-(1) a defendant with
continuous contacts in the forum state with a claim unrelated to the
contacts, and (2) a defendant with a single contact or occasional con-
tacts in the forum state but a claim arising directly from those con-
tacts. Moreover, the Court's opinion did not define clearly the reach
of the new principle; it did not indicate, for example, whether the
minimum contacts principle applied only to corporations or to indivi-
dual defendants as well or whether it applied only to in personam
jurisdiction or to in rem and status jurisdiction as well. Courts
struggled with these questions over the next three and a half
decades.
In Personam Jurisdiction
Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia18 was the Supreme
Court's first major attempt to amplify the meaning of the new mini-
mum contacts principle in one of the situations that International
Shoe identified as particularly troublesome, a defendant with few
contacts with the state but a claim arising directly from those con-
tacts. The question in Traveler's Health Association was whether
the Virginia State Corporation Commission had jurisdiction to issue
a cease and desist order against a non-profit Nebraska corporation
that provided health insurance benefits to 800 members who lived in
183. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas also found
the actions taken by Virginia consistent with "the traditional concept of due process."
339 U.S. at 655 (Douglas, J., concurring). Noting that the state had a valid interest in
protecting its citizens, he concluded that the use of members within the state to solicit
the majority of the association's Virginia business "operate[d] functionally precisely as
though appellants had formally designated the Virginia members as their agents." Id
at 654.
Mr. Justice Minton filed a dissenting opinion that Mr. Justice Jackson joined. He
argued that the Court should not have even reached the due process question because
"the Commission had in no way attempted to enforce the order" and thus the ap-
pellants had not been hurt. 339 U.S. at 655 (Minton, J., dissenting). On the merits, he
distinguished Travelers from International Shoe on the ground that the earlier case
had involved personal service on an agent within the state and contacts by agents
within the state that made the company present there; by contrast, in Travelers, no
agent of the defendant had operated in the forum state. Id. at 658-59. Justices Reed




Virginia.'" The Court ruled that the Commission could issue an
order binding on the Association even though the Association had
no agents or property within the state, all of the Association's acti-
vities with Virginia members or prospects were conducted by mail,
all membership association dues were payable in Nebraska, all
claims were to be submitted in Nebraska, and all claims payments
were issued in Nebraska.
In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion
made two principal arguments. First, it recognized a broad state
legislative power to regulate insurance contracts because of the
state's "legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its
residents against risks," including the desire to see "that those
obligations were faithfully carried out."'' In light of these interests
he concluded that the company's providing of health insurance bene-
fits to a sizeable number of Virginia members gave it sufficient con-
tacts with the state to satisfy International Shoe's minimum con-
tacts principle. Second, Mr. Justice Black emphasized the heavy
burden that might fall on individual policyholders if the state could
not reach the foreign insurance corporation. Not only were health
benefit claims "seldom so large that Virginia policyholders could
afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska lawsuit," but the
"suits on alleged losses . . . [could] be more conveniently tried in
Virginia." '86 Explicitly analogizing the new due process test to the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, he concluded that
the "Due Process Clause does not forbid a state to protect its
citizens from such injustice."'87
Two years later, the Supreme Court had to apply the Interna-
tional Shoe principle to the other class of cases that Mr. Chief
Justice Stone emphasized had called for careful qualitative judg-
ment-a suit against a corporate defendant with substantial con-
184. The case technically involved the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission
rather than a court, but Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion applied the same stand-
ards and expressly relied on International Shoe, 339 U.S. at 648, as did the dissent of
Mr. Justice Minton. 339 U.S. at 658-59 (Minton, J., dissenting)
185. 339 U.S. at 647-48.
186. Id. at 649.
187. Id. at 649. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows the court "discre-
tionary judgment as to whether the suit should be entertained" in situations where
there exist "at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process." Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947). A court may use this discretion to pre-
vent a plaintiff from placing a defendant at a disadvantage by choosing the least con-
venient forum. Id. at 508. See generally Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conven-
iens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
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tacts with the forum state in which the claim was unrelated to the
contacts. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company," the
defendant mining company was a Phillipine business associa-
tion, '8 and the plaintiff was a dissatisfied stockholder who claimed
the company had failed to issue her dividends and stock certificates
rightfully due her. When the Japanese occupied the Phillipine
Islands during World War II, the company had ceased its mining
operations on the islands; the company's president and general
manager returned to his home in Ohio where he "did many things on
behalf of the company" including maintenance of office files, hand-
ling of correspondence, payment of salaries, and the supervision of
the rehabilitation of the company's Phillipine properties after the
war. In addition, the company maintained substantial bank accounts
in Ohio during this period, appointed an Ohio bank as its stock
transfer agent, and held several directors' meetings within the
state. '9
After summarily rejecting plaintiff's claim that the due process
clause required Ohio to exercise jurisdiction under these facts, Mr.
Justice Burton's majority opinion turned to what it termed the
,more serious question" of whether the requirements of due process
precluded Ohio from exercising jurisdiction. 1" Declaring that the
"essence" of the minimum contacts principle was "one of general
fairness to the corporation," the Court first noted that the
company's Ohio activities were sufficiently "continuous and system-
atic" to have justified jurisdiction had the plaintiff's claim been
directly related to the corporation's activities in the forum state as
in International Shoe. 92 But Mrs. Perkins' claim was not based on
the Ohio activities; thus the case took the minimum contacts princi-
ple "one step further to a proceeding in personam to enforce a cause
188. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Minton argued that
the Court should not have granted the Perkins writ to consider the due process issue.
He labeled the majority's opinion "an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court"
because the state court's decision was based on adequate and independent state
grounds that were sufficient to support its decisions regardless of how the federal
question was resolved. 342 U.S. at 450 (Minton, J., dissenting).
189. The Court treated the association as a corporation for jurisdictional purposes.
Id at 439. The result would probably have been the same if the company had been
regarded as an unincorporated business association. See H.L. Doherty & Co. v. Good-
man, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
190. 342 U.S. at 447-48.
191. Id. at 441. The Court rejected the argument that Ohio had to exercise jurisdic-
tion on the basis of an earlier precedent declaring that the decision to make foreign
corporations subject to service "is a matter of legislative discretion." Id. at 440,
quoting Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., Inc., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922).
192. 342 U.S. at 445-46.
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of action not arising out of the corporation's activities in the state of
the forum."'93
Mr. Justice Burton relied on International Shoe's "realistic
reasoning" for the proposition that, under certain circumstances,
continuous corporate activity in a state could authorize the state to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation with respect to a
claim unrelated to the activities within the forum state."' He had,
therefore, only to decide if "the business done in Ohio by the . . .
mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as
to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign cor-
poration, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely
distinct from its activities in Ohio."'95 After carefully summarizing
the extent of the company's Ohio activities, he concluded that Ohio
could exercise jurisdiction because the president's actions amounted
to "a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
limited wartime activities of the company."' "
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Company,'97 the Court
returned to the problem of a lawsuit arising directly from a corpora-
tion's minimal activities in the forum state. In 1948, International, a
Texas-based insurance company, assumed the insurance obligations
of an Arizona insurance company, Empire Mutual. Prior to the
transfer of obligations Empire had insured the life of Lowell
Franklin, a California resident, although Empire apparently never
had an office or any agents in California. When International
assumed the liabilities of Empire, it "mailed a reinsurance certifi-
cate to Franklin in California offering to insure him in accordance
with the terms of the policy he held with Empire Mutual," and "so
far as the record. . . show[ed]," this was the only California insur-
ance business in which International had ever engaged.' Franklin
accepted International's reinsurance offer, and from 1948 until 1950
he paid his premiums, mailing them from his California home to In-
ternational's Texas office. After Franklin died in 1950, the
beneficiary of the policy, Mrs. McGee, filed a claim with Interna-
tional; but the company denied it. Mrs. McGee then filed suit against
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
196. Id at 448. The Court remanded the case to the Ohio Supreme Court for a
determination of whether its courts had jurisdiction under the state's statute, id. at
449, and the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently ruled that state law did confer jurisdic-
tion. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 158 Ohio St. 145, 107 N.E.2d 203
(1952).
197. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
198. Id. at 221-22.
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International in a California state court and recovered a default
judgment.
Mrs. McGee could not collect her judgment in California, so she
sought to enforce it in Texas. But the Texas court refused to give
the California judgment full faith and credit. All parties agreed that,
if the California court had jurisdiction over the defendant, "the
Texas courts erred in refusing to give its judgment full faith and
credit" and that the issue before the Supreme Court was whether
the California court had jurisdiction to render a binding judg-
ment. 9' But before Mr. Justice Black's opinion for an unanimous
court considered that precise issue, he briefly reviewed the
Supreme Court's attempt since Pennoyer to place "some limit on the
power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons
not served with process within their boundaries." '0 The "clearly
discernable" trend was, he declared, "toward expanding the per-
missible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
other nonresidents," a trend that he attributed at least in part "to
the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the
years."'' Accompanying "this increasing nationalization of com-
merce" had been modern transportation and communications changes;
these developments had "made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic acti-
vity."02
Turning his attention more specifically to the case before him,
Mr. Justice Black held that "the Due Process Clause did not pre-
clude the California court from entering a judgment binding on
[International]."'' He derived this holding from the suit's basis in a
"contract which had substantial connection with [California]."'04 The
connection included the delivery of the contract in California, the
mailing of premiums from California, and the insured's California resi-
dence at the time of his death. Moreover, as he had done in Trav-
eler's Health Association, Mr. Justice Black emphasized the state's
"manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims." 25 Although he
recognized that holding International amenable to suit in California
might result in some inconvenience to the company, he rejected the
199. Id. at 211. For an argument that the court lacked jurisdition, see Kurland,
supra note 63, at 607.
200. 355 U.S. at 222.
201. Id.






notion that this inconvenience would amount to a denial of due pro-
cess.
2 06
From International Shoe through McGee, the Supreme Court
consistently had expanded the authority of state courts to render
binding judgments against foreign corporations, but Hanson v. Den-
ckla,27 rendered in the term following McGee, broke that pattern. In
1935 Mrs. Dora Bonner created a trust, reserving the trust income
to herself for life and allowing her to name the remainderman bene-
ficiary by inter vivos power of appointment or in her will. When she
created the trust, Mrs. Bonner was a Pennsylvania domiciliary, but
she executed the trust instrument in Delaware, and she named a
Delaware bank as trustee. She later moved her domicile to Florida,
where she carried on several bits of trust administration and, in
1949, executed a power of appointment over the remainder of the
trust. At the same time she also executed her will, which gave the
residuary legatees all property over which she had an unexercised
power of appointment at her death.
After Mrs. Bonner died in Florida in 1942, the residuary
legatees under the will filed suit in Florida seeking a determination
that her attempt to exercise the power of appointment was ineffect-
ive and that they were entitled to the assets of the trust. Most of
the beneficiaries of the trust named by the power of the appoint-
ment were Florida residents and were served with process in the
state. The Delaware trustee was not served but was mailed a
"Notice to Appear and Defend" together with a copy of the com-
plaint; the trustee never appeared in the suit and a default judg-
ment was entered against it. While the Florida suit was pending,
the trust beneficiaries under the 1949 power of appointment com-
menced an acton in Delaware seeking a judicial determination as to
who was entitled to the trust assets. The Florida Supreme Court
206. Id. at 224. He also noted that "[t]here is no contention that respondent did not
have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and appear."
Id.
207. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). Mr. Justice Black dissented and filed an opinion that Mr.
Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Brennan joined. In arguing that the Florida court's
assertion of jurisdiction did not offend due process, he stressed that state's interest in
applying its own laws, the convenience of the forum for all, and the relationship
between the transaction and the forum state. 357 U.S. 258-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice Douglas also filed a dissenting opinion. He emphasized the state's
interest in determining the distribution of Mrs. Donner's assets which include the
power of appointment, as well as the nexus between the decendent-settlor and her
trustee. He contended that these considerations gave Florida "the right to make the
controlling determination even without personal service over the trustee," since the
suit merely determined "interests in . . . intangibles" and did not seek "to impose
liability on the Delaware trustee." 357 U.S. at 262-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ruled first and held that the residuary legatees were the rightful
beneficiaries of the trust."°8 The Delaware Supreme Court declared,
however, that it was not bound by the Florida judgment because
that judgment depended on the unconstitutional exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the Delaware trustee; it ruled that the trust assets should
pass to the beneficiaries named in the power of appointment. 09 Not
surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
both state courts. 10
Although the factual setting was thus intricate, the Court's
majority treated the decisive issue as whether Florida could exer-
cise jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.2 1 1 If so, Delaware erred
in refusing to give the Florida judgment full faith and credit; if not,
the Florida judgment was a nullity and the Delaware court, which
had jurisdiction with respect to its suit, was free to decide the issue
for itself.
A sharply divided Court ruled that Florida lacked in personam
jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. The majority opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Warren began its analysis of this issue by conceding
that one could discern, in the transition from the "rigid rule" of Pen-
noyer to the "flexible standard" of International Shoe, a "trend of
expanding jurisdiction over nonresidents. ' '1 Nonetheless, he
declared that the trend did not herald "the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts," because the
restrictions were "more than a guarantee of immunity from inconve-
nient or distant litigation. '213 They resulted from "territorial limita-
tions on the power of the respective States" that could not be over-
come no matter how "minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal." '' The minimum contacts that International Shoe required
were a "prerequisite to its exercise of power over [a defendant]." 20
Or, as the Chief Justice reformulated the International Shoe test
later in the opinion, the defendant must by some act "purposefully
[avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws."1
208. Hansen v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1956). For a more complete description
of the lower court proceedings, see Kurland, supra note 63, at 611-14.
209. Lewis v. Hanson, 36 Del. Ch. 235, 128 A.2d 819 (1957).
210. 354 U.S. 919, 920 (1957).
211. 357 U.S. at 255.
212, Id at 250-51.
213, Id at 251.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 253.
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In the case before him, the Chief Justice concluded that the
Delaware trustee did not have the requisite contact with Florida.
The defendant trust company has no office in Florida, and ...
[has transacted] no business there. None of the trust assets has
ever been held or administered in Florida, and the record dis-
closes no solicitation of business in that State either in person or
by mail. 17
He distinguished McGee on the ground that the trustee had not
''performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to
the agreement as the solicitation in McGee,"2 ' and he specifically
rejected the suggestion that the Florida courts had jurisdiction over
the nonresident trustee "because the settlor and most of the
appointees and beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida." '219 A state
court, he argued, "does not acquire . . .[in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident] by being the 'center of gravity' of the contro-
versy, or the most convenient location for litigation."220 Since the
issue concerned "personal jurisdiction, not choice of law," the essen-
tial inquiry was whether the acts of the nonresident trustee were
adequate to confer jurisdiction; he concluded that they were insuffi-
cient."1
For two decades Hanson remained the last major Supreme
Court decision with respect to the jurisdiction of state courts. But
Hanson did not reverse the general trend of expanding state court
jurisdiction,' perhaps because it could be interpreted as an anomaly
designed to do substantive justice in the particular case before the
Court." At any rate, state courts continued the expansive
trend -especially with respect to foreign corporations -although
jurisdictional boundaries were never totally obliterated. 24
217. Id. at 251.
218. Id at 252. Mr. Chief Justice Warren also relied on the state's special regula-
tion of insurance companies as a ground for distinguishing McGee. Id.
219. Id at 254.
220. Id.
221. Id. This resolution of the jurisdictional issue made it unnecessary to decide
the due process claim that the Delaware plaintiffs raised with respect to the
merits-"that the contacts the trust agreement had with Florida was so slight that it
was a den'al of due process to determine its validity by Florida law." Id. at 254 n.27.
222. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113, 458 P.2d 57 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 431, 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961); Hoagland v. Springer, 75 N.J. Supes. 560, 183 A.2d 678
(A.D. 1962); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208
N.E.2d 439 (1965).
223. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES &
MATERIALS 141 (2d ed. 1974); Hazard, supra note 13, at 243-44.
224. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1973); Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968);
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In two of its last three terms the Supreme Court has again
returned to the question of the ability of a state court to exert in
personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Both decisions
reiterated the Hanson theme that International Shoe did not signify
an end to the significance of state territorial boundaries and empha-
sized the necessity of the defendant's contacts with the forum state
as a prerequisite to the exercise of state court jurisdiction.
Kulko v. Superior Court 5 involved California's attempt to
increase the amount of child support that a New York domicilliary
was required to pay. The Kulkos had lived together in New York
prior to their separation in 1972.'" Following the separation, Mr.
Kulko remained in New York but Mrs. Kulko moved to California. A
separation agreement granted Mr. Kulko custody of the couple's
children during the school year; but it gave Mrs. Kulko custody dur-
ing vacations and required Mr. Kulko to pay Mrs. Kulko $3,000 per
year in child support. The Kulko's daughter subsequently told her
father that she wanted to remain in California with her mother, and
Mr. Kulko arranged for her to do so. Somewhat later, the Kulko's
son told his mother that he wanted to live with her, and Mrs. Kulko
arranged for him to travel to California without consulting her
former husband. Once she had assumed responsibility for the year-
round care of the children, Mrs. Kulko filed an action in California
seeking to increase the amount of support that the New York court
had required Mr. Kulko to pay. The California Supreme Court held
that its courts had jurisdiction to enter a modified support judgment
against Mr. Kulko. 7
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1, 347 P.2d 1 (1959);
Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732
(1962). Courts sometimes construed state jurisdictional statutes narrowly to avoid con-
stitutional difficulties. E.g., Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (applying Virginia law); Singer, PPA v. Piaggio & Co., 420
F.2d 679 (lst Cir. 1970) (applying Massachusetts law); Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d
443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965).
225. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Mr. Justice Brennan filed a brief dissenting opinion that
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Powell joined. 436 U.S. at 101-02 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Although he refused to say that the majority's "determination against
state-court in personam jurisdiction [was] implausible," he nonetheless dissented
because his "independent weighing of the facts . . . [led him] to conclude, in agreement
with the analysis and determination of the California Supreme Court, that . . . [Mr.
Kulko's] connection with the State of California was not too attenuated, under the
standards of reasonableness and fairness implicit in the Due Process Clause, to require
him to conduct his defense in the California courts." Id. at 102.
226. The Kulkos were divorced later under a Haitian decree that incorporated the
terms of their earlier separation agreement. 436 U.S. at 87.




The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall's majority
opinion confirmed that the minimum contacts principle applied to
individuals as well as corporate defendants, but it emphasized the
necessity for "a sufficient connection between the defendant and the
forum State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the
forum." 28 In light of this requirement Mr. Kulko was not subject to
the jurisdiction of California's courts because he "did not purposely
derive benefit from any activities relating to the State of
California."' The majority dismissed Mr. Kulko's action in sending
his daughter to live with her mother in California with the observa-
tion that a "father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony
and his children's preferences, to allow them to spend more time in
California than was required under a separation agreement can
hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself of the 'benefits
and protections' of California's laws."2 "0 It also rejected the contention
that California's exercise of in personam jurisdiction was justified
by the financial benefit Mr. Kulko received from his daughter's
presence in California."3 ' It found this financial benefit, "even if
true," insufficient to support California's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction for two reasons: "Any diminution .. . in [Mr. Kulko's]
household costs resulted, not from the child's presence in California,
but rather from her absence from . . . [his] home;" and "[alny
ultimate financial advantage" to Mr. Kulko resulted "not from the
child's presence in California, but from . . . [Mrs. Kulko's] failure
earlier to seek an increase in payments under the separation agree-
ment." 2'
228. 436 U.S. at 91. Cf. id. at 100-01:
It cannot be disputed that California has substantial interests in protecting
resident children and in facilitating child-support actions on behalf of those
children. But these interests simply do not make California a "fair forum," ... in
which to require .. .[Mr. Kulko], who derives no personal or commercial benefit
from his child's presence in California and who lacks any other relevant contact
with the State, either to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liability by
default.
Kulko also reitterated the independent requirement of reasonable notice but did not
discuss that problem further because Mr. Kulko did "not dispute the adequacy of the
notice that he received." Id at 91.
229. Id at 96. The Court agreed with the California Supreme Court that neither
two visits to California by Mr. Kulko in 1959 and 1960 nor the conducting of the
Kulkos' marriage ceremony in California "for reasons of convenience" during one of
those visits provided sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction on California's courts. Id.
at 93.
230. Id at 94 (footnote omitted).
231. Id. at 94-95. Since the children were living in California, Mr. Kulko's expenses
to support them presumably were reduced without a corresponding increase in child
support payments.
232. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Not only did the Court find that Mr. Kulko's lack of any pur-
poseful availment of the benefits of California law precluded that
state's exercise of jurisdiction, but it also ruled that California's
attempt to exercise jurisdiction was unreasonable and violated
"basic considerations of fairness." The "circumstances in this case
clearly render[ed] 'unreasonable' California's assertion of personal
jurisdiction" because Mr. Kulko had not "visited physical injury on
either property or persons within the State" nor did Mrs. Kulko's
claim arise "from the defendant's transactions in interstate com-
merce, but rather from his personal, domestic relations." 3 ' In addi-
tion, the Court concluded that "basic considerations of fairness point
decisively in favor of . . . [Mr. Kulko's] State of domicile as the
proper forum for adjudication of this case. 234 To support this conclu-
sion, Mr. Justice Marshall emphasized Mr. Kulko's long-time domi-
cile in New York, which had also been the site of the matrimonial
domicile, and his mere acquiescence in "the stated preference of one
of his children to live with her mother in California." ' 5 This action,
he declared, would not lead a reasonable parent to anticipate "the
substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child-
support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away." ' By contrast, insofar as
California had legitimate interests "in protecting the welfare of its
minor residents and in promoting to the fullest extent possible a
healthy and supportive family environment in which the children of
the State are to be raised," those interests were protected ade-
quately by the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act that
"permits a California resident claiming support from a nonresident
to file a petition in California and have its merits adjudicated in the
state of the alleged obligor's residence, without either party's hav-
ing to leave his or her own State.2 3 7
The Supreme Court's most recent decision with respect to in
personam jurisdiciton, the January 21, 1980 decision in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,"8 confirmed that the renewed inter-
233. Id at 96-97. Cf id. at 92: "[Tlhe California Supreme Court's application of the
minimum-contacts test in this case represents an unwarranted extension of Interna-
tional Shoe and would, if sustained, sanction a result that is neither fair, just, nor
reasonable."
234. Id at 97.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 98-99.
238. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun filed dissenting
opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan argued that the majority's approach placed too much em-
phasis "on the existence of contacts between the forum and the defendant." 444 U.S. at
299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his view, the changes in society that had occurred
since International Shoe, both the nationalization of commerce and the ease of
transportation and communication," necessitated less of an "extreme concern for defen-
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est in the territorial limits of state court jurisdiction extended to
corporate defendants as well as individuals. The defendants in
Woodson were a New York automobile dealership, Seaway Volks-
wagen, Inc., and a New York corporation that was the distributor
for the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut area, World-Wide
Volkswagen Corporation.39 The precise issue before the Supreme
Court was whether an Oklahoma court could exercise jurisdiction
over these defendants "in a products liability action, when ... [their]
only connection with Oklahoma ... [was] the fact that an automobile
sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an acci-
dent in Oklahoma." ' The Court ruled that an Oklahoma court could
not exericise jurisdiction under these circumstances because the
defendants had "no 'contacts, ties, or relations' with the State of
Oklahoma."2"1
Mr. Justice White's majority opinion proceeded from the
premise that "a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist 'minimum con-
tacts' between the defendant and the forum State." ' This limitation
on the jurisdiction of state courts served "two related, but distin-
guishable, functions": (1) protecting "the defendant against the
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum;" and (2)
insuring "that the States through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sover-
eigns in a federal system."2 '3
The majority opinion noted that prior decisions had typically
dants" than was once necessary to satisfy "constitutional concepts of fairness." Id. at
309. Although he still would require a demonstration of "sufficient contacts ... among
the parties, the forum .... and the forum state" to render the proposed place of trial a
fair one, he concluded that Oklahoma property could exercise jurisdiction under this
revised test. Id. quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 220 (Brennan, J., Dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Blackmun, declared that the majority
had taken too narrow a view of the "forum-related conduct" of the defendants. He
argued that jurisdiction could be "premised on the deliberate and purposeful actions of
the defendants themselves in choosing to become part of a nationwide . . . network for
marketing and servicing automobiles." 444 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In a
separate dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Blackmun argued that when a vendor could
foresee that an automobile would be used in a state other than the one in which it was
sold, this was sufficient to subject the seller to jurisdiction in the state where the
automobile was used. 444 U.S. at 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. The plaintiffs also sued the manufaturer of the automobile and its importer,
both of them remained as defendants in the Oklahoma suit despite the Supreme
Courts' decision in Woodson 444 U.S. at 288.
240. Id. at 287.
241. Id. at 299.
242. Id. at 291.
243. Id. 291.
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described the first function of the minimum contacts principle, pro-
tecting against inconvenient litigation, "in terms of 'reasonableness'
and 'fairness.' "2" According to Mr. Justice White, this "emphasis on
reasonableness" allowed the Court to retain "the burden on the
defendant" as a primary concern while also permitting consideration
of other relevant factors such as "['1] the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute . . ; [2] the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief . . .; [3] the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies; and [4] the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies." ' 5 As a practical
matter, the variety of factors considered under this reasonableness
standards substantially had relaxed "[t]he limits imposed on state
jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause, in its role as a guarantor
against inconvenient litigation," a trend "largely attributable to a
fundamental transformation in the American economy.""2 '
Despite this relaxation of due process limits, the Woodson
majority affirmed that the Court had "never accepted the proposi-
tion that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes" and
could not if it was to "remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution."2 7 Those principles, the
Court declared, required "that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign
power to try causes in their courts."' 8 This guarantee of sover-
eignty, in turn, "implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its
sister States," a limitation that the Court never expressly defined,
but which apparently consisted of the prohibition against a sister
state exerting in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who lacked
contacts with the state. ' Moreover, this limit on state sovereignty
applied regardless of whether jurisdiction was appropriate under
the tests of reasonableness or fairness; that is, it precluded the exer-
cise of jurisdiction "[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or
no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals
of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; [and] even if the forum State is
the most convenient location for litigation."12 0
244. Id. 292.
245. Id. 292.
246. Id at 293.
247. Id at 293.
248. Id. at 293.
249. Id. at 293.
250. Id. at 294.
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This limit on state sovereignty formed the basis for the Wood-
son holding that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction over the
New York retailer or the New Jersey distributor. Neither defendant
carried on any of its corporate activities in Oklahoma nor did either
attempt to serve the Oklahoma automobile market, directly or indi-
rectly. Thus, the only basis for jurisdiction was "the fortuitous cir-
cumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New
York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing
through Oklahoma"; this circumstance was insufficient to establish
"those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to
any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.""25
The Court expressly rejected the argument "that because an
automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was
'foreseeable' that the . . . [plaintiffs] Audi would cause injury in
Oklahoma." ' According to the majority, "'foreseeability' alone has
never been a sufficient bench mark for personal jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause." 52 Although conceding that foreseeability
was not "wholly irrelevant," the Woodson majority emphasized that
"the foreseeability that is critical to Due Process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State."2 ' Instead, foreseeability embodies the requirement "that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being hailed into court there." '55
This requirement permitted a state court to exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident corporation" if the sale of a product of a manu-
facturer or distributor is not simply an isolated occurrence, but
arises from the efforts of the . . . [defendant] to serve directly or
indirectly, the market for its product in other States." ' 8 But "no
such or similar basis for Oklahoma jurisdiction over . . . [the retailer
and distributor]" existed in Woodson because neither corporation
had sought to serve the Oklahoma market.257
251. Id at 295.
252. Id. at 295.
253. Id. at 295.
254. Id. at 297.
255. Id. 297.
256. Id.
257. Id Nor was the Court persuaded by the argument that the Woodson defen-
dants earned "substantial revenues from goods used in Oklahoma" since "the pur-
chase of automobiles in New York, from which the petitioners earn[ed] substantial
revenue, would not occur but for the fact that the automobiles are capable of use in
distant states like Oklahoma." Id at 298. According to the Court, major "financial
benefits accruing to the defendant from a collateral relation to the forum State will not
support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with
the State." Id at 299.
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In Rem Jurisdiction
The adoption of the minimum contacts principle for in personam
jurisdiction led to the growth of a considerable body of commentary
arguing that a minimum contacts or fairness principle should be
substituted for Pennoyer's territorial framework for in rem cases as
well. This scholarly ferment directed little attention to suits to quiet
title to real estate or to determine the ownership of tangible prop-
erty because everyone appeared to concede that the state where the
property was located would have jurisdiction in these cases under
either principle.25 But commentators did argue that the flexible rule
of International Shoe would permit the overruling of Dunlevy259 and
allow a desirable expansion of in rem jurisdiction in cases involving
claims to intangible property in which no state could exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction over all the potential claimants."'
Even more scholarly attention was directed at criticism of the
exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in cases like Harris, which
allowed states the authority to dispose of the property of nonresi-
dents within their borders even in lawsuits to satisfy claims
unrelated to the property."1 Now that International Shoe permitted
a state's courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant whenever the defendant had sufficient contacts with
the forum state to "make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the .. .[defendant] to defend the
particular suit which is brought there,""2 critics of the Harris rule
argued that its only function was to allow a state, merely because a
person owned property within its borders, to adjudicate a contro-
258. But cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977) (in explaining why the
Delaware courts lacked quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that the record
did not indicate that the defendants has "ever set foot in Delaware" nor that "any act
related to this cause of action [had] taken place in Delaware").
259. For a description of the Dunlevy holding, see notes 90-93, supra, and accom-
panying text.
260. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 156, at 960-65. Cf. von Mehren & Traut-
man, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1159
(1966): "The only argument of policy against such acceptance [of state interpleader
actions reaching nonresident defendants] would turn on the preferability of extending
federal interpleader to cover those situations."
261. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27
HARV. L. REV. 107, 121-22 (1913); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of
Extended Jurisdiction, in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 583-85; Hazard, supra note 13,
at 282; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 141; Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEx. L. REV. 657, 662-63 (1959); Zammit, supra note 13, at
670-72; Developments, supra note 156, at 955-60. But see Smit, The Enduring Utility
of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600
(1977).
262. 326 U.S. at 317.
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versy that it was unreasonable to require the person to litigate
there. This result, they contended, was inconsistent with an essen-
tial element of the International Shoe principle, the prohibition
against a state rendering binding judgments "against an individual
or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations.""2 3
The 1950 decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Company... appeared to support the position that the minimum con-
tacts principle had replaced Pennoyer's emphasis on territoriality
with respect to attempts to exercise jurisdiction, whether labeled in
personam or in rem. Mullane involved a New York statutory scheme
designed to provide an accounting binding on all claimants to trust
funds administered by New York banks."' Objectors to the account-
ing in Mullane2. argued that New York's courts lacked authority to
"adjudicate at all as against those beneficiaries who reside without
the State" because "the proceeding is one in personam in that the
decree affects neither title to nor possession of any res, but
adjudges only personal rights of the beneficiaries to surcharge their
trustee for negligence or breach of trust.""2 7 The Court swiftly
rejected this challenge to state jurisdictional authority, and it did so
without deciding whether the New York proceeding was in
personam or in rem. "Without disparaging the usefullness of distinc-
tions between actions in rem and those in personam in many
branches of the law, or on other issues," Mr. Justice Jackson's
majority opinion refused to "rest the power of the State to resort to
constructive service in this proceeding upon how its courts or this
Court may regard this historic antithesis." ' To the contrary, the
majority was content to rely on the following justification:
[Wlhatever the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the
interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as
to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine
the interest of all claimants, resident or nonresident. '
263. Id. at 319.
264. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
265. N.Y. [BANKING] LAW § 100-C, 1937 N.Y. Laws, c. 687, as amended by 1943 N.Y.
Laws, c. 602 & 1944 N.Y. Laws, c. 158.
266. The appellants in Mullane were the special guardians and attorneys that the
court appointed for "all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had
or might thereafter have any interest" in the income or principal of the common trust
fund. 339 U.S. at 310.
267. Id. at 311.
268. Id. at 312-13.
269. Id. at 313.
19811 1107
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Despite the language of Mullane the Supreme Court never com-
pletely abandoned the distinction between actions in personam and
those in rem, nor did it jettison the territorial principle in defining
the limits of in rem jurisdiction. In Hanson the Court appeared to
foreclose the use of the minimum contacts principle to expand in
rem jurisdiction with respect to claims concerning rights to intan-
gibles. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion adhered to Pen-
noyer's territorial framework in explaining the reach of in rem
jurisdiction by describing it as "[flounded on physical power" and
"limited by the extent of . . . [the state's] power and by the coor-
dinate power of sister States" and identifying its essential element
as "the presence of the subject property within the territorial
jurisdiction of the forum State."' 70 Although the Chief Justice con-
ceded that "the situs of intangibles is often a matter of
controversy," that issue was not a problem in Hanson:
The parties seem to assume that the trust assets that formed
the subject matter of this action were located in Delaware and
not in Florida. We can see nothing in the record contrary to that
assumption, or sufficient to establish a situs in Florida.27'
The Hanson majority also rejected the Florida court's holding
that "the presence of the subject property was not essential to its
jurisdiction." ' According to the Chief Justice, Florida's probate
authority did not allow it to determine the validity of Mrs. Donner's
inter vivos power of attorney because of "the contingent role of this
Florida will," ' which applied only if the power of appointment were
ineffective. Such an expansion of probate jurisdiction was unaccept-
able, he declared, because it would grant probate courts "nationwide
service of process to adjudicate interest in property with which
neither the State nor the decedent could claim any affiliation."27 '
Hanson did not completely settle the question of whether the
minimum contacts principle could be used to expand a state's ability
to exert in rem jurisdiction. Only a week after Hanson was decided,
270. 357 U.S. at 246. In the paragraph preceding the language quoted in the text
the Chief Justice reaffirmed the utility of the in personam and in rem classications,
although he conceded that they did not "exhaust all the situations that give rise to
jurisdiction." Id.
271. Id. at 246-47.
272. Id. at 247. Hanson also found Mrs. Donner's Florida domicile "equally unavail-
ing as a basis for jurisdiction over the trust assets." Id. at 249. Declaring "the maxim
that personality has its situs at the domicile of its owner" to be a "fiction of limited
utility," the majority concluded that "[tihe fact that the owner is or was domiciled with
the forum State is not a sufficient affiliation with the property upon which to base
jurisdiction in rem." Id.
273. Id. at 248.
274. Id. at 248-49.
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the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Atkinson v. Superior
Court,275 a widely noted decision of the California Supreme Court
that relied on the minimum contacts principle to approve the exer-
cise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction with respect to intangibles without
an explicit determination that the property was physically present
in California. In light of this denial, one could dismiss the apparent
clarity of the Hanson language with respect to in rem, as well as in
personam, jurisdiction as designed to achieve a just substantive
result in the case before the court." In fact, at least two states
relied on International Shoe's fairness concept to stretch quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction in tort cases; they characterized the alleged tort-
feasor's insurance policy as a debt that the company owed to the
tortfeasor and allowed jurisdiction based on an attachment of the
policy. The effect of this expansion was to permit the state's courts
to exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits based on automobile accidents
occuring outside the state when the plaintiff was a resident of the
forum and the alleged tortfeasor was insured by a company licensed
to do business within the state. 77
Although the Court vacillated on the issue of whether the
minimum contacts principle could expand in rem jurisdiction, the
1977 decision of Shaffer v. Heitner"8 expressly answered in the affir-
275. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), noted in
46 CAL. L. REV. 637 )1958).
276. See COUND. FRIEDENTHAL, & MILLER supra note 223, at 141.
277. See Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110 (1978); Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966); Rush v. Savchuck, 311 Minn. 480,
245 N.W.2d 264 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), reaffirmed on remand, 272 N.W.2d
888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Other states rejected the insurance attach-
ment theory, although New Hampshire allowed it if the defendant resided in a state
that permitted it. See Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320, 326 (1980).
278. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Conceptual and Prac-
tical Effects 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 183 (1978); Note, 13 TULSA L.J. 82 (1977). Mr. Justice
Powell filed a concurring opinion. Although he agreed with the Court's extension of
the principles of International Shoe to govern assertions of in rem jurisdiction as well
as its determination that the defendants in Shaffer had insufficient contacts for
Delaware to exercise jurisdiction, he preferred to reserve judgment as to "whether the
ownership of some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently
located with a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a
defendant to jurisdiction within the State," at least to the extent of the value of the
property. 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring). In a separate concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Stevens urged that the holding be limited to a determination that the due pro-
cess clause protected defendants "against 'judgments without notice.'" 433 U.S. at 217
(Stevens, J., concurring). He argued that the requisite notice should provide both
"actual notice of the particular claim" and a "fair warning" that the activity under-
taken could subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. According to
Mr. Justice Stevens, the defect in Shaffer was the failure to provide "fair warning"
that the ownership of stock would subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of
Delaware's courts.
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented. He agreed that the minimum contacts standard
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mative the question of whether the minimum contacts principle
limited a state's ability to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on
the presence of property within its borders. The basis for jurisdic-
tion in Shaffer was a Delaware sequestration statute"7 that allowed
a state court "to compel the personal attendance" of a nonresident
defendant by seizing his property within the state."0 In Shaffer, the
plaintiff had sought to use the sequestration statute in a share-
holder's derivative action to obtain jurisdiction over the nonresident
directors of Greyhound Corporation, a corporation incorporated in
Delaware. The property that was the subject of the sequestration
order was stock options in the Greyhound Corporation; under state
law, the stock of a Delaware corporation had a situs within that
state."'
Applying the Harris rule, 8' Delaware's courts had little diffi-
culty rejecting the jurisdictional challenges of the Shaffer defen-
dants."' The presence of their property within the state was suffi-
cient to give Delaware's courts authority to dispose of the property
in an unrelated dispute, and thus the defendants' contacts (or lack of
contacts) with the forum state were irrelevant. The Supreme Court,
however, refused to accept this "categorical analysis" because it was
based on a faulty assumption of "the continued soundness of the con-
ceptual framework founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer v.
Neff."28
should govern in all cases involving challenges to state-court jurisdiction; however, he
declared that the majority's determination of whether minimum contacts were present
was a mere "advisory opinion" because the Delaware judgment was based on a tradi-
tional analysis of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 436 U.S. at 220-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
He also argued that, if it were appropriate for the Court to decide the minimum
contacts issue on the existing record, the Shaffer defendants had sufficient contacts to
allow Delaware to exercise jurisdiction over them. Id at 222-28.
279. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975), quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 190 n.4 (1977).
280. 433 U.S. at 193 (quoting decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery).
Delaware did not recognize the limited appearance. See notes 155-59, supra, and
accompanying text. To offer a defense on the merits, defendants whose property had
been sequestered had to enter a general appearance thus subjecting themselves to in
personam, liability. Id at 195 n.12.
281. DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 169 (1975), quoted in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 n.9.
Earlier decisions of the Supreme Court had upheld A similar situs finding for stocks in
another context. See State Tax Comm'n v. Untermeyer, 316 U.S. 645 (1942); State Tax
Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
282. See notes 86-89, supra, and accompanying text.
283. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976). The Delaware court also
rejected the contention that the prejudgment attachment procedures violated the due
process standards established by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), but the Supreme Court never reached this question because of its resolution of
the jurisdictional issue. 433 U.S. at 93.
284. 433 U.S. at 196.
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After reviewing the Pennoyer holding in some detail, Mr.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Shaffer described the quasi-in.
rem doctrine as an amelioration of the harshness of Pennoyer's in
personam rules, which "favored nonresident defendants by making
them harder to sue."285 But the intervening decades had expanded
significantly the state's ability to exert in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident. As a result of the line of decisions extending
from Hess to International Shoe, "the relationship among the defen-
dant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclu-
sive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest,
became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdic-
tion."'
Mr. Justice Marshall acknowledged that "[n]o equally dramatic
change has occurred in the law of governing jurisdiction in rem;"
nonetheless, he detected "intimations that the collapse of the "in per-
sonam wing of Pennoyer has not left that decision unweakened as a
foundation for in rem jurisdiction" in "[wiell-reasoned lower court
opinions,"" as well as scholarly commentary 88 and in the increas-
ingly strict notice requirements that the court's decisions had imposed
in cases in which jurisdiction was based on the attachment of prop-
erty. 89 In light of these developments, he concluded that "the time
is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial
justice set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern
actions in rem as well as in personam."' 0
The majority described the argument for applying the Interna-
tional Shoe standard to in rem jurisdiction as "simple and
straightforward."' 1 Its basic premise was the acceptance of the
Restatement's assertion that "[tihe phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over
a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction
285. Id. at 200.
286. Id. at 204.
287. Id. at 205, citing U.S. Industries v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Camire v. Scieszka, 358 A.2d 397 (N.H. 1976);
Bekins v. Huish, 401 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1965); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338,
316 P.2d 960 (1955), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1957).
288. 433 U.S. at 205, citing Hazard, supra note 13; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 260; Traynor, supra note 261; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956);
Developments, supra note 156.
289. 433 U.S. at 206, citing Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962);
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
290. 433 U.S. at 206.
291. Id. at 207.
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over the interests of persons in a thing.""2 Acceptance of this
premise led naturally to the conclusion that "to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to
justify exercising 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a
thing.' "29 Since International Shoe's minimum contacts principle
established "[t]he standard for determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due
Process Clause," that standard should govern the exercise of in rem
as well as in personam jurisdiction."'4 To preserve the Harris rule
merely would perpetuate "[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdic-
tion over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over
the owner of the property" and would amount to "support[ing] an
ancient form without substantial modern justification." 5 Unwilling
"to allow state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the
defendant," the majority opinion declared in sweeping terms "that
all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.""6
Applying the minimum contacts principle to the factual situation
involved in Shaffer, the majority found insufficient contacts with the
state to permit Delaware to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent directors. Even though the property had a "statutory
presence" in Delaware, the defendants' ownership of the property
could not provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the
jurisdiction of that state's courts because the "property . . . [was]
not the subject matter of this litigation, nor ... [was] the underlying
cause of action related to the property." 7 Moreover, the plaintiff
neither claimed that the defendants had "ever set foot in Delaware"
nor identified "any act related to his cause of action as having taken
place in Delaware." 8 Under these circumstances the Court was
unwilling to rely solely on the defendants' "positions as directors
and officers of a corporation chartered in Delaware" to "provide suf-
ficient 'contacts, ties, or relations' . . . with that State to give its
courts jurisdiction over [them].""" The majority recognized that
Delaware might have an interest in asserting jurisdiction in stock-
holder derivation actions to protect its ability to define the respon-
292. Id., citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971) (Introductory
Note).
293. 433 U.S. at 207.
294. Id.
295. Id at 212.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 213.
298. Id.
299. Id at 213-14 (footnote omitted).
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sibilities of corporate officers. That interest, however, did not
authorize jurisdiction in Shaffer because of "the failure of the
Delaware Legislature to assert the state interest that [the plaintiff]
finds so compelling"; °0° the basis for jurisdiction under Delaware law
rested not on the defendants' "status as corporate fiduciaries, but
rather on the presence of their property in the State."' 1 Further-
more, "even if . . . [the plaintiffs] assessment of the importance of
Delaware's interest . . . [was] accepted, his argument fail[ed] to
demonstrate that Delaware . . . [was] a fair forum for this liti-
gation";"0 2 at most it demonstrated that Delaware's substantive law
should govern the merits of the controversy. In conclusion, the
majority declared that the defendants "have simply had nothing to
do with the State of Delaware" since Delaware had "not enacted a
statute that treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to juris-
diction in the State" or "required . . . [the defendants] to acquire
interests in . . . [the corporation] in order to hold their positions." '
The decision in Shaffer understandably raised doubts as to thecontinued validity of the cases permitting a state court to exercise
jurisdiction in tort suits against nonresidents by attaching the alleged
tortfeasor's insurance policy. The initial results in the lower courts
were encouraging; at least two state courts3 4 and the second cir-
cuit"0 5 upheld insurance attachment jurisdiction in cases after Shaffer.
But the arguments supporting those decisions failed to persuade the
Supreme Court in Rush v. Savchuck,'" which invalidated
Minnesota's attempt to base jurisdiction on an insurance attachment
300. Id. at 214.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 215.
303. Id. at 216. A footnote reference called attention to three states that had
enacted statutes treating acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the
state. Id. at 216 n.47, citing CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-322 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
55-33 (1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-5-70 (1977).
304. Rush v. Savchuk, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd 444 U.S. 320 (1980);
Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110 (1978).
305. O'Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1034 (1978). See Note, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 736 (1979).
306. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens dissented.
For a summary of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent, which also applied to Woodson, see
note 238 supra. Mr. Justice Steven's, dissent conceded that Shaffer precluded the
assertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction with respect to property that was located within
the forum but had no relationship to the cause of action. Nonetheless, he argued that
Shaffer did not preclude jurisdiction in Rush because the carrier did business in the
forum and had contracted specifically in the attached insurance policy to defend
against the very type of litigation that the case involved. 444 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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in a law suit between a Minnesota resident and an Indiana resident
that arose as a result of an automobile accident in Indiana."7
Mr. Justice Marshall again authored the majority opinion. It
began its analysis with the Shaffer directives that "all assertions of
state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stand-
ards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny" and that "[iun
determining whether a particular exercise of state-court jurisdiction
is consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on 'the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'"308
Applying these directives to Rush, the majority concluded that Min-
nesota could not exercise jurisdiction because the defendant "Rush ...
[had] never had any contacts with Minnesota.""3 9 Indeed, "[tihe only
affiliating circumstances offered to show a relationship among Rush,
Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that Rush's insurance company does
business in the State."3 "0 This circumstance "suggest[ed] no further
contacts between the defendant and the forum, and the record
suppl[ied] no evidence of any. 31
The majority also rejected two other rationales to support
jurisdiction in Rush. First, it refused to uphold jurisdiction "by
treating the attachment procedure as the functional equivalent of a
direct action against the insurer." '312 Mr. Justice Marshall gave two
reasons for this reluctance: Under the insurance attachment
schemes, "[t]he State's ability to exert its power over the 'nominal
defendant' is analytically prerequisite to the insurer's entry into the
case as a garnishee;" 313 and the direct action analogy required an
"assumption that the defendant has no real stake in the litigation,"
an assumption the majority opinion termed "far from self evident.""' 4
307. The jurisdictional issue had a significant relationship to the merits in Rush.
Had Minnesota been allowed to exercise jurisdiction, its conflicts rules would have
resulted in the application of Minnesota comparative negligence law in lieu of Indiana's
contributory negligence rule and also might have refused to apply Indiana's guest
statute. 444 U.S. at 325 n.8.
308. Id at 327, quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 212 (1977).
309. 444 U.S. at 327.
310. Id. at 328.
311. Id.
312. Id at 330.
313. Id at 330-31.
314. Id at 331. In a footnote, the Court gave some examples of circumstances in
which the "nominal defendant" might have a substantial stake in the litigation:
A party does not extinguish his legal interest in a dispute by insuring himself
against having to pay an eventual judgment out of his own pocket. Moreover, the
purpose of insurance is simply to make the defendant whole for the economic
costs of the lawsuit; but noneconomic factors may also be important to the defen-
dant. Professional malpractice actions, for example, question the defendant's inte-
grity and competance and may affect his professional standing .... Further, one
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Second, the majority also spurned the suggestion that sufficient con-
tacts for Minnesota jurisdiction could be found "by considering the
'defending parties' together and aggregating their forum contacts in
determining whether it had jurisdiction. 1 5 International Shoe's
requirements, Mr. Justice Marshall declared, had to be "met as to
each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction." '
The Rush opinion closed by noting that the justification for
jurisdiction shared a "common characteristic: "[Tihey shift the focus
of the inquiry from the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation to that among the plaintiff, the forum, the insurer,
and the litigation.""3 7 According to the majority, International Shoe's
minimum contacts principle forbade this approach. When "a defen-
dant has certain judicially cognizable ties with a State," Interna-
tional Shoe permitted consideration of a "variety of factors" to
determine if a state's exercise of jurisdiction would satisfy the
fairness test.1 But when "the defendant has no contacts with the
forum," the due process clause precludes a state from making a
binding judgment. 9
Status Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court never has brought the status cases com-
pletely within the umbrella of International Shoe's minimum contacts
principle. Indeed, the Court had not articulated any clear unifying
principle in the status jurisdiction cases, nor has it ever ended the
division between the due process and full faith and credit stand-
ards."' The result has been somewhat of a hodgepodge-the divorce
cases have significantly expanded the ability of a state to dissolve
the marriage but not to end its financial obligations, while the
custody decisions have made it difficult for a state to render any
type of custody award that the Constitution requires a state court
to treat as binding on a nonresident.
can easily conceive the cases in which the defendant might have a substantial
economic stake in [insurance-attachment] litigation-if, for example, multiple
plaintiffs sued in different State for an aggregate amount in excess of the policy
limits, or if a successful claim would effect the policyholder's insurability. For
these reasons, the defendant's interest in the adjudication of his liability cannot
reasonably be characterized as de minimus.
Id. at 331 n.20.
315. Id. at 331.
316. Id. at 332.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 332-33.
320. See H. CLARK, supra note 96, at 289-90; Corwin, Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93
U. PA. L. REV. 341 (1945).
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Divorce
Even though the Supreme Court's decision in Haddock v. Haddock
was criticized widely,321 its dual requirements of domicile of one of
the parties and in personam jurisdiction over both parties remained
an accurate summary of the constitutional limits of divorce jurisdic-
tion for forty years until Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I)
overruled the requirement that the court acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant. Williams held that a state divorce
judgment was entitled to full faith and credit if the plaintiff were
domiciled in the forum state. It, therefore, reversed North Carolina
bigamy convictions of two defendants who had returned to North
Carolina after a three-month stay in Nevada during which they both
received Nevada divorces, following constructive service of process
on the absent spouses, and then married each other. The trial judge
had charged the jury that North Carolina would not recognize a
Nevada divorce decree based on substituted service when the defen-
dant made no appearance.2 Expressly overruling Haddock, the
Court declared that "[d]omicile creates a relationship to the state"
authorizing the state to "alter within its own border the marriage
status of the spouse domiciled there, even through the other spouse
is absent,"32' and that a state court judgment exercising this author-
ity is entitled to full faith and credit "if the form and nature of the
substituted service . . . meet the requirements of due process."3
The North Carolina prosecutor refused to give up; however, he
instituted a new bigamy action against the defendants in Williams I.
A jury again convicted them after being charged that the recitation
of Nevada domicile in the divorce decree was sufficient to support
the inference that the defendants were domiciled there but it did
321. 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Even though ex parte divorce decrees rendered by a state
where only one marriage partner was domiciled were not entitled to full faith and
credit, a number of states recognized them as a matter of comity. E.g., Crimm v. Crimm,
211 Ala. 13, 99 So. 301 (1924); Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92 Atl. 684
(1914). See H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 348 (2d ed. 1938). The following articles
are illustrative of the scholarly debate that Haddock generated. Beale, Constitutional
Protection of Decrees of Divorce, 19 HARV. L. REV. 586 (1906); Beale, Haddock
Revisited, 39 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1926); Bingham, The American Law Institute v. the
Supreme Court-In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRN L.Q. 393 (1939);
McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction, 37 YALE L.J. 564 (1928);
Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case, 32 ILL. L. REV. 796 (1938); Vreeland, Mr.
and Mrs. Haddock, 20 A.B.A.J. 568 (1934).
322. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
323. Id at 290-91.
324. Id. at 298-99. Cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (state of domicile
retains in personam jurisdiction over its domicillaries). See notes 56-61, supra, and
accompanying text.
325. 317 U.S. at 299.
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not compel such an inference. In William v. North Carolina
(Williams II),3"' the Supreme Court affirmed the second set of convic-
tions on the basis of an opinion that emphasized the state's terri-
torial power, particularly its power to control the substantive law
that governs those who live within its borders. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion rested on two premises: (1) The full faith
and credit clause precludes inquiry into the merits of a sister state's
judgments "only if the court of the first State .. . [has] power to
pass on the merits-has jurisdiction, that is, to render the judg-
ment;" 7 and (2) "[u]nder our system of law, judicial power to grant a
divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile." '328
Since the domicile of the parties was a jurisdictional requirement
for divorce cases, a court could inquire whether domicile (the basis
for divorce jurisdiction) existed prior to determining whether a
divorce judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. Of course,
even jurisdictional issues could not be relitigated "after appro-
priate opportunity to present their contentions has been afforded to
all who had an interest in its adjudication" but this rule did not
preclude relitigation by the state, which was not a party to the ori-
ginal litigation.2 ' Because the state "is concerned with the vindica-
tion of its own social policy and has no means, certainly no effective
means, to protect that interest against the selfish action of those
outside its borders," it had "a right, when asserting its own unques-
tioned authority, to ascertain the trust or existence of . . . [the]
crucial fact [of domicile]."3 '
Applying these principles, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded
that North Carolina was not required to give full faith and credit to
.the Nevada divorce decrees because the North Carolina court gave
the Nevada court's determinations the "[a]ppropriate weight" to
which they were entitled and allowed the jury to overturn those
determinations "only by relevant standards of proof."3 1 Although
the Court recognized that because of its rule "persons may, no
doubt, place themselves in situations that create unhappy conse-
quences," it viewed that result as one "inevitable in a federal
system in which regulation of domestic relations has been left with
the States.3 32
326. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
327. Id at 229.
328. Id.
329. Id at 230.
330. Id.
331. Id at 236.
332. Id at 237.
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A companion case to Williams indicated that a spouse could also
challenge the jurisdictional finding of domicile on which a divorce
judgment was based. In Eisenwein v. Eisenwein.3 the husband filed
suit in Pennsylvania seeking to terminate a support order issued by
a Pennsylvania court on the ground that a subsequent Nevada
divorce decree extinguished his support obligation. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court refused to give the Nevada decree full faith
and credit. It concluded that the defendant, Mrs. Eisenwein, had
proved that her husband was not domiciled in Nevada when the
judgment was rendered and that the Nevada court therefore lacked
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in a brief opinion. The
majority insisted "[tihis case involves the same problem as that
which was considered in [Williams Ill" and thus concluded that "the
considerations which controlled the result in [Williams II] govern
this.""'4
In subsequent decisions the Court limited Williams II by reduc-
ing the occasions when a court, prior to giving a judgment recogni-
tion under the full faith and credit clause, could independently
review the finding of domicile on which the court of a sister state
based its jurisdiction. The starting point for analysis was Davis v.
Davis,3.5 a pre-Williams II case holding that the parties could not
relitigate the issue of domicile when the question had been fully
explored in the original divorce action. But the pivotal case for
limiting Williams I was Sherrer v. Sherrer,336 which precluded an
333. 325 U.S. 279 (1945). Mr. Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion in which he
emphasized that it was "important to keep in mind a basic difference between the
problem of marital capacity and the problem of support." 325 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). When the parties to a marriage are domiciled in different states, the prob-
lem of marital capacity is one that involves many conflicting interest between the two
states, but the problem of support is more clearly the concern of the state where the
party seeking support is domiciled. Id at 282. In later majority opinions, Mr. Justice
Douglas expanded this distinction into the divisible divorce doctrine. See notes 366-93,
infra, and accompanying text.
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge announced his agreement
with the argument set forth by Mr. Justice Douglas as well as his acceptance of the
majority opinion as the natural application of the Williams II holding, from which he
had dissented. 325 U.S. at 283 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
334. 325 U.S. at 279.
335. 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
336. 334 U.S. 343 (1948). In a dissenting opinion that Mr. Justice Murphy joined,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stressed the state's interest in "the continuance of termina-
tion of the marital relationship of its domiciliaries." Because of the importance that he
attached to this interest, he would not allow "an arranged litigation between the par-
ties in which [the state] was not represented" to foreclose the state from asserting this
interest. 334 U.S. at 363 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He thus criticized the majority's
interpretation of the full faith and credit clause on the ground that it threatened to
give a "few states which offer bargain-counter divorces" the power to control the social
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independent review of the domicile question in a situation where
both parties appeared in the divorce action but the domicile issue
was not really contested.
In Sherrer Mrs. Sherrer left Massachusetts, the place of the
marital domicile, and went to Florida. She filed a lawsuit seeking a
divorce in Florida, and her bill of complaint alleged that she was
domiciled in the state."' After receiving notice of the Florida action
by mail, Mr. Sherrer retained a Florida attorney who entered a
general appearance on his behalf and filed an answer denying Mrs.
Sherrer's allegation that she was a Florida domicilary. At the hearing
on the merits Mrs. Sherrer offered evidence to prove her Florida
domicile. Mr. Sherrer appeared at the hearing and testified with
respect to a stipulation regarding custody, but his attorney did not
cross-examine Mrs. Sherrer or otherwise rebut her evidence with
respect to her domicile. The Florida court granted Mrs. Sherrer a
divorce; in doing so, it specifically found that she was domiciled in
Florida and that it had jurisdiction to grant the divorce. Mrs.
Sherrer subsequently remarried and moved back to Massachusetts.
When she returned, Mr. Sherrer filed an action seeking to have the
Florida divorce declared invalid and the second marriage void. The
Massachusetts courts refused to treat the Florida judgment as con-
trolling on the jurisdictional issue and, after an independent examin-
ation of the facts, concluded that the Florida court lacked jurisdic-
tion because Mrs. Sherrer was never domiciled in the state. 38
The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's major-
ity opinion began with the observation "that the proceedings in the
Florida court prior to the entry of the decree of divorce were in no
way inconsistent with the requirements of procedural due pro-
cess."339 Indeed, Mr. Sherrer "was afforded his day in court with
respect to every issue involved in the litigation, including the
jurisdictional issue of . . . [Mrs. Sherrer's] domicile.""34 The more
limited question in Sherrer was whether the finding of domicile by
the Florida court could, "consistent with the requirements of full
faith and credit, be subjected to collateral attack in the courts of a
sister State in a suit brought by the defendant in the original pro-
policy of those states that chose to place greater restrictions on the availability of
divorce. Id at 377.
337. The complaint actually alledged that she was a "bona fide legal resident" of
Florida, but the "Florida courts [had] construed the statutory requirement of resident
to be that of domicile." 334 U.S. at 345 n.3.
338. 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
339. 334 U.S. at 348.
340. Id. The Court also noted that the finding with respect to domicile was not sub-
ject to collateral attack in Florida.
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ceedings."84 ' Although the Court had never faced a situation pre-
cisely the same as the one in Sherrer, Davis was "clearly indicative
of the result to be reached here." ' 2 In conjunction with other similar
cases, it stood
for the proposition that the requirements of full faith and credit
bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on
jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there
has been participation by the defendant in the divorce pro-
ceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportun-
ity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is
not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the
State which rendered the decree."4
According to the Chief Justice, these principles controlled Sherrer.
If Mr. Sherrer "failed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
him, the responsiblity . . . . [was] his own." " Under these cir-
cumstances the Court was unwilling to allow "the dereliction of a
defendant" to "provide a basis for subsequent attack in the courts of
a sister State on a decree valid in the State in which it was ren-
dered .""
Nor was the majority persuaded that divorce cases required a
more lenient rule concerning collateral attack than other litigation
because "the regulation of the, incidents of the marital relation
involves the exercise by the States of powers of the most vital im-
portance."8 '6 The Chief Justice recognized "the importance of a
State's power to determine the incidents of basic social relationships
into which its domiciliaries enter," but concluded that issue was ir-
relevant in Sherrer.3 7 Sherrer did not involve a "situation in which
a State has merely sought to exert such power over a domicilary,"
but was "rather, a case involving inconsistent assertions of power
by courts of two States of the Federal Union and thus present[ed]
considerations which go beyond the interests of local policy, how-
ever vital." 8" In this situation the Court's role did not involve a duty
"to weigh the relative merits of the policies of Florida and Massa-
chusetts with respect to divorce and related matters," but to apply
the full faith and credit clause, which was "one of the provisions in-
corporated in to the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of
341. Id. at 349.
342. Id. at 351.
343. Id. at 351-52.
344. Id at 352.
345. Id.





transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into
a nation." '49 Applying that clause in Sherrer, the majority concluded
that, in refusing to recognize the Florida decree, "the Massachusetts
courts have asserted a power which cannot be reconciled with the
requirements of due faith and credit.""3 '
Later decisions expanded Sherrer by precluding collateral
attack on divorce judgments by third parties whose claims were
derived from their relationship to the original parties. Thus,
Johnson v. Muelberger35 ' precluded the children of the marriage
from challenging the jurisdiction of the court issuing a divorce
decree when the court had in personam jurisdiction over both
parents; Aldrich v. Aldrich52 refused to allow the estate of one of
the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the divorce court when
Sherrer would have precluded the decedent from doing so. But the
expansion of the Sherrer rule did not completely eviscerate
Williams 11. In Rice v. Rice 53 the Court continued to permit a state
to re-examine the jurisdictional finding of a sister state's court in
situations in which the spouse challenging the jurisdiction was not
subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court rendering the
divorce decree. Moreover, the Court has never decided whether
Sherrer would apply to the type of lawsuit involved in Williams II, a
state prosecution for the violation of its criminal laws.
Custody
During the second half of the twentieth century the constitu-
tional restrictions on the ability of state courts to exercise jurisdic-
349. Id at 354-55.
350. Id at 355. A companion case, Coe v. Coe. 334 U.S. 378 (1948), applied Sherrer
to a situation where the nonresident spouse entered an answer admitting the allega-
tion of the divorce petition on which jurisdiction was based. Since there was no sug-
gestion "that the decree of divorce in question is ... [not] valid and final in the State
in which it was rendered and, under the law of ... [the husband's domicile], may not
be subjected to the collateral attack permitted in this case," the decree was not sub-
ject to collateral attack outside the state where it was rendered. Id at 383. "[H]ere, as
in the Sherrer case, the decree of divorce is one which was entered after procedings in
which there was participation by both plaintiff and defendant and in which both par-
ties were given full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues." Id at 384. See
Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction By Consent of the Parties-Developments Since "Sher-
rer v. Sherrer," 26 IND. L.J. 380 (1951):
"In theory, as far as federal law is concerned, the divorce decree of an American
state is entitled to full faith and credit only if the divorcing state had jurisdiction
of the subject matter by virtue of being the domicile of at least one of the parties.
In practice, the decree of a state court which had personal jurisdiction over the
parties to a marriage is entitled to full faith and credit so far as the couples are
concerned."
351. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
352. 378 U.S. 540 (1964).
353. 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
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tion in custody cases continued to be developed in the context of
defining when a state had to give full faith and credit to the custody
decrees of a sister state. 5 ' For two reasons the extent of these
restrictions remained minimal. As late as 1962, Ford v. Ford55
affirmed the Halvey rule35 that, since the full faith and credit clause
only required that a judgment be given the same effect it would
have had in the state where it was rendered, a court could modify
the custody decree of a sister state whenever the courts of the state
originally entering the decree could have done so. In addition, the
Supreme Court ruled'in May v. Anderson"3 7 that a custody decree
was binding only on those persons who were subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree.
May involved a Wisconsin decree that had awarded the father
custody in an ex parte divorce action. The decree awarded the
mother certain visitation rights; several years later she kept the
children when they came to visit her in Ohio. The father filed a
habeas corpus petition in Ohio which was granted on the ground
that the full faith and credit clause required Ohio's courts "to accept
the Wisconsin decree as binding upon the mother.""35
The Supreme Court held that the Ohio court had misconstrued the
requirements of full faith and credit. According to Mr. Justice Bur-
ton's opinion for the Court, the effect of the Wisconsin decree was
to cut off "[r]ights far more precious to . . . [the mother] than prop-
erty rights."'59 He, therefore, concluded that her "right to custody of
her children" should be denominated a "personal right" that could
be extinguished only by a court exercising in personam jurisdiction
over her." Since the Ohio courts erroneously had given full faith
and credit to the Wisconsin decree, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings." 1
Coupled with the Halvey-Ford rule permitting modification of
the custody decrees of sister states, May's requirement, in personam
354. Except for the requirement of reasonable notice and the opportunity to
appear, none of the decisions attempted to formulate a due process restriction on a
state's ability to render a binding custody decree.
355. 371 U.S. 187 (1962). See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
356. See notes 118-21, supra, and accompanying text.
357. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
358. Id. at 529. The Court's analogy referred to the cases establishing the "divisible
divorce" doctrine, which distinguished between a state's authority to terminate marital
relationship and its ability to alter the financial and property rights of the marriage
partners. See notes 366-93, infra, and accompanying text.
359. Id at 533.
360. Id at 534.
361. Id at 535.
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jurisdiction before a custody decree was binding on an individual,
provided substantial leeway for courts to circumvent the custody
decision of sister states. Commentators frequently lamented the
ease of avoiding a previous decree,"' but other observers, before
and after May, argued that the decided cases failed to reveal the
feared encouragement to child-snatching or unconcern for the value
of a stable custodial environment to the child. 3 ' At least two reasons
explained why the results were less catastrophic than some antici-
pated. For one thing, judges often were reluctant to overturn consi-
dered custody decrees, especially when child-snatching was involved,
regardless of whether the Constitution required full faith and credit
recognition for the decree. 6' In addition, the widespread adoption of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act substantially limited, as
a matter of state statutory law, a state's ability to exercise jurisdic-
tion when a court in a sister state previously had rendered a child
custody decree."5
Support
The potential impact of Williams I on divorce-related support
decrees was substantial. If the ability to grant a binding divorce
decree encompassed the ability to render a binding judgment as to
the post-divorce support obligations of the couple, one partner to
the marriage could discard, simply by moving to a state with liberal
divorce laws and no provision for alimony, all the unwelcome finan-
cial baggage associated with an unsatisfactory marriage. As a prac-
tical matter, such an approach would have permitted wealthy
362. E.g., Hazard, May v. Anderson" Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L.
REV. 379 (1959).
363. E.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 112, at 358; Stansbury, supra note 109, at 829.
For general overviews of the development of modern jurisdictional problems with
respect to child custody, see Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L.
REV. 795, (1964); Note, Custody of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 1 DRAKE L. REV.
19 (1951).
364. See H. CLARK, supra note 96, at 325.
365. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 13 & 14. The Uniform Act
basically requires a state to recognize and enforce the custody decree of another state
if the first state had jurisdiction to render the decree. Modifications of the decree by
the second state are prohibited, unless the first state's jurisdiction has ended or the
first state has declined to exercise jurisdiction because of the inconvenience of the
forum. A number of states have adopted the Act, and the number has climbed
significantly in recent years. As of 1977, eighteen states had adopted the Act; by 1978,
twenty-six had done so. See generally Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint
Custody, and Excessive Modification, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 978 (1977); Comment, Jurisdic-
tional Guidelines in Matters of Child Custody: Kansas Adopts the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, 27 KAN. L. REV. 469 (1979).
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husbands to victimize non-working wives; but the Supreme Court
never endorsed this approach. Instead, the Court introduced the
concept of "divisible divorce," which distinguished a court's ability
to dissolve the marriage relationship from its ability to resolve the
financial responsibilities incidental to marriage dissolution.
A concurring opinion in Eisenwein first suggested the "divisible
divorce" distinction that eventually limited the reach of the
Williams'I principle, which allows a state's courts to exercise
jurisdiction to dissolve the marital relationship if one of the parties
is domiciled in the state. In explaining why he concurred in Eisen-
wein while adhering to his dissent in Willaims II, Mr. Justice
Douglas relied on what he termed "a basic difference between the
problem of marital capacity and the problem of marital support." "
He argued that the Court's task under the full faith and credit
clause was "to accommodate as fully as possible the conflicting inter-
ests of the two States.""8 7 In cases raising the question of marital
capacity, the Court often faced "an irreconcilable conflict between
the policies of the two states," and it had to decide which "[o]ne
must give way in the larger interest of the federal union."8 " But the
same conflict did not necessarily appear "when it comes to
maintenance or support." ' In this latter class of cases, "[tihe State
where the deserted wife is domiciled has a deep concern in the
welfare of the family deserted by the head of the household.""8 '
Moreover, the refusal to grant full faith and credit to the support
aspect of the divorce decree imposed a much less onerous burden on
the spouse securing the divorce than would the court's refusal to
require recognition of the termination of the marriage: "If ... [a hus-
band] is required to support his former wife, he is not made a
bigamist and the offspring of his second marriage are not bastard-
ized."8 '' According to Mr. Justice Douglas, this difference in impact
distinguished Eisenwein from Williams II and allowed the Penn-
sylvania court to "refuse to alter its former order to support or...
[to] enlarge it, even though Nevada in which the other spouse was
domiciled and obtained his divorce made a different provision for
support or none at all. 81 2
366. 325 U.S. at 281. He relied on a recent law review article as authority for such
a distinction. Id at 283, citing Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Its History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1, 28 (1944).




371. Id. at 282-83.
372. Id at 283.
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Subsequent decisions converted Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring
dictum into a holding. In Estin v. Estin3. a New York court granted
Mrs. Estin a separation decree and awarded her permanent alimony.
Mr. Estin subsequently moved to Nevada and secured a divorce in
that state. The Nevada decree made no provision for alimony, and so
Mr. Estin discontinued his support payments. When Mrs. Estin filed
suit to collect the arrears, he appeared and sought to eliminate the
alimony provisions of the New York decree. Following Williams II
the New York courts found that the Nevada divorce decree was
valid because Mr. Estin was domiciled in Nevada when it was ren-
dered, but they nonetheless refused to terminate the decree's prior
support order.7 '
Before the Supreme Court Mr. Estin argued that "the tail must
go with the hide-that since by the Nevada decree, recognized in
New York, he and . . . [Mrs. Estin] are no long husband and wife, no
legal incidence of the marriage remains." '375 Echoing the theme of his
Eisenwein concurrence, Mr. Justice Douglas began his analysis of
the issue for the Estin majority by noting that allowing a state to
change the "marital capacity" of persons "does not mean that every
other legal incident of the marriage was necessarily affected." ' He
recognized that "[ain absolutist might quarrel with the result and
demand a rule that once a divorce is granted, the whole of the mar-
riage relation is dissolved, leaving no roots or tendrils of any
kind." '377 But he argued against such an absolutist view. "[T]here
are," he asserted, "few areas of the law in black and white;" instead
"[tihe greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable.""37 Indeed, "the eternal problem of'the law" has been
to accommodate conflicting interests, and "[tihis is why most legal
problems end as questions of degree." '379
In making the accommodation of interests with respect to the
duty to give full faith and credit to the divorce judgments of a sister
state, the Estin majority sharply distinguished a state's interest in
the marital status of its domiciliaries from its interest in their sup-
port obligations. The question of marital status involved "the
regularity and integrity of the marriage relation .... affect[ed] the
legitimacy of the offspring of marriage .... [and was] the basis of
373. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
374. 296 N.Y. 308, 73 N.E.2d 113 (1947), affg, 271 App. Div. 829, 66 N.Y.S.2d 421
(1946).
375. 334 U.S. at 544.
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criminal laws." 8 ' These considerations had "long permitted the
State of the matrimonial domicile to change the marital status of the
parties by an ex parte divorce proceeding"; they were also the "con-
siderations which in [Williams I and II] we thought were equally
applicable to any State in which one spouse had established a bona
fide domicile."38' But these considerations had little relevance to the
question of whether the full faith and credit clause required New
York to accept the Nevada divorce as a binding determination that
the former husband no longer owed his wife any support obligation.
Here the interests to be accommodated were significantly different.
Not only was New York "rightly concerned lest the abandoned
spouse be left impoverished," but the New York separation judg-
ment was "a property interest of ...[Mrs. Estin], created by New
York in a proceeding in which both parties were present." ' 2 The
property thus created was an intangible, and "[j]urisdiction over an
intangible . . . [could] . . .only arise from control or power over the
persons whose relationships are the source of the rights and obliga-
tions."8 ' Since the domicile of the debtor within the forum state was
insufficient to allow the state "to determine the personal rights of
the creditor in the intangible," Nevada's position as the state of Mr.
Estin's domicile did not give its courts jurisdiction to alter Mrs.
Estin's rights under the New York judgment. 4 The practical effect
of this analysis was, as Mr. Justice Douglas recognized, "to make
the divorce divisible-to give effect to the Nevada decree insofar as
it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the issue of
alimony."3 5 But this approach was acceptable because "[ilt accom-
modate[d] the interests of both Nevada and New York in this broken
marriage by restricting each State to the matters of her dominate
concern."380
Nine years later the Court extinguished any lingering doubts
about the extent of the divisible divorce doctrine in Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt.87 In Vanderbilt the husband obtained a Nevada divorce
decree, which was entitled to full faith and credit, before a New
York court reduced his wife's right to support to a judgment.88 Mr.
380. Id. at 546.
381. Id. at 547.
382. Id. at 547-48.
383. Id at 548.
384. 334 U.S. at 548, citing inter alia New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S.
518 (1916). For a description of the Dunlevy holding, see notes 90-93, supra, and accom-
panying text.
385. 334 U.S. at 549.
386. Id.
387. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
388. The New York court relied on the presence of Mr. Vanderbilt's property to
authorize it to exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Id. at 417. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
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Justice Black's majority opinion recognized that this factor distin-
guished Estin, but treated the distinction as immaterial. Classifying
Mrs. Vanderbilt's right to support under the law of New York as "a
personal claim or obligation," the majority concluded that "the
Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any . . .[such]
right" because it lacked in personam jurisdiction over her. 89 And
since an essential element for jurisdiction was lacking, "the Nevada
decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife's right to sup-
port, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate
New York to give it recognition."3
The effect of Estin and Vanderbilt was to limit Williams I by
restricting the impact that a divorce decree based on the plaintiffs
domicile could have on the property rights of the nonresident spouse.
But Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank39 ' cautioned against
too hasty a generalization that such an ex parte divorce decree
could never affect property rights. Simons involved the question of
"whether a husband's valid Florida divorce, obtained in a proceeding
wherein his nonresident wife was served by publication only and did
not make a personal appearance," could extinguish constitutionally
"her dower right in his Florida estate." ' The Court held that it
could; "under Florida law no dower right survived the ... [divorce]
decree," and no constitutional prohibition precluded Florida from
declaring "that dower rights in Florida property, being inchoate, are
extinguished by a divorce decree predicated upon substituted or
constructive service."3'
No similar distinction on the ability to issue support decisions
U.S. 186 (1977), would appear to preclude such jurisdiction today unless the defendant
has sufficient contacts with the forum state to satisfy the minimum contacts test
established by International Shoe.
389. 354 U.S. at 418. Cf. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (right to custody of
one's child is a personal right that can be extinguished only by a court able to exercise
in personam jurisdiction over the parent). See notes 357-61, supra, and accompanying
text.
390. 354 U.S. at 419.
391. 381 U.S. 81 (1965). Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in an opinion that interpreted
Simons as a retreat from the principle that "an ex parte divorce can have no effect on
property rights," a retreat that he favored. 381 U.S. at 87-88 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In a separate concurrence that Mr. Justice Douglas joined, Mr. Justice Black argued
that Simons represented no retreat from Estin and its progeny. Because the dower
right vested only in "the legal wife of the husband when he dies," the divorce decree
did not sever any existing right. 381 U.S. at 88-89 (Black, J., concurring). Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Goldberg dissented, arguing that the writ should have been
dismissed as improvidently granted since the only issues involved were questions of
state law. 381 U.S. at 89 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
392. 381 U.S. at 82.
393. Id. at 85.
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governed custody cases. To issue a custody decree entitled to full
faith and credit, May required that the court have in personam
jurisdiction over the parent; if the court had such jurisdiction, it
could also order the parent to pay support. But Kulko revealed that
the achievement of in personam jurisdiction could prove difficult
when the parents lived in different states, 9 ' and Shaffer now
appeared to preclude the Pennington approach of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction to reach a defendant over whom a state could not exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction. 95
Two developments mitigated these difficulties. First, state
courts developed the doctrine of "continuing jurisdiction," which
allowed a court, with in personam jurisdiction over the parties to a
divorce or custody suit, to retain in personam jurisdiction for future
modification of its decrees even though one of the parties later
moved from the state."' No Supreme Court decision ever explicitly
endorsed this doctrine, 97 but at least one state court has recently
found it to be consistent with International Shoe's minimum con-
tacts principle. 98 Second, all states adopted some version of the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which offered a
mechanism for a litigant to secre a support order against a nonresi-
dent in the nonresident's home state without the necessity of physi-
cally going to the state. 99 Indeed, the availability of the uniform act
was a principal reason that the Supreme Court concluded in Kulko
that it would be unfair to allow California to exercise jurisdiction
over the nonresident husband."0
394. See notes 225-37, supra, and accompanying text.
395. See notes 278-303, supra, and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1978); Imperial v. Hardy, 302 So. 2d
(La. 1974); Glading v. Furman, 383 A.2d 398 (Md. 1978). See generally A. EHRENZWEIG,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 90-92 (1962).
397. But see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 95 (1978) (Court indicated that
New York, where the parties lived together and obtained their original custody decree
was the appropriate state to alter the original support order).
398. Parker v. Parker, 382 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980). Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 26 (1971) (continuing jurisdiction recognized so long as
the absent party receives "[r]easonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be
heard").
399. H. CLARK, supra note 96, at 206. A plaintiff invokes the procedures of the Act
by filing a complaint in the court where he resides. The court of this initiating state
then decides whether the petition "sets forth facts from which it may be determined"
(1) that "the defendant owes a duty of support" and (2) that "a court of the responding
state may obtain jurisdiction over the defendant." Id. at 207. If adequate facts are
alleged, then the initiating state forwards the petition to the responding state where
the duty of support will be adjudictaed and, if necessary, enforced. Id. at 206-12.
400. 436 U.S. at 98-100. See notes 225-37, supra, and accomapnying text.
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Notice and the Opportunity to Appear
Notice
The Supreme Court increasingly categorized reasonable notice
to the litigants as an independent requirement of due process in all
litigation."' Indeed, International Shoe's concept of "traditional
notions of substantial justice and fair play," which ultimately defin-
ed the state's authority to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
nonresidents, was itself derived from earlier decisions applying the
same test to judge the adequacy of notice in situations in which the
state's ability to reach the nonresident was conceded.4 2 Moreover,
modern decisions also confirmed that the notice requirement applied
to state attempts to exert in rem"3 or status04 as well as in per-
sonam jurisdiction.
Mullane was the leading decision confirming that the notice
requirement was identical in in personam and in rem cases; it was
also the decision that most clearly articulated the standard to be
applied in judging the adequacy of a statutory scheme for providing
notice. As indicated above,"' Mullane concerned a New York judicial
proceeding designed to provide a definitive accounting of the actions
of trustees of "common trust funds," which were combinations of
small trust estates into larger funds for investment administration.
The New York statute establishing the accounting proceedings
require two forms of notice. First, "[alt the time the first investment
in the common fund was made on behalf of . . . [any] participating
estate," the trustee had to mail to all known beneficiaries a state-
ment advising them that the trustee could file for accountings
"twelve to fifteen months after the establishment of the fund and
triannually thereafter," and that he would publish notice of these
401. E.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945).
402. 326 U.S. at 316, citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Mr. Justice Black noted this origin of the standard in his
separate opinion in International Shoe. 326 U.S. at 324 (Black, J., concurring).
403. E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 352 U.S. 948 (1956); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v., Central Hanover Bk. & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See
generally Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV L. REV.
1257, 1264-71 (1957).
404. Decisions expanding the right of state courts to render status judgments
entitled to full faith and credit regularly emphasized that the state procedures for
notice were constitutionally acceptable. See, e.g., Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348
(1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942).
405. See notes 264-69, supra, and accompanying text.
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proceedings in a newspaper."' Second, when the accounting pro-
ceedings were actually initiated, the trustee published a notice in a
local newspaper "setting forth merely the name and address of the
trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the com-
mon trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or
funds." 07
After dismissing the contention that New York lacked authority
to render judgments binding on all claimants, Mr. Justice Jackson
turned to the notice issue. Although he acknowledged that "[p]er-
sonal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic
form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding,"" 8 he
refused to require personal service in all cases. Recognizing that
"the vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its
fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or
claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be
determined," he affirmed that it would be unjustifiable to place a
"construction on the Due Process Clause which would place impos-
sible or impractical obstacles in the way.""4 9
The problem involved balancing the admitted interest of the
state against the "individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.""' In striking that balance, the Court applied
the following standards: The notice must be "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections[,] ...must be of such nature as reasonably to con-
vey the required information, . . . [and] must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance. 1 1 If these
standards were met, "the constitutional requirements ... [were] satis-
fied." 2 But, Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized, "when notice is a
person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process." '413
The notice must involve a procedure that "one desirous of actually
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 4. 4
Judged by these principles, the notice provided by the New
York statute was inadequate. The publication associated with the
406. 339 U.S. at 309-10.
407. Id. at 310.
408. Id at 313.
409. Id at 313-14.
410. Id at 314.
411. Id.
412. Id at 315.
413. Id.
414. Id Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917): "To dispense with personal
service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that ought
to be required if substantial justice is to be done."
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accounting proceeding simply was not "a reliable means of acquaint-
ing interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the
courts," nor was it "reinforced by steps ... [such as the attachment
of tangible property] likely to attract the parties' attention to the
proceeding."4 '5 Mr. Justice Jackson conceded that earlier decisions
also had permitted "resort to publication as a customary substitute ...
where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more ade-
quate warning." ' Under the principle of these decisions, New
York's notice by publication was sufficient as to two classes of
beneficiaries, those "whose interests or whereabouts could not with
due diligence be ascertained" and those "whose interests are either
conjectual or future or ... do not in due course of business come to
knowledge of the common trustee.".1 . But Mullane imposed a stricter
requirement "[als to known present beneficiaries of known place of
residence."'1 8 For these beneficiaries, "[e]xceptions in the name of
necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of prac-
ticability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach
interested parties."'. Because the names and addresses of the bene-
ficiaries were available readily, the Court was unwilling to accept
notice less likely to provide actual notice than "ordinary mail to the
record addresses.'2 0
The Court emphasized that the interest of practicality applied
even as to known beneficiaries, for, as to them, the Court refused to
require personal service. Because "the rights of each . . . [benefi-
ciary] in the integrity of the funds and the fidelity of the trustee are
shared by many other beneficiaries[,] . . . notice reasonably certain
to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard
the interests of all, since any objections sustained would inure to the
benefit of all."' Under these circumstances, the "reasonable risks
that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are justifi-
able."' But despite this practical approach, the Court found the
New York scheme invalid for its failure to establish reasonable
means for notifying known beneficiaries. The defect, Mr. Justice
Jackson emphasized, was not the failure "to reach everyone," but the
415. 339 U.S. at 315-16.
416. Id at 317.
417. Id.
418. Id at 318.
419. Id.
420. Id. Several decisions upheld statutory provisions that notifed out-of-state
defendants by mail without the traditional formality of serving a state official. See
Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 650-51 (1950); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (alternate holding).
421. 339 U.S. at 319.
422. Id.
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failure to choose a procedure "reasonably calculated to reach those
who could easily be informed by other means at hand.' 23
Opportunity to Appear
Modern decisions produced few, if any, startling developments
with respect to the type of appearances that litigants were author-
ized to enter. State courts remained vitually unanimous in allowing
special appearances,2 2 but the Supreme Court never held that the
due process clause required a state to allow litigants to challenge
the jurisdiction of its courts without thereby consenting to the very
jurisdiction they were challenging.' 5 Fewer states embraced the
limited appearance for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 2 However, the
question of whether the limited appearance should be allowed seemed
to lose much of its significance in light of Shaffer's rule that a state
could exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction only if the defendants had
sufficient contacts with the forum state to make it reasonable to
require them to litigate the matter there.
CRITIQUE OF CURRENT DOCTRINE
An Attempt at Explanation
The Basic Principle
The most important element of the Supreme Court's recent
forays into the problems of state court jurisdiction appears to be
Shaffer's affirmation that all assertions of state court jurisdiction
are to be determined according to the standards of the minimum
contacts principle established by International Shoe and its progeny.
The significance of this approach is that, by focusing on "the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,"'2 7 the
Court has established a unified, functional approach for considering
the numerous problems that have been solved in the past by charac-
terization of the proceedings as involving in personam, in rem, or
status jurisdiction. The new approach thus permits a re-unification
423. Id.
424. See notes 150-59, supra, and accompanying text. For a commentary critical of
the approach of the Federal Rules, which allow a party to appear generally without waiv-
ing his right to appeal an overruled motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the per-
son, see Note, Special Appearance in California, 10 STAN. L. REV. 711 (1958).,
425. For an argument that the refusal to allow a special appearance would violate
modern notions of due process, see Developments, supra note 156, at 992-93.
426. Compare D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING & PROCEDURE; STATE &
FEDERAL 320 (4th ed. 1979); with Developments, supra note 156, at 953-55.
427. 433 U.S. at 204.
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of jurisdictional theory that has not been possible since the early
twentieth century when the widespread acceptance of exceptions to
the Pennoyer framework began. In essence, the new theory focuses
on the very practical question of whether the forum state should be
able to render a decision binding on this particular defendant in this
particular litigation.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions have unfortunately failed
to clarify the precise nature of the minimum contacts principle that
is now to be applied universally. Particularly confusing is the
reference in Woodson'28 to the concept of state sovereignty as a
limit on the jurisdiction of the courts of sister states. Exactly what
this concept means is difficult to decipher, although it obviously
represents an attempt to provide a narrower limit to state court
jurisdiction. A majority of the Court seems to have concluded that
the limits suggested by terms such as reasonableness and fairness
are insufficient, perhaps because of a concern over the natural ten-
dency of a state court to conclude that it is always a fair forum in
suits filed by its own domiciliaries. But giving content to the
sovereignty language of Woodson is particularly difficult since Shaf-
fer demonstrates that the Court unequivocally has rejected Pen-
noyer's notion that sovereignty always confers jurisdiction with
respect to things located within the state's borders.
In practical terms the new emphasis on sovereignty seems to be
a demonstration that Hanson4" remains a viable guide for the limits
of state court jurisdiction, and not merely an aberrational decision
designed to do justice in a specific case. The core of the Hanson
limitation is the idea that, although the minimum contacts principle
requires the forum to be a convenient one, convenience alone is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Before addressing the convenience
question, a court must first determine that the specific defendant,
who is to be bound by the judgment, has contacts with the forum
state that "make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system,"3 0 to require him to litigate the matter there. Hanson defined
this preliminary inquiry in terms of the requirement that the defen-
dant have "purposely availed" himself of "the benefits and protec-
tions" of the laws of the forum state. 31 Although there is some
language in subsequent cases that the defendant actually must have
428. 444 U.S. at 293.
429. See notes 207-21, supra, and accompanying text.
430. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). For a concise
description of the dual nature of the current test, see Note, The Long-Arm Reach of
the Courts Under the Effect Test After Kulko v. Superior Court, 65 VA. L. REV. 175,
196-97 (1979).
431. 357 U.S. at 253.
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engaged in activities within the forum state,"2 the Woodson dicta,
that would allow a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defen-
dant who attempts, directly or indirectly, to serve the state's
market for a product,' 3 indicates that the new sovereignty limit is
not a requirement of minimal presence but one of foreseeability: The
defendant's conduct with respect to the forum state must have been
such that he could reasonably have foreseen that he would be required
to defend his conduct there.
Application of the Principle to Particular Lawsuits
Defining the general parameters of the new principle that is to
govern state court jurisdiction provides only the starting point for
determining how it will be applied to the various situations that
have proved troublesome in the past. Although one can easily recog-
nize the artificial nature of the traditional distinctions between in
personam, in rem, and status jurisdiction, it nonetheless seems
reasonable for this survey to analyze the problems in terms of
attempts to impose liability on a person (whether individual or cor-
poration) without regard to any specific property of the defendant,
to use the defendant's claims to property as a basis for jurisdiction,
and to determine the legal relationships and financial obligations of
family members. In many respects new terminology such as that
proposed by Professors von Mehren and Trautman would be prefer-
able; 3' but the reality seems to be that lawyers and judges will con-
tinue to think in terms of jurisdiction over persons, things, and
status. And, in light of Shaffer, it is possible to think in such terms
without erecting artificial barriers between the categories.
With respect to persons, the recent decisions largely eliminate
any conceptual distinction between individuals and corporations.
One would expect a corporation to serve a multi-state market more
frequently than a natural person, but that expectation is the result
of modern business realities and not legal conceptualism. In either
case, the inquiry is the same; to the extent that natural persons
engage in activities with respect to a state that they reasonably
should foresee would require them to defend their conduct there,
the state may exercise jurisdiction over them. Seen in this light, the
recent decisions actually represent no retreat from the expansion of
jurisdiction permitted in cases such as Hess'35 and Doherty;'3 but it
432. E.g., Rush v. Savchuck, 444 U.S. 320, 322, 328-29 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 213 (1977).
433. 444 U.S. at 297-98.
434. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1124-36.
435. See notes 41-48, supra, and accompanying text.
436. See notes 49-55, supra, and accompanying text.
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now should be possible to abandon the consent fiction on which
those decisions largely were based and to use them to derive new
subrules for applying the minimum contacts principle. Judged by
the standards of International Shoe as modified by Woodson, Hess
illustrates not a specific exception for automobiles, but an accept-
ance of a more generalized concept: When persons voluntarily come
to a state, they reasonably can foresee that the state may require
them to return to defend their actions while in the state, and requir-
ing them to do so is consistent with our society's notions of fairness.
Similarly, Doherty does not depend on the state's special regulation
of the securities industry or any ability to condition an individual's
right to do business in the state. One might state its "true rule"
thus: When individuals (or other noncorporate business forms) carry
on businesses that serve customers within a state, they should
foresee that the state will exercise jurisdiction over them with
respect to litigation arising out of business with customers within
the state and the state's action in exercising jurisdiction meets con-
temporary standards of fairness and reasonableness. Under this
restatement of the Doherty rule, one could also explain the Supreme
Court's hint in Shaffer437 that Delaware could exercise jurisdiction
over corporate officers and shareholder derivative actions, if it
passed a specific statute authorizing such jurisdiction. The defect in
Shaffer was that the Delaware statute failed the test of foreseeabi-
lity, not the test of fairness or reasonableness; a general sequestra-
tion statute was simply too unlikely to inform officers and directors
that they would be subject to shareholder derivative actions if they
owned stock in the corporations they serve.
Kulko.a. suggests, however, that the ability of the minimum con-
tacts principle to expand jurisdiction over natural persons is limited,
perhaps to the Hess and Doherty exceptions; that is, requiring
defendants to defend their actions taken within the state and forc-
ing them to litigate matters with customers served in the state. In
other situations, current constitutional preference reaffirms the
traditional requirement that the plaintiff must seek out the defen-
dant at his home and may not force him to litigate matters in the
forum most convenient to the plaintiff."9
437. 433 U.S. at 216 n.47.
438. See notes 225-37, supra, and accompanying text.
439. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1127-28. Sunderland, The
Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in the New Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. CHI.
L. REV. 188, 192 (1933). Professors von Mehren and Trautman suggest the following
rationale for determining when to reverse this traditional rule: "[Iln any class of cases
in which the controversy arises out of conduct that is essentially multistate on the part
of the defendant, and essentially local on the part of the plaintiff an argument exists
for reversing the jurisdictional preference traditionally accorded defendants." von
Mehren & Trautman, sgpra note 260, at 1167-68.
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All of the Supreme Courts' post-International Shoe decisions
with respect to in personam jurisdiction have concerned the ability
of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons who could not
be served with process within the state's borders. The Court never
has addressed the question of whether the minimum contacts princi-
ple would limit a state's ability to exercise jurisdiction over a per-
son who was served with process during a temporary sojourn in the
state, but the issue has arisen occasionally in the lower courts. Prior
to Shaffer, the decisions commonly held that physical presence in
the state, evidenced by personal service, was sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. 40 More recently, some commentators have recognized
that Shaffer effectively destroys the logical underpinning of those
decisions. 4 ' The traditional rule derived from the first of Pennoyer's
positive assertions: Every state has jurisdiction over all persons and
property within its borders."2 Now that Shaffer has rejected that
axiom with respect to property, one can reasonably predict that the
Supreme Court also will reject it with respect to persons in an
appropriate case. Of course, situations in which a person, who is
served with process within the state, will lack sufficient contacts
with that state for its courts to exercise jurisdiction will be rela-
tively rare. But they can occur in either exotic circumstances, such
as airplane service, or in more mundane circumstances, as when an
individual visits a state different from the one in which he allegedly
committed a tort. Thus, while service of process should be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases, Shaffer will at least
require an expanded analysis when the adequacy of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state is challenged.
440. E.g., Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (lst Cir. 1976); Grace v.
MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 36 So. 720(1904); Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
441. See, e.g., Berstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient
Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILLANOVA L. REV. 38 (1979); Karst, The
Supreme Courk 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 162 n.62 (1977); Vernon, Single-Factor
Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 1978 WASH U.L.Q. 273, 302-05; Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v.
Heitner and the Premises of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.
565 (1979); Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 20-23
(1978); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: Reshaping the Contours of State Court Jurisdiction,
11 LOYOLA (L.A.) L. REV. 87, 120-21 (1977); Comment, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 490 (1977). See
also Schieber v. Allis Chambers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978) (dictum). But
see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring): "If I visit
another State or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume
some risk that the State will exercise its power over my property or my person while
there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks."
(Emphasis added). But see Oxman's Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273
N.W.2d 285 (1979).
442. 95 U.S. at 722. See note 13, supra, and accompanying text.
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Diminished significance of presence as a jurisdictional concept
for natural persons should not change Milliken's rule "' that the
defendant's state of domicile is always an appropriate forum, for the
defendant's domicile always should satisfy Woodson's dual test.
First, the permanance of the attachment to a state that domicile
implies means that the individual should foresee that this is a place
that he should be expected to account for all his actions, wherever
they might have occurred. Second, the defendant's ability to choose
his domicile should preclude any finding that requiring him to liti-
gate a matter there was unfair.
Not surprisingly, most of the litigation concerning the limits to
jurisdictional authority has concerned corporations, because in the
modern world the agents of corporations commonly engage in activi-
ties that can have consequences in different states. International
Shoe recognized this reality and devised a test that emphasized
economic reality over the fictions of presence and consent. But Han-
son and Woodson-the Supreme Court's last two decisions involving
corporations-reflect a determination to use the foreseeability con-
cept as a means to limit expansion of jurisdiction over foreign corpo-
rations. Under the test established by these cases, a corporation is
amenable to suit only in those states whose markets it has attempted
to penetrate; thus, for example, vendors of products who serve only
a limited market for a product that is marketed nationwide are
amenable to suits only in the states whose markets they reach. But
Woodson should not result in any substantial curtailment of jurisdic-
tion in products liability suits against nationally-marketed products.
Since the corporations that manufacture these products serve a
national market, they should have sufficient contacts with all states
to satisfy the foreseeability test; Woodson's favorable citation of a
leading state court decision"' suggests that the Court, in balancing
the burden of forcing the consumer to travel to a foreign forum
443. See notes 56-61, supra, and accompanying text. Of course, the significant point
in time is the time of service; that is, the defendant must be domiciled in the state at
the time he is served with process. See Developments, supra note 156, at 941 n.202.
444. 444 U.S. at 298, citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). In Gray, the plaintiff filed suit in an Illinois
court seeking to recover damages from a non-Illinois corporation for injuries that
resulted from the defendant's negligent construction of a safety valve outside the
state. The defendant had sold the valve, outside the state where American Radiator
was located, and American Radiator then incorporated it into a water heater that was
sold in Illinois to the plaintiff's employer. While the heater was being used in Illinois,
it exploded injuring the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the corpora-
tion that manufactured the valve was amenable to suit in Illinois. It reasoned that "if
a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in an other state .... it is not
unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those
products." 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
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against the burden of forcing a corporation to defend its conduct in
a market it serves, would judge the plaintiff's forum to be a reason-
able one. Moreover, this approach to jurisdiction over manufacturers
probably will not vary even in situations like Woodson in which the
injury occurs in a state other than the one where the particular pro-
duct is sold. Because the product is marketed on a national basis,
the possiblity of suit in all states is still foreseeable, and, in applying
the reasonableness or fairness aspect of the test, the relative burden
on the manufacturer and the consumer remain the same regardless
of where the sale took place.
Some pre-Woodson commentaries445 and cases 4 1 suggested a con-
ceptual difference between contract and tort cases in applying the
minimum contacts principle. Woodson does not appear to support
such an-a priori distinction. Instead, it substitutes the functional
question of whether the suit arises out of an attempt to serve a par-
ticular economic market. This functional approach might restrict
liability in cases in which a purchaser outside of a normal market
area seeks out a seller to purchase goods. But, when a seller regu-
larly serves a given market or, as in McGee 744 ' actively seeks out the
market even for a single transaction, that state should be able to
exert jurisdiction over him whether the action is labeled contract or
tort.
A question not clearly resolved by the Supreme Court prece-
dents is what state or states always can exercise jurisdiction over a
corporation. The same reasons supporting domicile as a proper
forum for individuals-the premanence of the relationship and the
element of choice by the defendant-make the state of incorporation
an appropriate general forum for corporations. But Perkins" ' sug-
445. E.g., Developments, supra note 156, at 925-28. Cf. Lewis, Sueing a
Nonresident-The Reach of Louisiana's Long-Arm Statute, 19 LA. B.J. 205 (1971)
(Louisiana courts interpret long-arm statute more broadly in tort than contract cases).
446. Compare Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113,
458 P.2d 57 (1969), and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.
2d 432, 176 N.E. 2d 761, 766 (1961), with Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
447. See notes 197-206, supra, and accompanying text.
448. See notes 188-96, supra, and accompanying text. For a pragmatic approach to
solving the problem of a corporation with substantial business activities in several
states, see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1141-42. Some commentators
have tried to constrict the reach of Perkins by arguing that it is a jurisdiction-by-
necessity case; that is, that the Supreme Court approved jurisdiction in Ohio because
Mrs. Perkins lacked an alternate forum for her claims. Since the Phillipine courts were
functioning by the time that Mrs. Perkins filed her claim in Ohio, the argument has to
be further refined to allow jurisdiction in the principal place of business only when the
plaintiff is suing a business entity created under the law of a foreign sovereign. See
Kurland, supra note 63, at 602; Developments, aupra note 156, at 932. The Court's opin-
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gests that when a state is the predominant center of a corporation's
business, that state also may serve as a general forum. As with the
state of incorporation, litigating at the center of corporate activity
seems foreseeable and does not seem to place an undue burden on
the corporation.
In light of Shaffer, jurisdiction based on property normally
should be limited to suits in which the property bears a substantial
relationship to the litigation. This rule should largely eliminate
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as a practical matter, for in most cases the
state's long arm statute would authorize jurisdiction in situations in
which the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state to
satisfy the minimum contacts test. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
however, might remain a viable source of judicial authority in two
narrow classes of cases-those in which the litigation is directly
related to the property even though title is not an issue "9 and those
in which the state could reach the defendant under the minimum
contacts principle but the state's statutes conferring in personam
jurisdiction failed to cover him. The approving citation of Atkinson
in Shaffer 5" suggests that the Court would be willing to countenance
such an approach, at least when the litigation is designed to define
the rights of various persons in property that bears a substantial
relationship to the forum state.
The emphasis in Shaffer and Rush on the defendant's contacts
with the forum state raises a potential analytical obstacle to suits to
determine title to real estate because one can easily conceive of
situations in which one or more of the potential claimants to the
property have never set foot'51 in the state where the property is
located. But the misleading language of these opinions probably will
pass to a well-deserved oblivion, as the courts focus on the triangu-
lar relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.
The new test does not require presence as a minimum criterion of
jurisdiction. To the contrary, it permits a state court to bind defen-
dants when they reasonably could foresee they would be required to
litigate a matter in the forum state and when the litigation in that
forum is fair and reasonable. The suit to quiet title satisfies both
prongs of the test. If a person claims an interest in real property
ion in Perkins, however, contains no language suggesting that the potential Phillipine
forum was an inadequate one. Cf. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1144
(Perkins authorizes jurisdiction with respect to an unrelated cause of action when the
defendant corporation has "the kind of total, close, and continuing relationship to a
community implied in incorporation or in the location of a head office within a state").
449. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977).
450. 433 U.S. at 205.
451. Md at 213. See 444 U.S. at 331-32.
1981] 1139
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
located in the state, the localized nature of property law makes it
foreseeable to expect him to defend his right to the property in that
state; since the desirability of permitting a suit to quiet title against
all the world generally is conceded, the state where the property is
located is the most reasonable forum when the potential claimants
are located in various states.'62
The permissibility of binding nonresidents in lawsuits to deter-
mine the ownership of personal property is less clear, for personal
property is never so closely tied to a single state as is realty. But the
application of the tests of foreseeability and fairness should permit a
state to issue binding judgments of the rights of claimants to both
tangible and intangible personality in appropriate cases. With
respect to tangibles, one should properly focus on the relative per-
manence of its location within the state.'53 If it has remained within a
state for some time or (when estates are being settled) if the former
owner kept it within a state, one can argue persuasively that all
who seek to assert rights in it should recognize the place of location
as the place where those rights will be litigated and that the place
of location is a reasonable place for resolving the conflicting claims
of out-of-state claimants. On the other hand, the minimum contacts
principle would not support jurisdiction when one claimant unilat-
erally moved property to another forum. Not only would it be dif-
ficult for other claimants to foresee being called upon to present
their claims in the new forum, but allowing one party to manipulate
jurisdiction by moving the property without the consent of other
claimants seems to encourage deception inconsistent with our basic
notions of fairness.
Intangibles present even more difficult problems because only in
legal terms are they present anywhere. With respect to trusts,
Mullane '5 and Hanson seemed to sanction the trustee's place of
business as the appropriate forum to resolve conflicting claims to
the property. Perhaps the emerging rule will be that the state in
which the person exercising day-to-day control over the intangible is
located permanently is normally an appropriate forum, since requir-
ing a defendant to litigate his claims there is both foreseeable and
452. Accord, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-09 (1977) (dictum); Note, supra
note 441, at 100-01.
453. See Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900); Educational
Studios, Inc. v. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc., 112 N.J. Eq. 352, 164 At. 24 (Ct. Er. &
App. 1933). The Supreme Court has distinguished between property permanently
and temporarily located in a state in defining the limits of state authority to tax the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
199 U.S. 194 (1905). See also Brock & Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 2d 287, 65 P.2d
791 (1937).
454. See notes 264-69, supra, and accompanying text.
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fair. This rule would permit expansion of jurisdiction over claims to
intangibles in cases such as Dunlevy6 5' in which the party exercising
control over the intangible needs a single forum to resolve conflict-
ing claims so that he may avoid the possibility of double liability.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet defined the parameters
of divorce and custody jurisdiction by the minimum contacts stand-
ard, Shaffer's declaration that the principle is to govern "all asser-
tions of state court jurisdiction" obviously opens the door for such a
doctrinal development. In fact, the minimum contacts approach might
well leave the current boundaries of state court jurisdiction with
respect to these matters substantially intact, but it would provide a
more coherent framework of analysis. It would also re-establish the
due process clause as a significant limit on jurisdiction in divorce
and custody cases, thus ending the anomaly that decisions in this
area can be binding, at least theoretically, in the state where ren-
dered but not elsewhere. Moreover, it also would permit a unified
approach to the problems that traditionally have been treated as
involving matters of status by focusing on the practical question of
the appropriateness of allowing a particular state to exercise juris-
diction over a particular defendant in a particular lawsuit. Using the
dual-pronged test established by Woodson, a state could bind a
defendant in a "status" proceeding when the defendant can
foresee that he would be requried to litigate that matter in the par-
ticular forum and when the forum is a reasonable location for the
particlar dispute to be resolved.
As applied to the ability to grant a binding decree of divorce,
the minimum contacts approach would permit a reasoned justifica-
tion of both the full faith and credit rule of Williams , ' which per-
mits the state in which either party is domiciled to exercise jurisdic-
tion in divorce litigation, and the estoppel doctrine of Sherrer,'7 for
in both cases the tests of foreseeability and fairness were satisfied.
In light of the traditional authority of a state to regulate the marital
status of its inhabitants and the modern ability of spouses to estab-
lish separate domiciles, the nonresident defendant should foresee
that he may be required to go to the spouse's domicile to argue that
the spouse is not entitled to have the marriage dissolved. The rea-
sonableness or fairness aspect of the test is a more subjective deter-
mination, but the Court probably would conclude that the desir-
ability of the plaintiff's having a convenient forum, and the state's
interest in providing a mechanism for defining the marital status of
455. See notes 90-93, supra, and accompanying text.
456. See notes 322-25, supra, and accompanying text.
457. See notes 336-50, supra, and accompanying text.
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its inhabitants, outweigh any inconvenience to the defendant;
extreme geographical separation between the marriage partners
probably would indicate that the law was doing no more than giving
legal recognition to a de facto dissolution of the marital relationship.
Allowing a state to issue a judgment binding on a defendant
who actually appears in a divorce suit also appears to satisfy both
aspects of the Woodson test. If the defendant has a jurisdictional
defense, he should expect to present that defense before defending
on the merits, and limiting the defendant to a single forum in the
divorce litigation does not appear unfair. Once this rule is accepted,
the Johnson-Aldrich corollary, that parties claiming by virtue of
their relationship to the defendant are also bound by the judgment,
seems unexceptional. Of course, the Williams situation itself raises
the theoretical problem of whether state prosecutions would be ban-
ned, although the increasing societal acceptance of divorce makes
the likelihood of such a prosecution extremely small. If one occur-
red, the diminishing weight given to the state's interest in denying
its citizens the right to divorce likely would result in the decision
that the state also is bound by a sister state's judgment in which
both marriage partners entered a general appearance.
The Court, however, also might permit divorce jurisdiction in
other cases since the test would focus on the minimum contacts
standard, not on domicile as a jurisdictional prerequisite. The most
common situation probably would involve members of the military
who often live outside their states of domicile."S When a couple lives
together outside the state or states where they are domiciled, allow-
ing the state where they lived together to divorce them should be
foreseeable, and in terms of convenience it should be the most rea-
sonable forum of all. In addition, focusing on minimum contacts
rather than solely on domicile as the basis for jurisdiction should
provide a means for reducing the uncertainty that results from
Williams H, ' which permits a collateral attack on an ex parte find-
ing of jurisdiction.46 To reduce uncertainty, a state could establish
458. A number of states have enacted statutes establishing residence as a basis for
divorce jurisdiction for military members who live within the state. E.g., OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (West 1965); N. MEX. STAT. § 40-4-4 (1978); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
tit. 1, § 3.23 (Vernon 1973). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 96, at 291. At least one
state court has upheld the validity of such a statute. Crownover v. Crownover, 58
N.M. 597, 272 P.2d 127 (1954). For a catalogue of some of the difficulties in ascertaining
a service member's domicile, see Borgen, The Determination of Domicile, 65 MIL. L.
REV. 133 (1974).
459. See notes 326-32, supra, and accompanying text.
460. According to one commentator, the minimum contact argument has surfaced
at the state level in several post-Shaffer divorce cases. Leathers, The First Two Years
After Shaffer v. Heitner, 40 LA. L. REV. 907, 913-16 (1980).
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the more objective test of residence within the state for a suitable
period as the basis for jurisdiction; if the residence were for a period
sufficient to show a substantial connection between the plaintiff and
the state, the minimum contacts standard should be satisfied. Of
course, the Court would have to determine the minimum period of
residence that would suffice (whether, for example, Nevada's short
residency period would be adequate""1 ), but the considerably longer
residency requirement of most states"' certainly should be sufficient
to show a substantial connection between the plaintiff and the state.
Adoption of the minimum contacts standard also would be con-
sistent with the functional approach to support and property mat-
ters that is embodied in the divisible divorce doctrine. As suggested
above, a party reasonably might expect that a state would choose to
give legal recognition to the breakdown of an existing marriage to
which one of its inhabitants is a party. But allowing that state to
determine the relative financial obligations of the parties merely
because one of them lived within its borders seems neither foresee-
able nor fair. It strains credulity to suggest that a party to a mar-
riage should foresee that he is agreeing to allow the partner to
choose any state to settle the couple's property affairs merely
because the partner unilaterally establishes a domicile there. In
addition, judged by the reasonableness test, no strong reason for
allowing the plaintiff to choose a forum unilaterally outweighs the
burden of forcing the defendant to travel to an inconvenient forum.
Accepting the defendant's state of domicile as an appropriate
forum for support judgments under the minimum contacts principle,
however, inevitably does not mean that the plaintiff must go to the
defendant's forum. To the contrary the plaintiff can choose any
forum where the defendant has sufficient contacts with the state to
make it reasonable "in the context of our federal system" for that
state to issue a binding judgment concerning the particular dispute
between the parties. Some forums that traditionally have been
acceptable-for example, a state in which the defendant owns prop-
erty or in which the defendant is served with process during a tem-
461. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1979) (plaintiff required to reside in the state six
weeks before suit can be brought). Cf. IDAHO CODE § 32-701 (1963) (six-week residency
requirement); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208 (1962) (minimum residency requirement of
sixty days before suit is filed and three months before decree is issued).
462. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 30-2-5 (1975) (six months); CAL. [CIv.] CODE § 4530 (1960)
(six months); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.021 (1957 & 1971 Supp.) (six months); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 16 (1955) (one year). Cf. LA. CODE Civ. art. 10(b) (for purposes of divorce
jurisdiction, establishment and maintenance of "a residence in a parish of this state,"
creates "a rebuttable presumption" of domicile). In recent years, several states have
reduced their residency requirements.
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porary sojourn - might fail to satisfy the new principle; but the
state where the parties last lived together as husband and wife pro-
bably would be an appropriate forum under the Hess rule if only one
of the parties had established a new domicile.6 One could foresee
being required to litigate marital responsibilities in the state where
one lived as a partner to the marriage; the forum seems reasonable
because the state was one with whom the parties voluntarily estab-
lished contacts relating to the marital relationship that gives rise to
the disputed rights and obligations. Similarly, the minimum contacts
approach would encompass the Simons decision' 4 permitting a state
to adjudge a marriage partner's claims to property within the state
as a specific application of the rule that the decisions of a state as to
the ownership of property within its borders bind all claimants to
the property.
In lawsuits relating to custody, the minimum contacts principle
also should unify due process and full faith and credit limitations by
rejecting domicile as an indispensable criterion and focusing instead
on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion. If the state is one with which both parties have adequate con-
tact (as for example, when one parent seeks to use the courts of the
other's state of domicile), the decree should be binding on both. But
May '5 should be overruled explicitly when the court exercising
jurisdiction is located in the state where the child is living on a per-
manent basis. A parent should foresee that such a state would exer-
cise its parens patria powers on behalf of the child; it does not
seem unreasonable or unfair to expect the parent to travel to the
state where his child is living if he decides to exert his parental
rights, since an extreme geographical separation probably would
indicate either a limited de facto exertion of parental rights or an
ability to get to the state where the child resides without undue dif-
ficulty. On the other hand, the parent having physical control of the
child should not be allowed to secure a jurisdictional advantage
merely by moving the child to a more favorable jurisdiction. As a
minimum, the fairness aspects to the minimum contacts approach
should constitutionalize the statutory rule of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act 6 that a court ordinarily should not exer-
cise jurisdiction to award custody to a party that brought a child
into its borders in violation of a valid custody decree.
463. This, of course, was the rule prior to Haddock. See Atherton v. Atherton, 181
U.S. 155 (1901).
464. See notes 391-93, supra, and accompanying text.
465. See notes 357-61, supra, and accompanying text.
466. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8. Cf. Spencer v. Terebelo, 373
So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (allowing tort recovery for removal of child from
jurisdiction in violation of custody decree).
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With respect to support awards in custody cases, the new ap-
proach should produce results similar to those suggested for the
financial aspects of divorce litigation. The defendant's domicile
would be an appropriate forum, but so would any other state with
which the defendant had substantial contacts directly related to the
cause of action. As a practical matter, courts are likely to approve
jurisdiction in at least two situtions: when the state seeking to exer-
cise jurisdiction was a state in which the parent and child lived
before the parent refused to honor a support obligation, and when
the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction is claiming "continuing
jurisdiction" over a defendant who previously has litigated the sup-
port issue within its borders.
Notice and Appearances
The universalizing of the minimum contacts principle would re-
emphasize the importance of notice as an independent requirement
of due process. The standard of notice probably will be the one
established by Mullane' - one must use a means that would be used
by a person actually trying to notify the defendant-but its applica-
tion will vary with different circumstances. For example, the stand-
ard presumably will permit a state to dispense with traditional ser-
vice of process in ordinary litigation, but only if the state
substitutes a method (perhaps certified mail with returned receipt)
that will be equally likely to advise the defendant that he is being
sued. For trust accountings and other litigation with large numbers
of potential litigants, the expense of providing notice will permit
sending the notice by regular mail to the record address of persons
with a known interest in litigation. Moreover, when an adequate
means of providing notice is provided, the court should follow the
traditional service of process cases ' and uphold the validity of the
judgment even though the defendant failed to receive notice in fact.
Naturally, one can expect courts in such cases to continue the well-
established tradition of carefully searching the record for errors
that might permit the defendant his day in court, ' but the Court
should avoid an absolute requirement of notice in fact, because that
467. See notes 405-23, supra, and accompanying text.
468. E.g., Morris v. Argo-Collier Truck Line, 39 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Ky. 1941);
Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Va. 1947); Regions v. Regions 381 So. 2d 920
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Temple v. Jackson, 376 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979);
Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112 57 N.E.2d 819 (1944). See generally Hazard,
supra note 13, at 287-88.
469. See, e.g., Temple v. Jackson, 376 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979). Cf
Hazard, supra note 13, at 286-87 (courts try to interpret state statutes to require
actual notice).
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could permit a defendant to avoid civil liability merely by disregard-
ing his mail.
The fairness aspect of the minimum contacts principle also
argues for constitutionalizing the right to a special appearance,
however denominated, in all litigation. Now that amenability to suit
always depends on the fact-sensitive question of whether the defen-
dant has sufficient contacts with the forum state with respect to
this particular litigation, the defendant deserves an opportunity to
present evidence on that matter without foregoing a defense on the
merits if he fails to prevail on the jurisdictional issue. The contrary
precedent of York v. Texas"' should be overruled as inconsistent
with the new theoretical framework governing state court jurisdic-
tion.
On the other hand, Shaffer's expansion of the minimum contacts
approach to encompass all assertions of state court jurisdiction
argues for an elimination of the limited appearance, for its existance
depended on a system that used quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as an alter-
native to in personam jurisdiction. Now that a court can exercise in
rem jurisdiction only when it is reasonable to require the defendant
to litigate the matter in the forum state, the court that hears the
dispute should be able to grant any relief that is appropriate in the
matter over which it exercises jurisdiction.
Evaluation of Contemporary Dogma
The most fundamental aspect of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sions-Shaffer's declaration that all assertions of state court juris-
diction should be judged according to the minimum contacts prin-
ciple"'-merits commendation. A generation ago, International Shoe
rejected the territorial principle on which the traditional in rem and
in personam distinctions were based and expanded the reach of in
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to encompass all situations
in which it was reasonable, in the context of our federal system, to
require the defendant to litigate the matter in the forum state."" In
light of the widespread, modern agreement among legal scholars
concerning the limited utility of any sharp conceptual distinction
between personal and property rights,' the continued approval of
the exercise of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over defendants who lack
470. 137 U.S. 15 (1890). See notes 148-50, supra, and accompanying text.
471. 433 U.S. at 207.
472. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 (1971) (Introductory Note); Hazard, supra note 13, at 267; Von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1135-36.
473. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 195 n.12 (1977).
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sufficient contacts with the forum to satisfy the International Shoe
test was an anomaly. Since these cases used property to confer jur-
isdiction over a defendant with respect to a cause of action that had
nothing to do with the property, they found the functional equiva-
lent of in personam jurisdiction (particularly in states that failed to
recognize the limited appearance 4 ) over a defendant who, by defini-
tion, had insufficient contacts with the forum state to justify that
state's exercise of jurisdiction.
Of course, the change is in some respects a minor one, for after
Shaffer as before, most litigation likely will focus on the application
of the minimum contacts principle to specific factual situations. But
even modest advances in the cause of justice deserve praise, and the
Shaffer rule seems to qualify as such an advance. Moreover, as sug-
gested above, the Shaffer universalization of the minimum contacts
principle also opens the door to reaching status proceedings, the
third traditional category of jurisdiction; this doctrinal development
would provide both a defensible rationalization for most of the exist-
ing precedents as well as a coherent framework for addressing con-
tinuing problem areas.
Less deserving of unqualified praise is the Supreme Court's
recent attempt in Woodson to refine the minimum contacts principle
established in International Shoe. From an analytical standpoint, the
attempt to clothe Hanson's foreseeability doctrine in the language of
state sovereignty415 was unfortunate; it is difficult to see what rights
of a state are violated by permitting another state to exercise juris-
diction over a particular lawsuit. The opinion suggests that the right
of a state to exclude other states from exercising jurisdiction over
474. 444 U.S. at 294. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958); Kurland,
supra note 63, at 569:
In matters of personal jurisdiction of state courts, no less than in matters of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, doctrines of federalism have been subordinated
by the Supreme Court to concepts of convenience. The result is another major
step-in this instance, perhaps, a desirable one-toward the limitaton of the
federal principle.
(Footnote omitted). But see Hazard, supra note 13, at 265: "[Wlhen adjudication of civil
controversies does involve multistate elements, it is fatuous to think of any court hav-
ing exclusive jurisdiction of anything. The jurisdictional problem exists precisely
because there is no single tribunal that has exclusive jurisdiction in the territorial
sense." (Emphasis in original).
475. Indeed, the modern estoppel decisions in cases involving divorce jurisdiction
suggest that the Court currently is allowing consent to jurisdiction in divorce cases,
which traditionally have been classified as problems of subject matter jurisdiction. Of
course, the fairness aspect of the minimum contacts test might invalidate some
agreements by which a party consents to jurisdiction for future claims. See von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1138-39; Developments, supra note 156, at
944-45.
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lawsuits rightfully belongs to the first state; but the Court never
has applied such a limitation with respect to jurisdiction except
perhaps in the confused maze of opinions defining the reach of
divorce jurisdiction. Indeed, defining the right to exclude jurisdic-
tion as belonging to the state (or states) that rightfully could exer-
cise jurisdiction seems fundamentally inconsistent with the rule that
a party can consent to in personam jurisdiction, a rule that the
Supreme Court has shown no inclination to discard. '
Once the garb of state sovereignty is discarded, however, the
foreseeability element of the minimum contacts doctrine is more
defensible as an attempt to preserve the traditional concept that
ordinarily the plaintiff, the party who initiates the lawsuit, must go
to the defendant's forum. Recognizing that a state court, bound only
by general terms such as fairness or reasonableness, is generally
likely to believe that it is a fair forum for virtually any litigation
involving its inhabitants, Woodson erects the foreseeability require-
ment as a prerequisite for state court jurisdiction. It thus attempts
to insure that a state does not ignore completely the defendant's
interest in avoiding an inconvenient forum by emphasizing the con-
siderations such as the plaintiff's right to a convenient forum and
the forum state's interest in providing relief for its citizens.
Although the new analysis does not insure that state decisions will
always be correct, it at least forces the court to consider directly
the defendant's interest in avoiding an inconvenient forum or, to use
the Woodson language, his interest in avoiding a forum where he
should reasonably not have been expected to litigate the matter.
Despite the virtues in the principles established by Shaffer and
Woodson, the actual decisions in the cases before the Court were
quite objectionable. Shaffer refused to allow Delaware to use its
sequestration statute to establish jurisdiction in a shareholder's
derivative action over the officers and directors of a corporation that
chose Delaware as the state of incorporation. In the light of the
many benefits that Delaware corporation law accords to officers and
directors of its corporations,477 a decision that such persons have not
476. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 141(e), 143, 145 & 326 (1974) (directors pro-
tected from personal liability when they rely in good faith on corporate books; corpora-
tion can make loans to corporate officers; corporation may indemnify officers and direc-
tors for legal fees incurred in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation; and corporate officer may, in some cases, recover
against the corporations amounts paid in judgments in which the corporation is jointly
liable). Of course, the benefits that inure to the corporation are legion. See generally
E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
(1972); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967,
117 U. PA. REV. 861 (1969).
477. 433 U.S. at 216.
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received sufficient benefits from Delaware law to allow the state to
exercise jurisdiction over them in a lawsuit directly related to their
status as corporate fiduciaries seems little short of incredible, and it
is a position never clearly adopted by the majority. But the alter-
native argument (manifested in the majority emphasis on Delaware's
failure to adopt a specific statute conferring in personam jurisdic-
tion in shareholder derivative actions... and in Mr. Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion 79) suggesting that the Delaware statute failed
the foreseeability test because the defendants could not reasonably
foresee that Delaware would allow the use of its general sequestra-
tion statute to exercise jurisdiciton over them in shareholder deriva-
tive actions, is equally unpersuasive. In fact, providing a means for
exercising jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries in shareholder
derivative actions, and applying Delaware's substantive law to
establish the liability of corporate fiduciaries who generally own
substantial blocks of the corporate stock, had long been principal
purposes of the Delaware sequestration statute. To hold that the
use of the sequestration statute for precisely this purpose is unfore-
seeable is to permit the fiduciaries to wear blindfolds by permit-
ting them to foresee only those applications of Delaware law that
are found in the corporation code. Fortunately, however, the specific
impact of this narrow approach should be short-lived; Delaware now
has passed a statute expressly conferring jurisdiction over cor-
porate fiduciaries in shareholder derivative actions.80 Since the
foreseeability obstacle has been eliminated, the Court should resolve
the fairness or reasonableness aspect of the minimum contacts prin-
ciple in favor of jurisdiction.
Perhaps more disturbing is the Court's application of the
foreseeability requirement in Woodson. Indeed, one can argue that
it reflects the very defect that the Court tried to eliminate in Shaf-
fer-deciding the jurisdictional issue on the basis of artificial legal
conceptions distinguishing sellers, distributors, importers, and
manufacturers rather than on a realistic analysis of the underlying
economic relationships. Limiting a defendant seller's amenability to
suit to the specific state or states he serves creates at least three
unnecessary risks. First, nothing in the Woodson opinion limits it to
the precise situation involved there, a suit filed against the vendor
478. Id. at 217-19.
479. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch.
1972).
480. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1978). See generally Stargatt, The New
Delaware Director-Consent-to-Service Statute, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 217 (1978). See
Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978) (recent state decisions
upholding jurisdiction over nonresident directors in a shareholder's derivative suit).
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of a consumer good by the purchaser who took it to a state that the
vendor did not serve. Thus, Woodson apparently also bars a suit by
an innocent third party who might be injured by a defect in the prod-
uct, a result that seems particularly unfair because it forces a
plaintiff, whose activities are localized entirely in the state where
the injury occurred, to go to the place of business of a vendor who
sells automobiles that are virtually certain to be used outside of the
particular market that the vendor serves.481 Second, it may force a
plaintiff who admittedly is injured in an accident, but is doubtful as
to whether the proximate cause of the injury was a defective prod-
uct or the negligence of a third party, to litigate his claims in alter-
nate forums, and thereby run the risk of securing no recovery
because the two forums reach inconsistent results, each concluding
that the party over which it lacked jurisdiction was responsible for
the accident. Fortunately, the practical application of this possibility
will be relatively small since successful products liability actions
against the manufacturer are more likely than those against the
seller; but if the Court's small progress in Shaffer receives accom-
modation, the possibility of an occasional injustice permitted by
Woodson is equally deserving of condemnation. Third, Woodson's
narrow definition of foreseeability might mean that consumers will
forego assertion of their legal rights in non-tort situations such as
warranty claims because the cost of returning to the state where
the sale took place is too great in light of the relatively limited
amount of the potential recovery. In effect, Woodson reflects an
extreme insensitivity to the modern consumer economy by enhanc-
ing the already considerable disparity in economic power between
consumer and seller.
A far preferable test of foreseeability for consumer transactions
would define the limits of the vendor's liability in terms of locations
where he could reasonably expect the product to be taken and used.
So long as the alleged injury occurred in such a location, the plain-
tiff could require the defendant to litigate his potential liability in
the place where the alleged injury occurred. This approach would
solve the difficulties inherent in the Woodson approach, and the
burden it imposes on the vendor would not be an intolerable one. Of
course, litigating in a far-off forum might be inconvenient for the
defendant, but the cost of such litigation presumably would be
spread over all consumers (through an appropriate adjustment in
price48 ) rather than placed totally on the particular consumer who
481. Accord, von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 260, at 1172. But see
Developments, supra note 156, at 929-30.
482. Of course, if a particular seller were unable to pass the cost on to his
customers, he might be forced to accept a lower profit margin or perhaps to go out of
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has experienced difficulty with the product. Some situations still
would present difficulty because determining where a particular prod-
uct foreseeably might be used would depend on a variety of factors;
but the expanded approach at least would have the virtue of follow-
ing International Shoe's vision of using economic reality, not legal
conceptualism, to define the limits of a state court's jurisdiction.
Less objectionable than the applications of the minimum con-
tacts principle in Shaffer and Woodson are its applications in Kulko
and Rush.83 Kulko, of course, concerns liability arising out of a per-
sonal relationship rather than a commercial one; thus, allowing
jurisdiction over the defendant would not permit any more equitable
spreading of the cost of litigation. Moreover, the state seeking to
establish jurisdiction is not attempting to impose liability on the
defendant resulting from actions he took within the forum state, nor
should the consent to a shift in custody to the parent in the forum
state be regarded as the practical equivalent of such in-state acts.
Even if one could overcome the substantial argument that a person
could not be expected to foresee that this action would have the ef-
fect of conferring jurisdiction on the state to which the child was
permitted to go, adopting such a rule would run counter to the cur-
rent substantive policy of basing custody decisions on the best in-
terests of the child. 84 If agreeing to such a change in custody were
adequate to confer support jurisdiction on a far-away forum to which
a former spouse moved, the parent with legal custody would have a
strong financial disincentive to permit such a change even when the
change served the child's best interest. Finally, one should not ig-
nore the existence of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act, which makes it less costly for the plaintiff to secure judg-
ment in the defendant's forum than for the defendant to travel to
the forum chosen by the plaintiff. All in all, the Kulko plaintiff
presented no compelling argument for disturbing the customary rule
that the plaintiff must travel to the defendant's forum.
business. Such individual difficulties, however, merely would reflect an inability to
bear all of the costs associated with a particular business.
483. See notes 306-19, supra, and accompanying text.
484. See, e.g., Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1980 Supp.); Mast v. Mast, 95 Idaho 537,
511 P.2d 819 (1973); Louisiana: LA. CiV. CODE art. 157; Howard v. Howard, 339 So. 2d
1275 (La. 1976); New York: N.Y. [DoM. REL.] LAW § 70 (1977); Opferbeck v. Opferbeck,
57 A.D.2d 1074, 395 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1977); Texas: TEXAS [FAM.] CODE ANN. § 14.07 (1975
& 1980); Fergus v. Fergus, 547 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1977). A recent article
has traced the development of the best interests of the child standard during the first
half of the nineteenth century. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American




A similar conclusion is justified with respect to the Supreme
Court's refusal to accept insurance-attachment jurisdiction in Rush.
Analytically, the attempt to assert jurisdiction in Rush was
unacceptable because the individual tortfeasor, who under Shaffer
had to have sufficient contacts to satisfy the minimum contacts
standard, had no connection with the forum state. Nor should one
accept the superficially attractive appeal to economic reality-the
argument that the insurance attachment cases really only involve
the equivalent of a direct action against insurance companies, which
are the defendants as a practical matter in modern tort litigation.
The argument is ultimately unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it
simply is not true that a person named as a defendant has no signifi-
cant interest in the litigation. The most obvious problems of inade-
quate coverage or multiple exposure probably could be handled by
an appropriate protective order, but securing such an order could in-
volve considerable inconvenience, and possibly expense, for the
plaintiff. Moreover, so long as tort liability is based on fault, a defen-
dant may have non-economic interests such as professional pride or
personal morality in avoiding a judgment that his fault caused injury
to another. Second, the direct action analogy is an inapplicable one
because none of the states that have attempted to exercise insur-
ance-attachment jurisdiction permitted direct actions against the
insurers of their own residents; thus, insofar as the insurance-
attachment jurisdiction is the functional equivalent of a direct action
statute, it represents an unreasonable attempt to grant plaintiffs
who sue out-of-state tortfeasors a special procedural advantage that
the state refuses to accord plaintiffs suing resident tortfeasors.'85
In the divorce and custody cases, the fundamental error of the
twentieth-century cases has been the failure to establish the due
process clause as a significant standard for judging when a state can
exercise jurisdiction. In fact, the emasculation of the due process
clause seems to be a historical anomaly. It originated with
Haddock's attempt to limit a state's ability to grant divorces to its
domiciliaries, but the Court failed to reestablish due process limits
when it repudiated Haddock in Williams L' But whatever its
origins, the disparity between due process and full faith and credit
standards can be justified only by accepting Pennoyer's nineteenth-
century view of American society and ignoring the fundamental
485. But see Leathers, supra note 460, at 918-20. It is interesting to note that many
of the decisions establishing the early exceptions to Pennoyer's territorial principal
emphasized that the exceptions did not impose special burdens on nonresident defen-
dants, but merely treated them like resident defendants. E.g. Hess v. Pawlowski, 274
U.S. 352, 356 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916).
486. See Corwin, supra note 1, at 349-50.
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transformation in our economic and social system that has led to the
acceptance of the minimum contacts principle as establishing the
constitutional standard for defining the limits of state court jurisdic-
tion under both clauses. In light of Shaffer, the Court should
reassert the due process clause as a meaningful limitation in the
status cases by adopting the minimum contacts principle. As sug-
gested above, this doctrinal development would permit a coherent
framework for reconciling most of the existing precedents and per-
mitting an orderly doctrinal development in the future.
Needless to say, bringing the status cases under the minimum
contacts umbrella would not eliminate all uncertainties and ambigui-
ties. Custody decrees, for example, are likely to remain subject to
change, so long as our society regards the evils of relitigation less
than the evils of continuing a custody arrangement that does not
serve the best interests of the child. But adopting the minimum con-
tacts standard would have the virtue of establishing a standard appro-
priate to the purpose that jurisdictional limits can reasonably serve:
assuring that a defendant is bound by judgment only if litigation is
conducted in a forum where it was reasonable to expect him to
litigate the matter. To the extent that the Court desires to control
the substantive law applicable to the dispute, as, for example, it has
in the past tried to preclude states with liberal divorce laws from
divorcing persons from states where divorce laws are more strict,87
it should do so by constitutionalizing the substantive conflict of law
rules;88 for if history is any guide, the attempt to impose such
limitations on jurisdictional authority of a state's courts merely will
confuse jurisdictional doctrine without achieving the substantive
purposes that were intended.
CONCLUSION
The development of jurisdictional concepts that is outlined in
this article provides an intriguing illustration of the historicity of
legal doctrine, or to put it another way, the possibility in a case law
system of judicial adaptations of legal concepts to meet perceived
changes in the reality of economic and social relationships.' 8 Indeed,
487. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Cf. Developments, supra note
156, at 976 (suggesting that state courts be allowed to exercise divorce jurisdiction
over nondomiciliaries if they apply the substantive law of one party's domicile).
488. A recent decision indicates that the Supreme Court remains reluctant to
establish constitutional limits that would restrict a state court's power to choose what
substantive law is to apply in a lawsuit over which the court has jurisdiction. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
489. For a more systematic attempt to relate jurisdiction to the whole of American
history, see Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi
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one reason that jurisdiction (absent the aberration with respect to
status) remains such an important part of the first-year course in
civil procedure in most law schools may be the comparative rarity of
such "pure" case-law developments in the legislation-dominated
twentieth century. Not only does a study of the evolution of jurisdic-
tion demonstrate how judges mold the law over time, but the inter-
related nature of the various changes forces the students to develop
skills of analysis, analogy, and classification that will enable them to
test the consequences that changing a particular jurisdictional rule
has for the underlying theory that supposedly guides the develop-
ment of the particular rules. Finally, the modern minimum contacts
approach to jurisdictional problems introduces the student to the
balancing concept, the weighing of various functional factors, which
is so much. a part of contemporary doctrine."'
Seen in a more comprehensive framework, the growth of jurisdic-
tional doctrine provides a summary in microcosm of important general
themes in the development of modern American legal thought. 91 The
origins of the doctrine are manifested in the formalism of the late
nineteenth century, which accepted certain distinctions (e.g., in per-
sonam v. in rem; direct v. indirect) as axiomatic and self-defining.92
But the rapid changes of the twentieth century rendered increas-
ingly archaic not only these distinctions, but also the underlying con-
cept on which they were based: the territorial autonomy of the
American states. At first, the law responded by creating exceptions
without altering the theory; it invented legal fictions (most commonly
in the form of implied consent) that forced a new reality into the
in Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147. This phenomenon is not con-
fined, of course, to judicial development of the contours of the vague due process
clause. It is a common feature attribute of doctrinal development that the author has
traced in other areas of constitutional interpretation, see Murchison, Toward a
Perspective on the Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORY L.J. 469 (1978), as well as in non-
constitutional areas. See Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts:
Emergence of a Legal Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J. 211 (1976).
490. The quintessent expositor of the balancing approach was Benjamin Cardozo.
See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 544 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting);
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1927).
491. The analytical framework for this concluding section is not original. The
writer borrowed it from the materials presented at a National Endowment for the
Humanities seminar led by Professor Morton Horwitz of Harvard University. Pro-
fessor Horwitz thus derserves credit for any insights offered by this analysis although
he is not responsible for any errors in the specific application of his analytical
framework made herein.
492. Cf. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (distinction between
interstate and intrastate commerce). See Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
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traditional framework. As the chasm between theory and decided
cases widened, legal realism-the distinctive American legal philos-
ophy of the twentieth century-began to exert its classic argument
that courts and scholars should focus on the actual decisions rather
than the nominal superstructure; that is, the "ought" of jurisdic-
tional theory should be developed from a careful examination of the
"is" of twentieth century decisions.49
In International Shoe the Supreme Court embraced the realistic
argument and adopted the minimum contacts standard as a way of
explaining "more realistically" the actual standards applied in
previous decisions.494 The initial impact of the triumph of legal
realism was an expansion of the ability of consumers, shareholders,
and tort plaintiffs to force out-of-state defendants to come to the
forum chosen by the plaintiff, an expansion that, except for the Han-
son exception, continued for three decades. But the malleability of
judicial decisions did not end with International Shoe, and in its
most recent decisions the Court has transformed the expansive non-
doctrine of International Shoe-the appeal to convenience and
fairness-into a new theory to govern all assertions of state court
jurisdiction. As was true with the theory originally articulated in
Pennoyer, the aim of the new theory was not to expand the limits of
jurisdiction, but to define and thus to limit the ability of states to
issue binding judgments against out-of-state defendants.
Naturally, the new framework is not completely confining and
may permit expansion of jurisdiction in some areas such as status
jurisdiction. Nor should one expect this or any other legal theory to
alter the legal system in a manner substantially out of accord with
the national character of American society. But the central thrust of
recent decisions is to limit jurisdiction; as a specific example, resur-
recting the language of territoriality to establish a new requirement
of foreseeability in lawsuits against corporations reflects an increased
willingness to allow the cost of litigation to be borne by the individ-
ual plaintiff, rather than spread among all consumers by making the
corporation bear the expense of cost of doing business. 95
493. The literature of legal realism is, of course, voluminous, but a few of the
classic articles deserve mention. E.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM.
L. SCHOOL REV. 1063 (1934); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931). See also White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-
Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
494. 326 U.S. at 318.
495. Indeed, one might argue coherently that insensitivity to the realities of a con-
sumer economy has been a consistent characteristic of the Burger Court. See, e.g.,
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In a very real sense the recent transformation of International
Shoe's principle for expanding jurisdiction into a device for limiting
the authority of state courts is the reflection of a profoundly con-
servative element in legal realism, which usually is described as a
radical legal philosophy. Although focusing on the "is" of decided
cases to derive the "ought" for a theoretical framework initially may
permit the overruling of older decisions that are inconsistent with
the "real" trend of recent cases, it offers no standard for judging
whether the realism of recent decisions conforms to existing social
reality or whether another approach would produce more socially
desirable results. ' " Nor can the use of words like "reasonableness"
or "fairness" satisfy the need for an external moral standard
because such terms must derive their meaning from some substan-
tive view of a just society. Without such a view, one lacks any effec-
tive basis to criticize the "is" (that is, the status quo), and the "is"
itself becomes normative. This pattern is one that jurisdictional
opinions reflect; International Shoe's "realistic" description of the
"is" (how the Court had resolved the jurisdictional issues in earlier
decisions) becomes in Hanson, Shaffer, and Woodson the "ought" or
the substantive standard that limits future attempts to expand juris-
diction.
Understanding this conservative tendency does not deny the
considerable utility of realism. If a goal of legal thought is to guide
decision-making, judging the value of any theoretical framework
requires an evaluation of how well it explains prior decisions and offers
a usable approach to future decisions. But by making harmonization
of the precedents along the ultimate goal of legal theory, one does
not eliminate normative values from decision-making; one simply
ascribes normative value to the status quo.'91 The development of
jurisdictional theory illustrates the consequences of the failure to
articulate the normative values that the theory is to serve. Without
such a substantive standard, disputes about which theory best
serves "reasonableness" or "fairness" are ultimately unresolvable,
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private sale of stored goods by
warehouseman does not constitute state action); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974) (Louisiana statute authorizing sequestration of property without a prior
hearing does not violate procedural due process guarantees); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S., 332 (1969) (claimants in class action may not aggregate their claims to satisfy the
amount in controversy requirements).
496. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 461-62 (1934). See Dan-
zig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STANFORD
L. REV. 621 (1975).
497. Ignoring this point seems to be the fundamental error of those who insisted on
"neutral principles" to guide all constitutional adjudication. See generally Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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and the modern balancing approach can lead almost inexorably to
legitimizing the economic and social power of existing society.9 8 If
law is to serve broader goals and to establish standards by which
the exercise of legal power is to be judged, a principal task of the
legal scholar is to articulate the goals that society should pursue and
thus to provide external standards by which the existing legal
regime can be judged.
498. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v. (1978):
Equally fundamental is my belief that the conventional ways even of stating the
choices between greater freedom or equality, on the one hand, and greater
governmental power, on the other hand-and particularly the conventional
emphasis on 'balancing interests' as the statesmanlike method of making such
choices-are remarkably unilluminating as well as misleadingly ahistorical.
(Emphasis in original).

